Haack v. Weicken
| Decision Date | 17 December 1889 |
| Parties | HAACK v. WEICKEN et al. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Appeal from supreme court, general term, first department.
Action by Wilhelmina Haack against John Weicken and another, as executors, etc., of Heinrich A. Haack, deceased, for the reformation of a deed executed by John Albert Ropke to deceased. From a judgment affirming a judgment of the special term dismissing plaintiff's complaint on the merits, she appeals.
Matthew Hale, for appellant.
Rudolph Rabe, for respondents.
This action was brought for the reformation of a deed executed by John Albert Ropke to Heinrich A. Haack, dated the 6th day of October, 1879, conveying certain real estate in the city of New York, by inserting the name of the plaintiff as one of the grantees therein, and adjudging her to be the owner of one undivided half thereof. The trial court has found as facts that William Ropke died seised of two parcels of real estate, one situated in the city of Brooklyn, and the other in the city of New York, each valued at the sum of $20,000; that he left him surviving three daughters and one son, of which the plaintiff was one, who had become vested as tenants in common of the real estate so left by him; that on or about the 6th day of October, 1879, they entered into an agreement to the effect that the lands situated in the city of Brooklyn should be conveyed to the plaintiff's brother, John Ropke, upon payment by him of the sum of $10,000 to one of the plaintiff's sisters, and that the lands situated in the city of New York should be conveyed to him, in order that the same should be conveyed by him to the plaintiff and her husband, Heinrich A. Haack, upon payment by her husband of the sum of $10,000 to the other sister; that the plaintiff's interest in the estate should remain in the New York property; that instruments in writing, intended to execute and consummate the agreement, were executed and delivered, and the sums of money so agreed were paid by John Ropke and the plaintiff's husband respectively; that the deed executed by John A. Ropke, of the New York property, pursuant to the agreement, ran to Heinrich A. Haack, the plaintiff's husband, as the sole grantee, and that the plaintiff received no consideration whatever for conveying her interest in the estate of her father to her husband; that she did not know of it until after the death of her husband, and until the month of September, 1883, but had always understood and believed that the title had been taken in the name of herself and her husband, pursuant to the agreement. The trial court further found as a fact that no mistake was made in omitting from the deed mentioned the name of the plaintiff as one of the grantees or parties of the second part; and, as conclusions of law, that it was valid and effectual as against the plaintiff, and conveyed the entire title to her husband. Exceptions were taken to the last finding of fact as well as to the conclusions of law.
There is an apparent conflict in the finding of fact to the effect that there was no mistake in omitting from the deed the name of the plaintiff, with the findings that precede it. It is our duty to see if they can be reconciled. Green v. Roworth, 113 N. Y. 462, 21 N. E. Rep. 165. We have therefore examined the case with some care, for the purpose of determining what was intended by the trial court in making this finding. Upon referring to the requests to find which were submitted by the plaintiff, the trial court repeated the finding of the partition agreement of the children of William Ropke, and that the conveyance was to be made by them to John Ropke, and that he was to convey the New York property to the plaintiff and her husband upon the payment by the husband of the sum of $10,000 to one of the sisters, ‘and that the plaintiff's interest in the said estate should remain in said New York property;’ and that the instruments in writing intended to execute and consummate the agreement were executed and delivered, etc.,-thus finding that, so far as John Ropke was concerned, that he executed the deed with the intention and for the purpose of carrying out the agreement. Upon referring to the evidence, we find that there was no dispute about the agreement; that all of the children understood it alike; that John Ropke understood that he was to convey to the plaintiff and to her husband, and that the plaintiff's $10,000 was to stay in the property along with her husband, and that in executing the deed he did not stop to read it. The agreement was so understood by Mr. Morgan, the executor of William Ropke, and he appears to have instructed Mr. Bradshaw to draw the deeds in conformity therewith. It seems that Mr. Bradshaw so understoodthe agreement, but he omitted the name of Mrs. Haack from the deed, because her husband stated to him that ‘he wanted that portion to his wife fixed so it vested in him.’ He testified, however, that Mrs. Haack was not present, and that he did not consult her to see whether the arrangement was according to her wishes; that he did not ask any questions, but thought that Mr. Haack was a pretty clear-headed fellow, and was taking good care of himself to vest himself with the property. The trial court, in its opinion, restates the agreement as made between the children of Ropke, and that the plaintiff was to take title to the New York property with her husband, and then refers to the direction of the plaintiff's husband to the conveyancer to draw the deed so that the property would vest in him, and upon this fact appears to have based the conclusion that the idea of a mistake in the transaction could not be upheld. So that, as we understand, the intention and meaning of the trial court, in finding that there was no mistake in omitting from the deed the name of the plaintiff, means that there was no mistake so far as the plaintiff's husband was concerned. This construction removes the conflict that otherwise would exist between the findings of fact as made, and brings them into harmony with the testimony given.
It next becomes important to consider the interest of Ropke, the grantor, and his relation to the parties. As we have seen, he was the brother of the plaintiff, and one of the four tenants in common in the New York and Brooklyn property, of which his father had died seised. They had agreed upon a partition of the property between them. The sisters had joined in a deed to him with the understanding and agreement that he was to convey the New York property to the plaintiff and her husband, upon the payment by the husband of $10,000 to one of the sisters; that the plaintiff's interest was to remain in the New York property. The plaintiff, as one of the four children of William Ropke, was seised of a one-fourth interest in the real estate in New York and Brooklyn. Under the partition agreement, she was to convey her interest in the Brooklyn property to her brother, and her entire interest in the real estate was to vest in the New York property, which would make her interest in that property an undivided one-half. John Ropke, in taking the title to the New York property under the agreement to reconvey, became merely a trustee for that purpose. He was the mere conduit through whom the title was transferred. He had no authority or right to change the contract, and convey to other person or persons than those agreed upon. Stehlin v. Golding, 15 N. Y. St. Rep. 814; Stow v. Tifft, 15 Johns. 458; 1 Washb. Real Prop. 176. The agreement was with the plaintiff, his sister, to convey to her an undivided one-half. Instructions to that effect were given to the scrivener, and the deed was executed by Ropke with the intention and for the...
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