Haase v. Sawicki
Decision Date | 04 June 1963 |
Citation | 20 Wis.2d 308,121 N.W.2d 876 |
Parties | Charlotte J. Feldkamp HAASE, Appellant, v. Walter John SAWICKI et al., Respondents. |
Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Alvin L. Zelonky, Milwaukee; Moore & Moore, Milwaukee, of counsel, for appellant.
DeVries, Hollander & Vlasak, Milwaukee; Arthur J. Vlasak, Milwaukee, of counsel, for respondents.
The issue on this appeal is whether the retroactive feature of subd. (2) of sec. 330.205, by which the legislature attempted to make a three-year limitation applicable to causes of action which had become barred by the two-year limitation period prior to January 30, 1962, offends the due-process clause of the Fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and sec. 1, art. I, of the Wisconsin constitution. 2
There is a division of authority with respect to whether a legislature may constitutionally revive a tort action, which has become barred by a statute of limitations, by thereafter enlarging the limitation period and applying it retrospectively as was attempted in the instant case. Annos. 36 A.L.R. 1316, 1321, and 133 A.L.R. 384, 390. An analysis of the cases discloses that the difference in result turns on whether the applicable statute of limitations is construed to extinguish the right or merely the remedy. This court, by a long line of cases, has followed the construction that our statutes of limitation extinguish the right as well as the remedy.
In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Beleznay (1944), 245 Wis. 390, 393, 14 N.W.2d 177, 179, Mr. Chief Justice ROSENBERRY, speaking for the court, declared:
Other cases so holding are Reistad v. Manz (1960), 11 Wis.2d 155, 159, 105 N.W.2d 324; First Nat. Bank of Madison v. Kolbeck (1945), 247 Wis. 462, 464, 19 N.W.2d 908, 161 A.L.R. 882; Long v. Mates (1935), 219 Wis. 414, 415, 263 N.W. 371; State v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co. (1907), 132 Wis. 345, 361-362, 112 N.W. 515; Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Co. (1899), 103 Wis. 373, 375, 79 N.W. 433; Pierce v. Seymour (1881), 52 Wis. 272, 276-277, 9 N.W. 71; Brown v. Parker (1871), 28 Wis. 21, 28; and Sprecher v. Wakeley (1860), 11 Wis. *432, *439.
In some jurisdictions a distinction has been made, for purposes of retrospective revival of actions, between a statutory bar which operates to invest persons with a constitutionally-protected title to property and a bar which merely constitutes a defense to a personal demand. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 266, pp. 1261-62. This court, however, has not drawn such a distinction.
The legislature may not constitutionally enact retrospective laws creating new obligations with respect to past transactions. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 417, p. 99. Two cases so holding are: Todd v. Morgan (1959), 215 Ga. 220, 109 S.E.2d 803, and Opinion of the Justices (1956), 334 Mass. 711, 714, 134 N.E.2d 923. See also Sturges v. Carter (1885), 114 U.S. 511, 519, 5 S.Ct. 1014, 29 L.Ed. 240; and Estate of Riley (1959), 6 Wis.2d 29, 37, 94 N.W.2d 233. If a statute of limitations extinguishes the right as well as the remedy, then a statute which attempts to reinstate a cause of action that has been barred is constitutionally objectionable under the foregoing rule. This is because the statute seeks to impose a new duty or obligation even though none existed when the retrospective statute was enacted. This rationale is particularly well stated by Mr. Justice MARSHALL in Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Co., supra, as follows (103 Wis. at p. 376, 79 N.W. at p. 434):
'What is meant by the term 'extinguish the right' as used in the adjudications and by the text writers, in discussing the subject under consideration, is not actual satisfaction of the right by the operation of the statute of limitations. The idea is that a right to insist upon the statutory bar is a vested property right protected by the constitution the effect of which is to forever prevent the judicial enforcement of the demand affected by it, against the will of the owner of the prescriptive right. Deprivation of the remedy under such circumstances, that there can be no adverse restoration of it, is a destruction or extinguishment of the right to which such remedy relates. The law deals only with enforceable rights, and if such a right be changed to a mere moral obligation, in a legal sense it no longer exists at all.
The retrospective feature of sec. 330.205(2), Stats., was held unconstitutional in an able opinion by the late Judge Patrick T. STONE in Lundquist v. Coddington Bros., Inc. (D.C.Wis.1962), 202 F.Supp. 19. There the wrongful death action was commenced in 1961 more than two years, but less than three years, after the fatal accident which caused the alleged wrongful death. Thus, as in the instant case, the cause of action had been extinguished by the two-year statute of limitation provided in sec. 330.21 (3), Stats. at the time sec. 330.205(2), Stats. was enacted. The opinion cites and quotes extracts from the opinions in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Beleznay, supra; State v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., supra; Pereles v. Leiser (1903), 119 Wis. 347, 96 N.W. 799; and Estate of Riley, supra.
Plaintiff's brief cites Schultz v. Vick (1960), 10 Wis.2d 171, 102 N.W.2d 272, as pointing to a different conclusion. There, however, we were concerned with a retrospective amendment to the two-year notice of injury statute, formerly sec. 330.19(5), Stats. We there held that the change in this notice requirement affected merely a procedural matter. This was in keeping with prior holdings of this court that the notice-of-injury requirement was not a statute of limitations but merely a condition precedent to the commencement of a personal-injury suit where the summons and complaint was not served within two years of the accrual of the cause of action. Nelson v. American Employers' Ins. Co. (1952), 262 Wis. 271, 276, 55 N.W.2d 13, and cases cited therein.
Plaintiff's counsel also place great reliance on Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson (1945), 325 U.S. 304, 311-312, 65 S.Ct. 1137, 1141, 89 L.Ed. 1628, and quote several paragraphs of the opinion in their brief including this paragraph:
One feature of the Chase Securities Case which distinguishes it from the instant case is that it affirmed the decision of the Minnesota supreme court 3 which held that the running of the statute of limitations, which defendant relied upon as a bar, merely extinguished the remedy and not the right. Nevertheless, we find it unnecessary to decide whether this distinction would afford a sufficient basis for this court to hold that the retrospective feature of sec. 330.205(2), Stats., violates the due-process clause of the Fourteenth amendment.
The opinion by the United States supreme court in the Chase Securities Case also noted that some states had not followed Campbell v. Holt 'in construing provisions of their constitutions similar to the due process clause' and by footnote cited Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Co., supra, among other cases as so holding. It is impossible to tell from reading this court's opinion in the Eingartner Case, however, whether the phrase 'the constitution,' that appears in the hereinbefore-quoted extract therefrom, refers to the United States constitution or the Wisconsin constitution. An examination of the printed briefs submitted in the Eingartner Case has cast no light on this question either. Nevertheless, this court is not inclined to give a more restrictive construction to sec. 1, art. I, Wis. Const., than does the United States supreme court in interpreting the due-process and equal-protection-of-the-laws clauses of the Fourteenth amendment. Cf. Boden v. Milwaukee (1959), 8 Wis.2d 318, 324, 99 N.W.2d 156.
Plaintiff's counsel, however, have overlooked a portion of the opinion in the Chase Securities Case, that does provide the basis for resolving the instant controversy. It is set forth 325 U.S. at page 312, in footnote 8, 65 S.Ct. at page 1141, 89 L.Ed. 1628, in which the court explained why that case was not controlled by William Danzer Co. v. Gulf R. R. (1925), 268 U.S. 633, 45 S.Ct. 612, 69 L.Ed. 1126, and Davis v. Mills (1904), 194 U.S. 451, 24 S. Ct. 692, 48 L.Ed. 1067. We quote a portion of...
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