Haberkorn v. Chrysler Corp.(Two Cases)
| Decision Date | 28 April 1995 |
| Docket Number | 151110,Docket Nos. 148831 |
| Citation | 533 N.W.2d 373,210 Mich.App. 354 |
| Parties | Caryl L. HABERKORN and James Haberkorn, Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, f/k/a Jeep Corp., f/k/a American Motors Corp., Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant. Caryl L. HABERKORN, Jennifer Haberkorn, Minor, Grant Haberkorn, Minor, Luke Haberkorn, Minor, and James Haberkorn, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, f/k/a Jeep Corp., f/k/a American Motors Corp., Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Goodman, Lister & Peters, P.C. by Richard M. Goodman, Williams & Youngblood, P.C. by Carole F. Youngblood, Detroit and Michael J. Steinberg, Ann Arbor, for plaintiffs.
Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, P.L.C. by Stephen J. Ott, Erich H. Hintzen, Wolfgang Hoppe, Brian S. Westenberg, and Stefany L. Freeman, Detroit, for defendant.
Before JANSEN, P.J., and MICHAEL J. KELLY and HOOD, JJ.
This is a products liability case arising out of an automobile accident during which plaintiff Caryl Haberkorn's 1 1974 Jeep CJ-5 rolled over and ejected her. In Docket No. 148831, plaintiffs appeal as of right a judgment of the circuit court for plaintiffs in the amount of $861,477.60 (plus prejudgment interest). The judgment was entered after a jury trial in which the jury found $2.7 million in damages, which the court reduced in part by seventy percent consistent with the jury's findings regarding plaintiff's comparative negligence. Defendant cross appeals the same judgment, claiming that it was entitled to summary disposition or a directed verdict on all plaintiffs' claims. In Docket No. 151110, plaintiffs appeal as of right an award of mediation sanctions to defendant in the amount of $562,712.40. The appeals were consolidated.
In 1981, the American Motors Corporation entered into a consent agreement with the Federal Trade Commission regarding its advertising about the driving characteristics of Jeep CJ-5, CJ-6, and CJ-7 models, which AMC produced. Without admitting liability, AMC agreed to affix labels to the windshields of all new Jeep CJ vehicles to warn drivers that these vehicles handled differently from passenger cars and that sudden sharp turns and abrupt maneuvers could result in a loss of control. AMC also agreed to place similar warnings in all new Jeep CJ owners' manuals and to mail warning labels and manual supplements to all identifiable owners of 1972 and later model Jeep CJ vehicles.
In 1983, plaintiff Caryl Haberkorn purchased a 1974 soft-top Jeep CJ-5 from a private seller for her husband, plaintiff James Haberkorn. There was no warning label on the windshield, and the previous owner testified that he did not recall if he had received one in the mail. In the evening of June 26, 1986, plaintiff was driving the vehicle with her three children down a gravel road between twenty-five and fifty-five miles per hour. The vehicle bogged down in some sand or gravel, then began to fishtail. Plaintiff pumped the brakes and attempted to steer into the skid, but the steering was unresponsive. The vehicle headed for the side of the road and rolled over twice, ejecting plaintiff and two of her children. The children suffered only minor injuries, but plaintiff was left a paraplegic.
Plaintiffs initiated this action against defendant Chrysler Corporation, as successor to AMC, in November 1988. After extensive discovery and mediation, a jury trial was held from April through June 1991. The case was submitted to the jury on eight theories: (1) negligent design with respect to handling characteristics; (2) negligent design with respect to roll stability; (3) negligent design with respect to occupant protection or crashworthiness; (4) negligent testing; (5) breach of express warranty; (6) negligent warning with respect to handling characteristics; (7) negligent warning with respect to rollover characteristics; and (8) negligent warning with respect to crashworthiness.
The jury found defendant liable only on the third theory, answering "yes" to the question on the jury verdict form that asked whether defendant was negligent in the design of the Jeep with regard to crashworthiness (i.e., occupant protection of the windshield, top, roll bar, or seat belts) and whether such negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. The jury found plaintiff Caryl Haberkorn's damages to be $2.3 million and awarded an additional $400,000 to the remaining plaintiffs. However, the trial court reduced all plaintiff Caryl Haberkorn's damages and portions of the remaining damages by seventy percent in response to the jury's finding regarding plaintiff's comparative negligence. Applying the collateral source rule, the court reduced plaintiff's damages by the amount of social security disability benefits that she had received up to the time of judgment in October 1991. That judgment also awarded defendant actual costs as mediation sanctions under MCR 2.403(O ), which the court calculated to be $562,712.40 in March 1992. Both parties had rejected a mediation evaluation of $1.5 million in November 1990.
Plaintiffs present two challenges to the jury's determination of comparative fault.
First, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in excluding under MRE 403 evidence of the FTC's 1981 consent order and agreement with AMC. We review the trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Davis v. Wayne Co. Sheriff, 201 Mich.App. 572, 588, 507 N.W.2d 751 (1993). Under MRE 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. "Unfair prejudice" does not mean "damaging"; any relevant evidence will be damaging to some extent. Rather, unfair prejudice exists when marginally relevant evidence might be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury or when it would be inequitable to allow use of such evidence. People v. Harvey, 167 Mich.App. 734, 745-746, 423 N.W.2d 335 (1988). Assessing probative value against prejudicial effect requires a balancing of several factors, including the time necessary to present the evidence and the potential for delay; whether the evidence is cumulative; how directly the evidence tends to prove the fact in support of which it is offered; how important the fact sought to be proved is; the potential for confusion; and whether the fact can be proved another way with fewer harmful collateral effects. People v. Oliphant, 399 Mich. 472, 490, 250 N.W.2d 443 (1976).
Plaintiffs sought to introduce the FTC agreement as evidence that defendant was negligent in warning about the handling characteristics of Jeeps. 2 However, the probative value of the agreement was marginal because there was no evidence that defendant actually breached the agreement and because the agreement merely showed why defendant sent warnings, not whether defendant did so negligently. The danger of prejudice was high because the jury could have mistaken the agreement as a government finding that the Jeeps were defective. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in deeming the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice. Although plaintiffs claim that exclusion of the agreement created a danger of prejudice to them because the jury could believe that the warnings were sent voluntarily, and not under government coercion, any such prejudice was cured by the trial court's cautionary instruction that the jury was not to speculate regarding the reason why defendant sent the warnings. Further, exclusion of the agreement did not deprive the plaintiffs of proving inadequate warning by other means. In fact, plaintiffs presented extensive expert testimony that the exterior of the envelopes containing the warnings was insufficient to reflect the seriousness of their contents.
Second, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in excusing a juror for health reasons midway through trial without first consulting with counsel and making a record of the conversation between the trial judge and the juror. However, plaintiffs failed to make a timely and specific objection or to move for a mistrial. When the topic of excusing jurors arose later in the trial, counsel's only concern was the possibility that other jurors might claim to fall ill. This issue is therefore not preserved for appellate review. Wicklund v. Draper, 167 Mich.App. 623, 627-628, 423 N.W.2d 294 (1988). Furthermore, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate prejudice. Under M.C.L. § 600.1354; M.S.A. § 27A.1354, failure to comply with chapter 13 of the Revised Judicature Act, concerning jurors, does not affect the validity of the jury verdict unless a party makes a timely objection, demonstrates actual prejudice, and shows that noncompliance was substantial.
Defendant claims that, regardless of plaintiff's comparative fault, any jury verdict was inappropriate because plaintiffs did not establish a prima facie case in support of their crashworthiness design claim. Specifically, defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a directed verdict. In deciding this issue, we review all the evidence presented up to the time of the motion in a light most favorable to plaintiffs and determine whether there was a material issue of fact. See Stoken v. J.E.T. Electronics & Technology, Inc., 174 Mich.App. 457, 463, 436 N.W.2d 389 (1988). Here, a material issue of fact existed regarding defendant's negligence in designing the Jeep CJ vehicles for crashworthiness.
An automobile manufacturer has a duty to design its product so as to eliminate any unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury to its occupants as a result of a collision. Rutherford v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 60 Mich.App. 392, 400, 231 N.W.2d 413 (1975). See also Shipman v. Fontaine Truck Equipment Co., 184 Mich.App. 706, 711, 459 N.W.2d 30 (199...
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