Hacker v. Dickman, 94-2400

• Decision Date: 04 March 1996
• Docket Number: No. 94-2400,94-2400
• Citation: 75 Ohio St.3d 118,661 N.E.2d 1005
• Parties: HACKER et al., Appellees, v. DICKMAN et al.; State Auto Insurance Companies et al., Appellants.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 118

75 Ohio St.3d 118

661 N.E.2d 1005

HACKER et al., Appellees, v. DICKMAN et al.; State Auto Insurance Companies et al., Appellants.

No. 94-2400.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Nov. 14, 1995.

Decided March 4, 1996.

Murray & Murray Co., L.P.A., W. Patrick Murray and Steven C. Bechtel, Sandusky, for appellees.

Flynn, Py & Kruse Co., L.P.A., John A. Coppeler and Randolph E. Digges III, Port Clinton, for appellants.

COOK, Justice.

In this case we consider the argument that a clause in an insurance policy which employs the pronoun "you" may have different meanings, depending on the perspective and circumstances of the particular "covered person" reading it. We reject such a proposition in favor of according to pronouns in a contract applicable to more than one person a uniform meaning consistent with policy definitions.

It is well-settled law in Ohio that "[w]here provisions of a contract of insurance are reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation, they will be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured." (Emphasis added.) King v. Nationwide Ins. Co. (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 208, 519 N.E.2d 1380, syllabus; see, also, Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Price (1974), 39 Ohio St.2d 95, 68 O.O.2d 56, 313 N.E.2d 844. It is axiomatic that this rule cannot be employed to create ambiguity where there is none. It is only when a provision in a policy is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation that an ambiguity exists in which the provision must be resolved in favor of the insured.

In the present case, both State Auto and the Hackers acknowledge that Judith Dickman was a "covered person" under Gary's automobile insurance policy and that the Chevrolet truck was not a "covered auto." State Auto, therefore, maintains that Judith's use of the 1973 truck was unambiguously excluded from coverage by the clause in its contract with Gary, denying coverage for the use of a vehicle unlisted in the declaration section of the policy as a "covered auto" which is "owned by you."

The pronouns "you" and "your" are defined in the policy.

"Throughout this policy, 'you' and 'your' refer to:

"1. The 'named insured' shown in the Declarations; and

"2. The spouse if a resident of the same household."

In urging this court to find the (B)(2) exclusion ambiguous, the Hackers argue that the words "you" and "your" should be given their ordinary and commonly understood meaning and that each covered person under the policy has a right to read the contract and assume that the word "you" applies in a particularized way to that person. Thus, the Hackers argue that when Judith read this exclusion, she would have reasonably concluded that the phrase "owned by you" did not exclude her from coverage because Gary and the neighbor owned the truck, and she did not.

The Hackers' argument, however, would obviate the policy's definition of "you." The policy definition requires that "you" references both Gary as the named insured and Judith as the resident spouse. Judith, therefore, cannot reasonably claim that "owned by you," when she reads it, does not encompass the circumstance of Gary's ownership as the named insured which triggers the exclusion. The only reasonable interpretation of the exclusion language with the policy's definition of "you" is that State Auto does not cover the use of a vehicle not listed in the declarations which is owned by the named insured, and State Auto does not...