Haag v. Barnes
| Citation | 175 N.E.2d 441,216 N.Y.S.2d 65,9 N.Y.2d 554 |
| Parties | , 175 N.E.2d 441, 87 A.L.R.2d 1301 Dorothy HAAG, Also Known as Dorothy Hawthorne, Appellant, v. Norman BARNES, Respondent. |
| Decision Date | 18 May 1961 |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals |
Alfred A. Rosen, New York City, for appellant.
Phoenix Ingraham, New York City, for respondent.
This appeal is concerned with the effect in New York of an agreement made in another State for the support of a child born out of wedlock.
The complainant Dorothy Haag alleges that in 1947 she moved from Minnesota and took up residence in New York City and that since then she has been a resident of this State. The defendant Norman Barnes, on the other hand, is now and was, during the period involved in this litigation, a resident of Illinois.
According to the statements contained in the complainant's affidavits, she met the defendant in the spring of 1954 in New York. She was a law secretary and had been hired by the defendant through an agency to do work for him while he was in New York on one of his business trips. The relationship between the man and the girl soon 'ripened into friendship' and, on the basis of representations that he loved her and planned to divorce his wife and marry her, she was 'importuned' into having sexual relations with him.
The complainant further alleges that she became pregnant as a result of having sexual relations with the defendant and that, upon being informed of this, he asked her to move to Illinois to be near him. She refused and, instead, went to live in California with her sister to await the birth of her child. Fearing that the defendant was losing interest in her, however, she returned to Chicago before the child was born and, upon attempting to communicate with the defendant, was referred to his attorney. The latter told Dorothy to choose a hospital in Chicago, which she did, and the baby was born there in December, 1955, the defendant paying the expenses.
Shortly after the birth of the child, her attempts to see the defendant in New York failed and she was advised by his attorney to return to Chicago in order that an agreement might be made for the support of her and her child. Returning to that city, she procured an attorney, recommended by a friend in New York, and signed an agreement on January 12, 1956. The agreement provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
1. It recites payment to the complainant by the defendant of $2,000 between September, 1955 and January, 1956 and a willingness on his part to support her child in the future, on condition that such payments 'shall not constitute an admission' that he is the child's father;
2. The defendant promises to pay $50 a week and $75 a month, i. e., a total of $275 a month, 'continuing while (the child) is alive and until she attains the age of sixteen years';
3. The complainant agrees 'to properly support, maintain, educate, and care for (the child)';
4. The complainant agrees to keep the child in Illinois for at least two years, except if she marries within that period;
5. The complainant 'remise(s), release(s) and forever discharge(s) Norman Barnes * * * from all manner of actions * * * which (she) now has against (him) or ever had or which she * * * hereafter can, shall or may have, for, upon or by reason of any matter, cause or thing whatsoever * * * including * * * the support of (the child)'; and
6. The parties agree that their agreement 'shall in all respects be interpreted, construed and governed by the laws of the State of Illinois'.
Shortly after the agreement was signed, the complainant received permission, pursuant to one of its provisions, to live in California where she remained for two years. She then returned to New York where she and her child have ever since been supported by the defendant in full compliance with the terms of his agreement. In fact, he has provided sums far in excess of his agreement; all told, we were informed on oral argument, the defendant has paid the complainant some $30,000.
The present proceeding was instituted in 1959 by the service of a complaint and the defendant was thereafter arrested pursuant to section 64 of the New York City Criminal Courts Act. A motion, made by the defendant, to dismiss the proceeding was granted by the Court of Special Sessions and the resulting order was affirmed by the Appellate Division.
The ground urged for dismissal was that the parties had entered into an agreement providing for the support of the child which has been fully performed; that in this agreement the complainant relinquished the right to bring any action for the support of the child; and that, in any event, the action is precluded by the laws of the State of Illinois which, the parties expressly agreed, would govern their rights under the agreement. In opposition, the complainant contended that New York, not Illinois, law applies; that the agreement in question is not a sufficient basis for a motion to dismiss under either section 63 of the New York City Criminal Courts Act or section 121 of the Domestic Relations Law, since both of these provisions provide that 'An agreement or compromise made by the mother * * * shall be binding only when the court shall have determined that adequate provision has been made'; and that, even were the Illinois law to apply, it does not bar the present proceeding.
The motion to dismiss was properly granted; the complainant may not upset a support agreement which is itself perfectly consistent with the public policy of this State, which was entered into in Illinois with the understanding that it would be governed by the laws of that State and which constitutes a bar to a suit for further support under Illinois law.
The complainant is correct in her position that, since the agreement was not court approved, it may not be held to be a bar to her suit under New York internal law. (See New York City Criminal Courts Act, § 63; Domestic Relations Law, § 121.) On the other hand, it is clear that the agreement is a bar under the internal law of Illinois since it provides, in the language of that State's statute, for a 'sum not less than eight hundred dollars'. (See Ill.Rev.Stat., former ch. 17, § 18, amd. by former ch. 17, § 52 (now ch. 106 3/4, § 65).) The simple question before us, therefore, is whether the law of New York or of Illinois applies.
The traditional view was that the law governing a contract is to be determined by the intention of the parties. See Wilson v. Lewiston Mill Co., 150 N.Y. 314, 322-323, 44 N.E. 959, 961-962; Stumpf v. Hallahan, 101 App.Div. 383, 386, 91 N.Y.S. 1062, 1063, affirmed 185 N.Y. 550, 77 N.E. 1196; Grand v. Livingston, 4 App.Div. 589, 38 N.Y.S. 490, affirmed 158 N.Y. 688, 53 N.E. 1125. The more modern view is that 'the courts, instead of regarding as conclusive the parties' intention or the place of making or performance, lay...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Dynamics Corp. of America v. Intern. Harvester Co., 74 Civ. 4501.
...State of New York," and there is no issue concerning the validity of this agreement. See Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.S.2d 554, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65, 69, 175 N.E.2d 441 (1961); Levey v. Saphier, 83 Misc.2d 146, 370 N.Y.S.2d 808, 813 (Sup.Ct. 1975); Tuition Plan, Inc. v. Zicari, 70 Misc.2d 918, 335 N.Y.......
-
Don King Productions, Inc. v. Douglas
...has "the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute...." Walter E. Heller, 730 F.2d at 52 (citing Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 559, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65, 175 N.E.2d 441 (1961) and Perrin v. Pearlstein, 314 F.2d 863, 867 (2d Under this standard, the parties' choice of New York as gover......
-
Martinez v. Bloomberg LP
...clause; indeed, the alleged contract was oral. However, the state case cited in Walter E. Heller, Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65, 175 N.E.2d 441 (1961), does indicate that New York does not always honor the choice of law made by the parties, but looks to the law of the state ......
-
In re Lois/USA, Inc., Bankruptcy No. 99 B 45910(REG)
...when the "most significant contacts" with the matter in dispute are in another state. Id.67See also Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 559, 175 N.E.2d 441, 443, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65, 68 (1961) (stating "traditional view" was that law governing a contract is to be determined by the intention of the pa......
-
Annual Brainerd Currie Lecture: How Modern Choice of Law Helped to Kill the Private Attorney General
...a divorce agreement case for a "grouping of contacts" theory that chose the law of the state that was more interested); Haag v. Barnes, 175 N.E.2d 441, 444 (N.Y. 1961) (using significant contacts test for contract dispute for child support); Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284-85 (N.Y. ......
-
Conflict of Laws Structure and Vision: Updating a Venerable Discipline
...beyond analytical puzzles and requires a forum court to evaluate and understand a foreign value system). 47. See, e.g., Haag v. Barnes, 175 N.E.2d 441, 444 (N.Y. 1961). The Center of Gravity approach is seen as a transition between the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws and more develo......
-
Mo Zhang, Party Autonomy and Beyond: an International Perspective of Contractual Choice of Law
...of the jurisdictions whose substantive law might be applicable. See Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101-02 (N.Y. 1954); Haag v. Barnes, 175 N.E.2d 441, 443-44 (N.Y. 1961). In Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom Inc., the New York Court of Appeals applied interest analysis in determin......