Habelmann v. City of Los Angeles
| Docket Number | B322879 |
| Decision Date | 31 August 2023 |
| Parties | KRISTINE HABELMANN, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Nos. BC692990, BC696190, Lia Martin, Judge.
Matthew J. Kita, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Scott Marcus, Chief Assistant City Attorney, Blithe S. Bock, Assistant City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent.
In March 2017, Stefan Habelmann was riding his motorcycle through a street that curves like the letter "S" (a reverse curve) when he hit the side of an automobile making a U-turn, leading to his death. His daughters, plaintiffs and appellants Kristine Habelmann and Katarina Habelmann (collectively, the Habelmanns), filed this action against defendant and respondent City of Los Angeles (City) alleging a dangerous condition of public property. The Habelmanns asserted the lack of traffic controls and center dividers, as well as the failure to warn drivers of a concealed trap created a dangerous condition. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was immune from liability for the design of the roadway under Government Code section 830.6[1] and immune from liability for failing to post signs under sections 830.4 and 830.8. It asserted it was not otherwise liable for a dangerous condition because it did not have notice of any such condition. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the City was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each ground. We conclude that while design immunity precludes the Habelmanns from holding the City liable for creating the alleged dangerous condition the Habelmanns raise triable issues of fact that allow them to maintain their action seeking to hold the City liable for failure to warn of a concealed danger.
On March 4, 2017, decedent Stefan Habelmann was riding his motorcycle eastbound on Oxnard Street between Yolanda Avenue and Reseda Boulevard in Tarzana, California. This is an east-west roadway in a business district divided by double yellow lines. It has a center turning lane and two lanes of travel in each direction delineated by broken white lines. The posted speed limit on Oxnard Street is 35 miles per hour (mph). However, there is a yellow advisory sign recommending a speed limit of 25 mph in advance of a reverse curve for motorists traveling eastbound on this segment of Oxnard Street. There is also a sign posted warning of the reverse curve.
The complaint alleges that prior to the accident, Alexandra Price (Price) was parked at the curb on the south side of Oxnard Street facing eastbound traffic in front of Tarzana Treatment Center, Inc. After dropping off a patient there, Price decided to make a U-turn through the eastbound traffic lanes, so that she could proceed westbound on Oxnard Street. While attempting the U-turn through the traffic lanes in the reverse curve, Price allegedly turned her vehicle in front of the decedent's motorcycle, causing the decedent to collide into the driver's side of Price's vehicle. The decedent died as a result of the accident.
The decedent's daughters, the Habelmanns, filed this action against the City and others.[2] The Habelmanns alleged a cause of action for dangerous condition of public property pursuant to section 835. The complaint asserts, "[t]he lack of traffic signs, traffic lights, center dividers, as well as lack of visibility due to the curvature of the roadway, caused a known dangerous condition on the roadway." The dangerous condition "Further, sign[s], warnings or other devices were necessary to warn of these dangerous conditions which endangered the safe movement of traffic and which would not be reasonably apparent to, and would not be anticipated by, a person exercising due care."
The City moved for summary judgment, arguing in pertinent part that it was immune from liability for failing to post signs pursuant to sections 830.4 and 830.8 and that no condition at the subject location constituted a concealed danger for motorists exercising reasonable care. Next, the City contended that it was immune from liability for the design of the road pursuant to section 830.6. The City's evidence showed that local officials approved plans for the roadway in June 2009, including the 35 mph speed limit, the advisory 25 mph for the reverse curve, and the placement of the traffic signs. Finally, the City argued that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition.
In opposition, the Habelmanns argued that there were triable issues of fact as to whether the subject location was in a dangerous condition due to inadequate and improperly placed signage, motorists driving above the posted speed limit, and limited visibility for persons travelling eastbound through the curve. They argued that the City was not immune from liability under section 830.4 or 830.6 because the City still had a duty to warn of non-obvious dangers or "traps." They further contended that the dangerous condition was not based on the design of the roadway, but rather was based on the City being aware that the signage on Oxnard Street was inadequate to prevent speeding. Additionally, they argued that the City had notice of the dangerous condition because it received numerous complaints about drivers going too fast through the curve, and it was aware of multiple collisions in the area.
In reply, the City reiterated that it was immune from liability for failing to provide traffic signs, and that there was no condition at the location that could be considered a trap. The City contended that it established the elements required for design immunity, and that there was no evidence of any similar incidents at the subject location such that it would have notice of a dangerous condition.
After taking the matter under submission, the trial court granted the City's motion.[3] First, the court concluded that the City met its burden of proving that it is immune from liability for failing to post traffic control signals, and that the Habelmanns failed to establish triable issues of fact as to the existence of a trap. Second, the court determined that "[e]ven if the Court were to find triable issues of material fact as to Defendant's sign immunity based on the improper placement of signage, . . . design immunity applies, warranting the granting of summary judgment." Lastly, the court found that the City met its burden of showing that it did not have notice of a dangerous condition and that the Habelmanns did not submit evidence showing otherwise. The court entered judgment in favor of the City, and the Habelmanns timely appealed.
"Summary judgment is appropriate only 'where no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" (Regents of the University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618.) A defendant moving for summary judgment must show that one or more elements of the plaintiff s cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) If the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence creating a triable issue of material fact. (Ibid.) A triable issue of material fact exists if the evidence would allow a reasonable juror to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) "We review the trial court's ruling on a summary judgment motion de novo, liberally construe the evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of the opponent." (Grebing v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 631, 637.)
Except as provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury arising out of an act or omission by itself or its employees. (§ 815, subd. (a).) Section 835 (Tansavatdi v City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 639, 652-653 (Tansavatdi).) (Id. at p. 653.) "Thus, section 835 expressly authorizes two different forms of dangerous conditions liability: an act or omission by a government actor that created the dangerous condition (§ 835, subd. (a)); or, alternatively, failure 'to protect against' dangerous conditions of which the entity had notice (id., subd. (b))....
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