Haas v. Vill. of Stryker
| Decision Date | 14 June 2013 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. WM-12-004,Trial Court No. 11 CI 138 |
| Citation | 2013 Ohio 2476 |
| Parties | Josh Haas, et al. Appellees v. Village of Stryker, et al. Appellants |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
George C. Rogers, for appellees.
Jane M. Lynch, Jared A. Wagner and Maria Armstrong, for appellants.
{¶ 1} Appellants, village of Stryker and Peggy St. John, appeal from the May 30, 2012 judgment of the Williams County Court of Common Pleas denying their motion to dismiss the 42 U.S.C. 1983 and malicious prosecution claims filed against them. For the reasons which follow, we affirm the decision in part and reverse in part.
{¶ 2} Josh Haas, appellee, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the village of Stryker and Peggy St. John, individually and as the village tax administrator, alleging violations of Haas' civil rights protected by the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Haas sought compensatory damages of $50,000 from the village and St. John, jointly and severally, and punitive damages of $50,000 from St. John. Haas also alleged a state law cause of action of malicious prosecution and sought damages of $50,000 for compensatory and $50,000 for punitive damages from St. John. Sheila Haas, appellee, sought consortium damages of $5,000 with respect to each claim.
{¶ 3} These allegations arise out of an alleged village policy, implemented by St. John, of swearing out a criminal complaint against village residents who do not file a village tax return even when it is known that the residents had not earned any income nor incurred any tax liability. St. John swore out such a criminal complaint against Josh Haas, which was filed in the Bryan Municipal Court. The clerk was unable to serve the complaint upon Haas, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Haas was arrested and released the next day after posting an appearance bond. Haas' motion to dismiss/ suppress the complaint for lack of probable cause was granted, as well as the prosecution's motion to dismiss the complaint. After the case was dismissed, appellees filed the current action against appellants.
{¶ 4} Appellants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim for relief. Appellees opposed the motion.
{¶ 5} With respect to the civil rights claims, the trial court relied upon the analytical framework and policy considerations set forth in our decision in Stevens v. Cox, 6th Dist. No. WD-08-020, 2009-Ohio-391. The trial court determined that 42 U.S.C. 1983 permits a local governing body and a local government official to be sued for the actions of the official when the official's actions were based on the customary policies of the local government, even if the policies were never formally approved through official decision-making. The court also found that there were sufficient allegations of fact to support a malicious prosecution claim under Ohio law. The trial court never specifically addressed all of the other issues raised in the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, but denied the motion to dismiss the claims. The court included Civ.R. 54(B) language to permit an immediate appeal of this issue even though such additional language is not required for an immediate appeal of an order denying immunity to a political subdivision or its employees. See R.C. 2744.02(C) and Sullivan v. Anderson Twp., 122 Ohio St.3d 83, 2009-Ohio-1971, 909 N.E.2d 88, syllabus.
{¶ 6} Appellants assert the following assignments of error on appeal.
{¶ 7} Appellants argue in their first assignment of error that the trial court erred by applying an outdated standard for determining whether to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim for relief.
{¶ 8} A complaint may be dismissed, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Civ.R. 8(A), and correspondingly Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), require notice pleading: "a short and plain statement of the claimshowing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Therefore, the plaintiff need not allege in the complaint every fact he intends to prove since many facts are not available until after discovery. But, plaintiff must allege a set of facts that would support a cause of action. Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 95 Ohio St.3d 416, 2002-Ohio-2480, 768 N.E.2d 1136, ¶ 5.
{¶ 9} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the trial court should not grant the motion to dismiss "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 245, 327 N.E.2d 753 (1975). If the court can determine from the face of the complaint that the action is barred by the statute of limitations, the court may dismiss the complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 109 Ohio St.3d 491, 2006-Ohio-2625, 849 N.E.2d 268, ¶ 11. The court must accept all of the factual allegations of the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753 (1988). We review the trial court's ruling on this type of motion under a de novo standard of review. Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362, 814 N.E.2d 44, ¶ 5.
{¶ 10} Appellants assert that the trial court should have applied a new, allegedly heightened, standard for determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss, which courts now identify as the "plausibility test." This "test" was first applied by the United States Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-556, 127 S.Ct.1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) and was further developed in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). These cases outline a two-step process for evaluating a motion to dismiss. First, the trial court should separate the allegations based upon legal conclusions and those based upon factual allegations. Only factual allegations are presumed to be true and only claims supported by factual allegations can avoid dismissal. Second, the trial court must determine whether the claims supported by factual allegations plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Ashcroft at 681-682 and Twombly at 555.
{¶ 11} Federal courts have been inconsistent in their application of the Twombly-Iqbal standard. Compare Watson Carpet & Floor Covering, Inc. v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., 648 F.3d 452, 456-457 (6th Cir.2011) and CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Goodmail Systems, Inc., 529 F.Supp.2d 1376, 1379 (N.D.Ga.2007). While some Ohio courts have cited to the Twombly-Iqbal plausibility standard, none of these cases actually applied it. See Sacksteder v. Senney, 2d Dist. No. 24993, 2012-Ohio-4452, ¶ 14-46 (). We find that the "plausibility test" was not intended to be a heightened standard, but another method of determining whether the allegations of the complaint were supported by sufficient allegations of fact. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not apply an incorrect standard for determining the motion to dismiss. Appellants' first assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 12} In their second assignment of error appellants argue the trial court committed reversible error in failing to find that appellant St. John is entitled to absolute immunity from 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims filed against her in her...
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