A. H. Belo & Co. v. Smith

• Decision Date: 18 November 1897
• Citation: 42 S.W. 850
• Parties: A. H. BELO & CO. v. SMITH.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 850

42 S.W. 850

A. H. BELO & CO. v. SMITH.

Supreme Court of Texas.

November 18, 1897.

Error to court of civil appeals of Second supreme judicial district.

Action by C. R. Smith against A. H. Belo & Co., a corporation. There was a judgment of the court of civil appeals (40 S. W. 856) affirming a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Willie, Campbell & Ballinger, for plaintiff in error. Stuart & Bell and Davis & Garnett, for defendant in error.

GAINES, C. J.

This suit was brought by defendant in error to recover of plaintiff in error, a corporation, damages for an alleged libelous publication which appeared in the Dallas News and the Galveston News, two newspapers published by the latter. The plaintiff, in the trial court, recovered there a judgment, which was affirmed in the court of civil appeals. A writ of error has been granted, and the case has been submitted, together with a motion to dismiss the writ for want of jurisdiction.

We considered the question of jurisdiction before we granted the writ; but, upon examining the argument filed in support of the motion, we find more difficulty in determining the point than we then apprehended. The statute which defines the jurisdiction of the court of civil appeals provides that the judgment of that court shall be final in "(1) any civil case appealed from a county court or from a district court when under the constitution a county court would have had original or appellate jurisdiction to try it, except in probate matters and in cases involving the revenue laws of the state or the validity of a statute; (2) all cases of boundary; (3) all cases of slander and divorce; (4) all cases of contested elections of every character other than for state officers, except where the validity of the statute is attacked by the decision." Rev. St. 1895, art. 996. The question is: Does the word "slander," as used in the article, include within its meaning actions for libel? The authorities leave but little doubt that at an early day in the history of the common law the term was applied both to oral and written defamations of character. Starkie, Sland. & L. 3, and authorities there quoted. But we think it equally clear that in modern usage it is applied to oral defamation only. This is the case in its technical use as well as in its common acceptation. Looking to the reason of the provision, we are of opinion that the legislature may have considered that there was good ground for allowing a writ of error in cases of written, and for denying it in cases or oral, defamation. Publications libelous per se were at common law punished as public wrongs; not so with slander. Under our statute, most libels are made penal offenses against the state, while only oral defamation which falsely imputes a want of chastity to a female is made a penal offense. Libels not infrequently involve questions which affect the liberty of the press, and which, therefore, are of great public importance. Written defamation is in its nature lasting, and may be read by many, while oral defamation is ordinarily heard by but few persons. It is obvious, therefore, that in the former the injury is likely to be more serious, and the damages greater. For these reasons, we are of opinion that the legislature, in the article quoted from, used the word "slander" in its more restricted sense, and conclude that we have jurisdiction of the case....