Haas v. Painter
Decision Date | 10 June 1983 |
Docket Number | No. A8011-06216,A8011-06216 |
Parties | , 9 Media L. Rep. 1665 Harl HAAS, Appellant, v. John PAINTER and Oregonian Publishing Company, an Oregon corporation, Respondents. ; CA A24559. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Gerald R. Pullen, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.
Michael G. Holmes, Portland, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Richard S. Pope, and Spears, Lubersky, Campbell & Bledsoe, Portland.
Before BUTTLER, P.J., and WARREN and ROSSMAN, JJ.
Plaintiff, a former Multnomah County District Attorney and the 1980 Democratic candidate for Attorney General, brought this action to recover damages to his reputation caused by an editorial published by defendants, which he contends was defamatory. He appeals from a judgment dismissing his complaint after defendants' motion for summary judgment 1 was granted on the ground that the editorial was not "capable of being defamatory as statements of fact."
The editorial was written by defendant Painter and published on the editorial page of The Oregonian on September 18, 1980, seven weeks before the November general election. It concerned a local juvenile case of some notoriety in which Michelle Gates, a 14-year-old girl, had been accused of killing a small child. Prior to publication of the editorial, a circuit judge had ruled that statements made by Gates to police would not be admissible at trial, because she had not been advised of her Miranda rights before she was questioned, and another circuit judge thereafter dismissed the delinquency petition, because prosecutors had not acted on it within the time required by court rule. 2
The editorial criticized the manner in which the police and prosecutors handled the case, and read as follows:
Plaintiff alleged that the third and fourth paragraphs of the editorial were false and that defendants knew that they were false but published the editorial deliberately to defame him and to injure and destroy his professional reputation. He sought damages of $500,000. Defendants asserted, as affirmative defenses, that they had thought that the editorial was true, that it involved fair and permissible expressions of opinion and that publication of the editorial was constitutionally protected. In granting defendants' motion for summary judgment, the trial court relied on the pleadings and a deposition of plaintiff and stated correctly that the only issue was whether the editorial, standing alone, was "capable of being defamatory as statements of fact" or was a protected expression of opinion.
Whether a communication is capable of a defamatory meaning is a question for the court; the jury determines whether a communication capable of a defamatory meaning was so understood by the recipient. Beecher v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 267 Or. 496, 500, 517 P.2d 667 (1973). The starting point, however, in analyzing any claim brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct is recognition of the constitutional and common-law safeguards afforded the defendants and the policy underlying them.
As additional means of furthering this important interest, courts have gone to considerable lengths to characterize what appear to be statements of fact as statements of opinion 3 when made in the course of disputing matters of public interest. King v. Menolascino, 276 Or. 501, 555 P.2d 442 (1976); Desert Sun Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, supra. In King, the court held that the words alleged to be defamatory must be read in the context in which they were written--in that case, in response to the plaintiff's letter to the editor on a controversial subject. The defendant had made some statements of fact which, if true, made plaintiff's statements false and tended to make her appear to be a supporter of unworthy causes. However, the court viewed the letter as a whole and in the context of the highly controversial subject matter to which it related. As so viewed, the court held that the defendant's statements were not capable of a...
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