Haas v. Kraus

• Decision Date: 24 May 1894
• Citation: 27 S.W. 256
• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Parties: HAAS et al. v. KRAUS et al.

27 S.W. 256

HAAS et al. v. KRAUS et al.

Supreme Court of Texas.

May 24, 1894.

Application for writ of error to court of civil appeals, fourth supreme judicial district.

Action by I. Haas and others against J. L. Kraus and others. On motion for rehearing of application for writ of error. Motion denied.

Millard Patterson, for applicants.

STAYTON, C. J.

If a decision of a court of civil appeals overrules its own decision, or the decision of another court of civil appeals, or of the supreme court, this court has jurisdiction to grant a writ of error, although, under the decision, the judgment of the district court be reversed, and the cause remanded; but it does not follow from this that a writ of error should be granted unless the decision of the cause in which the writ is asked is believed to be erroneous. When the application for writ of error in this cause was refused, it was not because this court had not jurisdiction,¹ but because the decision made in the cause by the court of civil appeals was believed to be correct. When this cause was before the supreme court at a former term (12 S. W. 394), it came with a charge which excluded the jury from all inquiry whether the trust deed was made with fraudulent intent, and on that ground the judgment was reversed, and the cause remanded. It was said in the course of the opinion that a charge requested, to the following effect, should have been given: "If they [the jury] believed that the transfer set up by defendant, of the property of Ben F. Levy, was made by him with the primary intent of placing such property in such position that it could not be levied on by his creditors, such intent would render the transfer fraudulent and void as to plaintiffs." This was not exactly the charge requested and refused, but it did embrace same propositions. If the word "intent" be restricted to the maker of the mortgage, then the charge should not have been given; but, if it be applied to him and to the accepting creditor, then it was correct, and should have been given. The moving or primary purpose of a debtor, in paying to a creditor a debt by conveying to him property, or in mortgaging property to secure a debt due to him, may be to prevent some other creditor from subjecting it to the payment of a sum due to him; but this, within the meaning of the law, will not render the conveyance or mortgage fraudulent as to such creditor, if his purpose is solely to have payment or security for the sum actually due. As...