Haddad v. Justice
| Decision Date | 28 August 1975 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 22639 |
| Parties | Farrid F. HADDAD and Ratiba Haddad, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Billie Elliot JUSTICE, Defendant-Appellee. 64 Mich.App. 74, 235 N.W.2d 159 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[64 MICHAPP 75] Nelson, Gracey, Turner & Turner by Lee I. Turner, Detroit, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Harold B. Leon, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.
Before T. M. BURNS, P.J., and QUINN and KELLY, JJ.
Plaintiffs' complaint sought recovery of damages for personal injuries and property damage arising out of a collision between defendant's automobile and the automobile of Farrid Haddad. By a separate count, Ratiba Haddad sought recovery of damages for loss of consortium. Defendant moved for accelerated judgment on the basis that plaintiffs' exclusive remedy was under the Workmen's Compensation Act. This motion was granted; the plaintiffs' motion for rehearing was denied, and accelerated judgment entered. Plaintiffs appeal on a single issue, namely:
Is plaintiffs' exclusive remedy under M.C.L.A. § 418.301; M.S.A. § 17.237(301)?
The accident occurred April 17, 1972 at about 3:40 p.m. on the premises of Ford Motor Company where both Farrid Haddad and defendant were employed. Farrid Haddad was on his way to work for the 3:30 shift and defendant was on his way home after his shift had ended. The accident happened near the Ford engine plant where Farrid Haddad had driven his brother to work. Farrid [64 MICHAPP 76] Haddad was returning to Specialty Foundry Rouge Plant where he worked. Both the foundry and engine plant are part of the large Rouge Plant Complex.
Plaintiffs claim that the Workmen's Compensation Act is not their exclusive remedy because the accident did not occur on the premises of Farrid Haddad's employer and the accident did not arise out of Farrid Haddad's employment because he was on a personal errand.
M.C.L.A. § 418.301(2) reads:
'Every employee going to or from his work while on the premises where his work is to be performed, and within a reasonable time before and after his working hours, shall be presumed to be in the course of his employment.'
Whatever Farrid Haddad was doing prior to the accident, at the time thereof, he was 'going to work', and we reject the personal errand argument.
Under a literal reading of 'on the premises where his work is to be performed', the statute would not include Farrid Harrad. However, the statute is to be construed liberally, Fischer v. Lincoln Tool & Die Co., 37 Mich.App. 198, 194 N.W.2d 476 (1971). In Fischer, plaintiff was injured on a public sidewalk abutting his employer's property and his workmen's compensation award was affirmed. In Ladner v. Vander Band, 376 Mich. 321, 136 N.W.2d 916 (1965), plaintiff was injured by a fellow employee in a plant parking lot across...
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...that are compensable under a worker's compensation statute." a. Haddad v. Justice In support of this position, Brocail first relies on Haddad v. Justice, in which the Michigan Court of Appeals Plaintiffs' complaint contained a claim for property damage and the wife's claim for loss of conso......
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...v. Justice, the Court of Appeals of Michigan held that property damage was not within worker's compensation exclusivity. 64 Mich.App. 74, 235 N.W.2d 159 (1975), cert. denied, id. (Mich.1976). The plaintiffs in Haddad were an employee and his wife. They were injured in an automobile accident......
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