H. W. Houston Const. Co. v. District Court of Tenth Judicial Dist.
| Decision Date | 26 May 1981 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 81SA72 and 81SA78,s. 81SA72 and 81SA78 |
| Parties | H. W. HOUSTON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Petitioner, v. The DISTRICT COURT OF the TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, State of Colorado, the Honorable Richard D. Robb, Respondent. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF PUEBLO, Petitioner, v. The DISTRICT COURT OF the TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, State of Colorado, the Honorable Richard D. Robb, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Melat & Wheeler, Jeffrey R. Wheeler, Colorado Springs, for petitioner Board of County Commissioners of Pueblo County.
Lee N. Sternal, P. C., Pueblo, for respondent.
Rector, Retherford, Mullen & Johnson, L. Dan Rector, Colorado Springs, for petitioner H. W. Houston Const. Co.
In this original proceeding, separate petitions in the nature of prohibition pursuant to C.A.R. 21 were filed by petitioners who were the defendants in the trial court. We have consolidated the petitions for the purpose of this opinion. We issued our rule to show cause why the relief prayed for should not be granted. We now discharge the rule in part and make the rule absolute in part.
On July 5, 1978, a cement mixer owned by Fountain Sand and Gravel Company (Fountain) was damaged in a construction site accident. The driver of the truck, an employee of Fountain, was injured in the accident.
On October 4, 1979, Fountain filed a negligence action against the Board of County Commissioners of Pueblo County (Pueblo) and H. W. Houston Construction Company (Houston), alleging that Pueblo and Houston were responsible for the property damage to Fountain's truck. The complaint sought damages in the amount of $5,642.09.
A pretrial conference was held on December 30, 1980, and all parties stipulated that Fountain had incurred property damage to its cement truck in the amount of $5,642.09.
Some time prior to January 9, 1981, the attorneys for the parties apparently had reached a compromise and settlement of Fountain's claim against Houston and Pueblo. Houston and Pueblo each tendered a $2,500 check to Fountain to settle its property damage claim. They also tendered a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice pursuant to C.R.C.P. 41(a)(1)(B) and a general release form of all liability.
Fountain's attorney refused to execute the stipulation for dismissal and informed his clients that he would not allow them to accept the compromise and settlement. He explained that when the general release form was tendered he refused to execute it since he had understood the settlement to be of property damages only. Subsequent discussions with Fountain's officers had indicated that the driver of the cement truck, who had also been injured, had been paid $24,673.40 Workmen's Compensation benefits by Fountain, which was self-insured under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Fountain's attorney informed the attorneys for Pueblo and Houston that one of two courses could be followed: first, Fountain would retain the $5,000 tendered and would execute a limited release of its claim for property damage only; or, second, in the alternative, Fountain would return the $5,000 and go to trial on its claim for property damage and its claim for reimbursement of the Workmen's Compensation benefits in the amount of $24,673.40 paid to its injured employee. Pueblo and Houston rejected these offers, preferring instead to attempt to have the "agreement" enforced as a settlement of all claims arising out of the incident.
When no course of action could be agreed upon by the parties, Fountain sought leave to amend its complaint to include the personal injury claim. After a hearing, the district court allowed Fountain to amend its complaint to include the personal injury claim. The court concluded that the parties had intended to compromise and settle only the property damage claim and that the compromise and settlement was binding upon the parties. The trial date was postponed. On February 23, Fountain moved for entry of judgment for $5,000 on the compromise and settlement agreement. Pueblo and Houston each brought separate C.A.R. 21 petitions, seeking relief from the order of the district court. Those petitions were consolidated for consideration by this court.
We agree with the contention of Houston and Pueblo that under the circumstances of this case the district court erred in holding that the settlement and compromise, which related only to property damages, was binding on the parties.
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