Haarhuis v. Cheek
Decision Date | 19 September 2017 |
Docket Number | No. COA16-961,COA16-961 |
Citation | 255 N.C.App. 471,805 S.E.2d 720 |
Parties | Joris HAARHUIS, Administrator of the Estate of Julie Haarhuis (Deceased), Plaintiff, v. Emily CHEEK, Defendant. |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Copeley Johnson & Groninger PLLC, Durham, by Leto Copeley, White & Stradley PLLC, Raleigh, by J. David Stradley and Robert P. Holmes, and Patterson Harkavy LLP, Chapel Hill, by Narendra K. Ghosh, for the Plaintiff-Appellee.
Burton, Sue & Anderson, LLP, Greensboro, by Walter K. Burton, Stephanie W. Anderson, and Cam A. Bordman, for the Defendant-Appellant.
Emily Cheek ("Defendant") appeals from a jury verdict awarding Joris Haarhuis ("Plaintiff") compensatory and punitive damages for the wrongful death of Plaintiff's wife, and from an order by the trial court denying Defendant's motion for a new trial. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant to recover both compensatory and punitive damages for the wrongful death of his wife, Julie Haarhuis. Before trial, the parties stipulated to a set of facts establishing that Defendant negligently caused the death of Ms. Haarhuis, in relevant part, as follows: Defendant was driving on a two-lane road at approximately 6:30 a.m. She lost control of her vehicle, crossing the opposing lane of traffic and striking Ms. Haarhuis, who was walking on the opposite shoulder of the road. As a result of the accident, Ms. Haarhuis suffered severe injuries. Several days later, Ms. Haarhuis died as a result of those injuries.
The trial was bifurcated, with the first phase of the trial addressing compensatory damages and the second phase addressing punitive damages. During the compensatory damage phase, Plaintiff put on evidence concerning his actual damages, including evidence of the suffering his wife endured before her death. The jury awarded Plaintiff $4.25 million in compensatory damages. The trial then moved to the punitive damage phase.
During the punitive damage phase of the trial, the jury heard evidence that Defendant was still in school and worked part time, that she had consumed alcohol in the early morning hours prior to the accident, and that she had a blood alcohol content above the legal limit approximately two hours after the accident occurred. The jury awarded Plaintiff $45,000 in punitive damages.
Defendant filed a motion for new trial which the trial court denied. Defendant appealed.
On appeal, Defendant makes a number of arguments concerning the conduct of the trial and the trial court's denial of her motion for a new trial. We address each argument in turn.
When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for a new trial, we consider whether there are grounds for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 59 (2015). Our review is "limited to the determination of whether the record affirmatively demonstrates a manifest abuse of discretion by the judge." Worthington v. Bynum , 305 N.C. 478, 482, 290 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1982). "Abuse of discretion results where the [trial] court's ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision." State v. Hennis , 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988).
At trial, Defendant exercised her right to request a bifurcated trial pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D-30. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D-30 (2015). On appeal, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's questioning of the jury during voir dire was improper and violated her "due process right" to a bifurcated trial because it involved issues that would only be relevant to Plaintiff's punitive damage claim.
Our General Assembly has provided that a plaintiff may not recover punitive damages where the defendant is not found to be liable for compensatory damages. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D-15. Therefore, to ensure that a jury does not award compensatory damages based on issues relevant only to punitive damages, our General Assembly has granted a defendant the right to a bifurcated trial, which allows "issues of liability for compensatory damages and the amount of compensatory damages, if any, [to] be tried separately from the issues of liability for punitive damages and the amount of punitive damages, if any." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D-30. In a bifurcated trial, the plaintiff is not allowed to introduce any evidence "relating solely to punitive damages" during the compensatory damage phase. Id. In addition, the statute requires the same trier of fact that tried the issues relating to compensatory damages to try the issues relating to punitive damages. Id.
In the present case, Defendant does not argue that Plaintiff introduced improper evidence concerning Defendant's intoxication during the compensatory phase of the trial. Rather, she argues that Plaintiff's questioning of potential jurors during voir dire regarding their general attitudes about alcohol and drunk driving—questions which were only relevant to the punitive damage phase of the trial—was inappropriate.1
We acknowledge that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D-30 presents a dilemma of sorts, as suggested by Defendant's argument. Specifically, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D-30 gives a defendant the right to a bifurcated trial in order to ensure that the jury, when considering the issue of compensatory damages, is not improperly influenced by evidence relevant only to punitive damages. However, a defendant's right to bifurcation must be weighed against a plaintiff's right to an impartial jury, which includes a plaintiff's right to question potential jurors during voir dire about issues that they may be asked to consider. See State v. Jones , 339 N.C. 114, 136, 451 S.E.2d 826, 836-37 (1994) ().
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D-30 requires that the same jury try both the issues relating to compensatory damages and the issues relating to punitive damages, presumably for judicial economy reasons. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D-30 ( ). As such, in the present case, Plaintiff had the right to question potential jurors regarding their general attitudes about alcohol and drunk driving in order to determine "whether a basis for challenge for cause exist[ed]" and to allow both parties to "intelligently exercise [their] peremptory challenges." State v. Gregory , 340 N.C. 365, 388, 459 S.E.2d 638, 651 (1995). Of course, the trial judge must exercise discretion in determining the extent and type of questioning permitted in order to protect the rights of all parties. See Jones , 339 N.C. at 134, 451 S.E.2d at 835 ( ). We conclude that Plaintiff's questioning, which was general in nature and did not expressly state that Defendant had been intoxicated, was appropriate.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in permitting Plaintiff's attorney to ask improper "stake out" questions during voir dire . Defendant contends that the totality of Plaintiff's voir dire questioning biased the jury, resulting in an unfair trial. We disagree.
The purpose of jury voir dire is to "eliminate extremes of partiality and ensure that the jury's decision is based solely on the evidence presented at trial." State v. White , 340 N.C. 264, 280, 457 S.E.2d 841, 850 (1995). "The extent and manner of a party's inquiry into a potential juror's fitness to serve is within the trial court's discretion." Id. On appeal, we review the entire record of voir dire to determine "whether the trial court abused its discretion and whether that abuse resulted in harmful prejudice to the defendant." State v. Cheek , 351 N.C. 48, 66, 520 S.E.2d 545, 556 (1999).
A "stake out" question asks a juror to "pledge himself [or herself] to a future course of action" by asking what "verdict [the prospective juror] would render, or how they would be inclined to vote, under a given state of facts." State v. Vinson , 287 N.C. 326, 336, 215 S.E.2d 60, 68 (1975), vacated in part on other grounds , 428 U.S. 902, 96 S.Ct. 3204, 49 L.Ed.2d 1206 (1976). Our Supreme Court has held that stake out questions are generally improper:
On appeal, Defendant challenges numerous questions asked by Plaintiff's counsel during voir dire . We will address each line of questioning in turn.2
Defendant first takes issue with a hypothetical scenario presented by Plaintiff's counsel where counsel asked if the juror approached a red light late at night with no traffic nearby, would the juror "wait for it to change or [ ] go straight through it?" Although this question did involve a hypothetical set of facts, it was not a stake out question because the facts presented were not similar to the underlying facts of the case and did not ask jurors to state what kind of verdict they would render. See State v. Parks , 324 N.C. 420, 423, 378 S.E.2d 785, 787 (1989). Rather, this question addressed a "key criterion of juror competency"—whether jurors were inclined to follow the law. See State v. Chapman , 359 N.C. 328, 346, 611 S.E.2d 794, 810 (2005).
Defendant next challenges Plaintiff's counsel's questions regarding jurors' attitudes toward awarding damages. Plaintiff's counsel first posed the question as follows:
Which way do you lean? Are you a little closer to the folks who think that, in considering money, you should...
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