H. L. Carpel Of Richmond Inc v. City Of Richmond
Citation | 175 S.E. 316 |
Parties | H. L. CARPEL OF RICHMOND, Inc. v. CITY OF RICHMOND. |
Decision Date | 14 June 1934 |
Court | Supreme Court of Virginia |
Error to Hustings Court of Richmond.
Prosecution by the City of Richmond against H. L. Carpel of Richmond, Inc., for violation of city ordinance. Judgment of the police justice finding defendant guilty and imposing a fine was affirmed by the Hustings Court of the city of Richmond, and defendant brings error.
Affirmed.
Argued before CAMPBELL, C. J., and HOLT, EPES, HUD GINS, GREGORY, BROWNING, and CHINN, JJ.
Leon M. Bazile and Alfred J. Kirsh, both of Richmond, for appellant.
James E. Cannon, W. W. Martin, and Henry R. Miller, Jr., all of Richmond, for appellee.
This summons was executed on August 10, 1932:
In due course it came on to be heard, and on August 24, 1932, the defendant (plaintiff in error) was found guilty and there was imposed upon him a fine of $5, costs $1. He appealed to the hustings court of the city of Richmond, which on the 2Sth of November, 1932. affirmed the judgment of the police justice, and that judgment is now before us on a writ of error.
[I] The defendant contends that the ordinance under which this fine is imposed is unconstitutional and void as being in conflict with section 1 of article 14 of the amendments to the Federal Constitution and sections 1 and 63 and 64 of the Constitution of Virginia.
This is the ordinance under which the city claims:
Pertinent facts are set forth in an agreement which reads:
The ordinance assailed is authorized by section 192a of the Tax Code (Code 1930, Appendix, p. 2182).
The right to assess peddlers with a license tax, so long as it is done in good faith, is perfectly plain. Myer's Case, 92 Va. 809, 23 S. E. 915, 31 L. R. A. 379. It rests both in the power to tax and in the police power.
The statute tells us who are peddlers.
"Any person who shall carry from place to place, any goods, wares or merchandise, and offer to sell or barter the same, or actually sell or barter the same, shall be deemed to be a peddler. * * * " Tax Code, § 192.
The right to classify and to exempt is widely recognized both in this country and in England.
People v. Sawyer, 106 Mich. 428, 64 N. W. 333.
This power has been exercised by our Legislature certainly for more than a century.
"No hawker or pedlar shall offer for sale or barter in any county or corporation within this commonwealth, any tin or pewter ware, or any other goods, wares or merchandise, not of his or her manufacture within this commonwealth; unless such person or persons shall ha, e previously paid the tax imposed by law, and obtained a license therefor * * *" Supplement to the Revised Code, p. 327 (act passed Feb. 24, 1823).
"No person shall, without a license, act as a hawker or pedlar in selling or trading in goods, wares, merchandize or other articles, except cotton yarns, and except articles manufactured by the seller in this state, or provisions or agricultural commodities grownor produced in the United States." Code 1849, c. 38, p. 210, § 30.
"The specific license tax on every person, for the privilege of peddling and bartering, shall be fifty dollars; but no resident mechanic or manufacturer, except a manufacturer of ardent spirits or malt liquors, shall be taxed for the privilege of peddling or bartering articles manufactured by himself in this state." Code 1873, p. 355, § 22.
By act approved May 20, 1903, Acts of Assembly 1902-03-04, c. 313, p. 533, it is declared that: "Nothing under this or the preceding section shall be construed to require of any farmer a peddler's license for the privilege of selling or peddling farm products, wood, or charcoal grown or produced by him."
Other instances might be added, but these are enough to show that a license has never been required for the sale of every conceivable article.
As we shall see, this case turns upon classification, and classification, unless essentially arbitrary, rests in the judgment of the Legislature.
State Board of Tax Commissioners of Indiana v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 51 S. Ct. 540, 543, 75 L. Ed. 1248, 73 A. L. R. 1464, is a case in which a license tax on chain stores was involved. The court said:
"One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary." Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 31 S. Ct. 337, 340, 55 L. Ed. 369, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160.
In Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 53 S. Ct. 481, 483, 77 L. Ed. 929, 85 A. L. R. 699, it was said that "the Legislature may make the difference in method and character of the business the basis of classification for taxation." See, also, Richmond Linen Supply Co. v. City of Lynchburg, 160 Va. 644, 169 S. E. 554; Bryce v. Gillespie, 160 Va. 137, 168 S. E. 653; Farmers', etc., Ins. Asso. v. Horton, 157 Va. 114, 160 S. E. 315; Martin's Ex'rs v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 603 102 S. E. 77, 724...
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