Habjan v. Vernon County Commissioners
| Decision Date | 05 October 1999 |
| Citation | 2 S.W.3d 875 |
| Parties | (Mo.App. W.D. 1999) Virginia Habjan v. Jime Earnest, et al., Vernon County Commissioners WD56611 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Vernon County, Hon. Joseph B. Phillips
Counsel for Appellant: Lynn M. Ewing
Counsel for Respondent: Kendall R. Vickers
Opinion Summary: The Vernon County commissioners appeal the circuit court's summary judgment for Virginia Habjan on her action seeking a declaration that she was entitled to $14,000 in annual compensation from Vernon County as the Vernon County Public Administrator for the calendar year of 1997.
Division Three holds: Section 50.333 provides that the county salary commission must meet on or before November 30 in odd numbered years for the purpose of determining the amount of annual compensation to be paid for the next term of office for each county officer to be elected at the next general election. At such meeting, if the salary commission votes to increase the compensation of any county officer, all officers whose compensation is being considered are required to receive the same percentage increase in their "maximum allowable compensation," which is to be determined by looking to the statutory salary schedule established for that officer.
Section 473.739.1, RSMo Supp. 1996 and Supp. 1997, governing the compensation of public administrators, provides for three classifications of public administrators for the purpose of determining their annual compensation. The first includes those public administrators who receive less than $25,000 in fees for the year in question. With respect to these individuals, the statute provides guaranteed annual compensation of $4,000 and also allows them to request the salary commission to authorize an additional $10,000 in compensation. The second classification includes those public administrators who receive more than $25,000 in fees but less than $45,000. These individuals may request the salary commission to authorize additional compensation totaling $14,000. As to the third classification, which includes those public administrators receiving more than $45,000 in fees, the statute does not provide or allow any annual compensation from the county.
When these two statutes are read together, they conflict, making them irreconcilable. Because section 473.739 is the more specific of the two statutes, it applies such that the provisions of section 50.333.7, as to "maximum allowable compensation," are inapplicable in determining the annual compensation for public administrators under section 473.739.1. Thus, the trial court misapplied the law in entering summary judgment for Habjan declaring her 1997 compensation to be $14,000 by applying the provisions of section 50.333.7. Having made this determination, the Court must still determine whether Habjan was otherwise entitled to $14,000 for 1997 pursuant to the applicable provisions, if any, of section 50.333.7 and section 473.739.1.
It is clear that, pursuant to section 473.739.1, the legislature intended for a public administrator to make any request for additional compensation to the salary commission after the public administrator's fees had been determined for the calendar year or years for which compensation is being requested. This interpretation conflicts with section 50.333.7 to the extent that it provides for a determination of compensation for the next term of office of the elected officers. The Court cannot reconcile this conflict and, thus, section 473.739 applies. Thus, pursuant to section 473.739, any request for an increase in compensation of a public administrator based on fees received for the year would have to be considered and allowed by the salary commission at its next regularly scheduled meeting after the fees received are determined for the calendar year or years for which compensation is being requested. Also, because compensation cannot be increased during an officer's term of office, the version of section 473.739 in effect on December 31, 1996, section 473.739, RSMo Supp. 1996, the day before Habjan began her term of office in question, applies to the determination of her 1997 compensation.
Even assuming that Habjan made a request to the salary commission to receive additional compensation after December 31, 1997, for consideration at the salary commission's 1999 meeting, the record reflects that the salary commission had not yet met in 1999 and approved any such request. Thus, Habjan, as a matter of law, was not entitled to judgment declaring her 1997 county compensation to be $14,000. Whether she received such additional compensation is a matter which would have to be considered at the 1999 meeting of the salary commission, assuming that she requests it to consider this matter.
Jime Earnest, Neal Gerster, and Bonnie McCord, the duly elected county commissioners for Vernon County, Missouri, appeal the summary judgment of the circuit court for the respondent, Virginia Habjan, on her declaratory judgment action against them seeking a declaration from the court that she was entitled to $14,000 in annual compensation from Vernon County (the county) as the Vernon County Public Administrator for the calendar year of 1997.
In their sole point on appeal, the appellants claim that the trial court erred in granting the respondent's motion for summary judgment because, based on the undisputed material facts alleged in her motion, she was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on her claim for declaratory judgment.
We reverse and remand.
On October 31, 1995, the Salary Commission for Vernon County (the salary commission) met in compliance with section 50.333.71 for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation to be paid to county officers who would be elected at the general election in November 1996 and would begin their terms on January 1, 1997. The Vernon County Prosecuting Attorney, Neal Quitno, was elected chairman of the meeting.
At the meeting, appellant Jime Earnest, the presiding commissioner of the county, made a motion to increase the salaries of all county officers to "100% the maximum allowed by statutes of the State of Missouri beginning January 1, 1997." Quitno asked Earnest whether his motion included the public administrator, and he replied that it did. The recorder of deeds, Doug Shupe, seconded the motion, and a discussion of the motion followed. During the discussion of the motion, Earnest stated:
I might want to clarify my motion by saying that in the case of the public administrator the county fees not to exceed $10,000. So we don't have the question that you have on your mind that I think the intent was $10,000 maximum. So that someone might not come back in 5 years and argue that was $4,000 plus $10,000.
Following further discussion, the salary commission unanimously approved the motion.
On December 13, 1995, pursuant to section 50.333.8, Quitno filed a report of compensation with the county clerk wherein he stated that the salary commission had set the public administrator's annual salary for the 1997-1998 term at $10,000, if the fees received by him or her annually were less than $25,000.
In the 1996 general election, the respondent was re-elected to a four-year term, section 473.730, RSMo Supp. 1996, commencing on January 1, 1997. As the duly elected public administrator, she earned fees in 1997 of $34,522.47. On December 2, 1997, she submitted a statement to the Vernon County Commission for payment to her of $10,000 as compensation for her services rendered as the public administrator in 1997. Sometime thereafter, but prior to March 24, 1998, she made a demand on the respondents for payment of $14,000 as compensation for 1997, claiming that such payment was authorized by section 473.739, RSMo Supp. 1996, and 50.333.7. The appellants refused to order the county clerk to pay her the requested compensation, claiming that pursuant to section 473.739, RSMo 1994, which was in effect at the time of the salary commission's October 31, 1995, meeting setting her 1997 salary, she was not entitled to such compensation.
On March 24, 1998, the respondent filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Circuit Court of Vernon County to compel the appellants to order the county clerk to pay her $14,000 as compensation for her services rendered during calendar year 1997. On April 23, 1998, the appellants filed a motion to dismiss the respondent's petition, claiming that mandamus was not the proper remedy for the relief sought.
On July 17, 1998, the respondent filed her first amended petition, adding as Count II a claim for declaratory judgment, seeking a determination of the amount of compensation due her from the county for her work as public administrator in 1997. Also on that date, she filed a motion for summary judgment on both counts of her petition. On August 17, 1998, the appellants filed their response to the respondent's motion for summary judgment and their motion for summary judgment.
On August 27, 1998, the trial court sustained the respondent's motion for summary judgment as to Count II, finding that there was no genuine dispute of material facts and that, as a matter of law, pursuant to section 50.333.7 and 473.739, RSMo Supp. 1996, she was entitled to be paid $14,000 as compensation for her services rendered as public administrator in calendar year 1997 and ordering the appellants to authorize the county clerk to pay her the same. As to Count I of the respondent's petition, the trial court sustained the appellants' motion to dismiss.
This appeal follows.
Our review is essentially de novo. The criteria on appeal for testing the propriety of summary judgment are no different from those which should be employed by the trial court to determine the propriety of sustaining the motion initially. The propriety of summary judgment is purely an...
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