Haddad v. Wall

• Decision Date: 08 August 2000
• Docket Number: No. EDCV98-0130 RTVAPX.,EDCV98-0130 RTVAPX.
• Citation: 107 F.Supp.2d 1230
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: Joseph HADDAD, Plaintiff, v. Scott E. WALL, Defendant.

107 F.Supp.2d 1230

Joseph HADDAD, Plaintiff, v. Scott E. WALL, Defendant.

No. EDCV98-0130 RTVAPX.

United States District Court, C.D. California.

August 8, 2000.

E. Thomas Barham, Jr., Shirley A. Ostrow, Law Offices of Barham and Ostrow, Los Alamitos, CA, for plaintiff.

Bruce E. Disenhouse, Kinkle, Rodiger and Spriggs, A Professional Corporation, Riverside, CA, for defendant.

AMENDED ORDER GRANTING 1) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION, AND 2) FOR A PERMANENT INJUNCTION.

TIMLIN, District Judge.

The court has read and considered Plaintiff Joseph Haddad ("Haddad")'s motion for summary adjudication,¹ Defendant California Department of Highway Patrol Officer Scott E. Wall ("Wall")'s opposition, and Haddad's reply. Based on such consideration, the court concludes as follows:

I.

BACKGROUND

Haddad is challenging the constitutionality of California Civil Code § 47.5 ("Section 47.5") which authorizes a defamation suit by a peace officer for false statements made in citizen complaints regarding the officer's conduct to his or her law enforcement agency employer.

Haddad initiated the instant action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California — Eastern Division. He alleges in his Third Amended Complaint ("TAC") the following claims against Wall²: 1) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment — denial of procedural due process — pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), 2) violation of the First Amendment pursuant to Section 1983, and 3) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment — denial of equal protection — pursuant to Section 1983. Haddad requests declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking a declaration that Section 47.5 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied and an injunction prohibiting Wall from executing on the judgment Wall obtained against him in state court. Haddad now moves the court for summary adjudication on his Second, Third, and Fourth claims.

II.

UNCONTROVERTED MATERIAL FACTS³

The following are uncontroverted material facts supported by admissible evidence:

On May 14, 1997, Haddad received a traffic citation from Wall who was employed by the State of California as a highway patrolman. The traffic citation alleged a violation of California Vehicle Code § 22450(a) (Failure to Stop for a Traffic Sign).

Haddad pled not guilty to the violation. On June 30, 1997, a court trial was held in the Long Beach Municipal Court ("municipal court"), at which Wall testified. Haddad was convicted of violating California Vehicle Code § 22450(a). The municipal court imposed a fine of $104, which Haddad paid.

After his conviction, Haddad made a telephonic complaint to a CHP official stating that Wall testified falsely as to two matters during the municipal court trial. On December 29, 1997, Wall filed a complaint against Haddad pursuant to Section 47.5 in the Long Beach Municipal Court, Small Claims Division ("small claims court") alleging that Haddad knowingly filed a false complaint with his employer accusing Wall of perjury, a felony. After initiating this action, Wall wrote to Haddad stating that Wall was entitled to file an action in accordance with Section 47.5 and demanded payment of $5,000. Trial was held in the small claims court on March 31, 1998 and judgment was entered for Wall against Haddad for $5,000 and $40 in costs.

On April 23, 1998 Haddad filed a Notice of Appeal seeking a trial de novo in Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of Los Angeles ("LASC"). On or about May 26, 1998, Haddad filed an Ex Parte Application to Stay All Proceedings, or in the alternative to order Wall to pursue his claims for relief in this federal court action. It was denied. Wall prevailed in the trial de novo held on June 10, 1998, and was awarded $5,000 in damages, $150 in attorneys' fees, and $40 in costs.

II.

ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court may grant summary judgment where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c).

The Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have established the following standards for consideration of such motions: "If the party moving for summary judgment meets its initial burden of identifying for the court those portions of the materials on file that it believes demonstrates the absence of any genuine issue of material fact," the burden of production then shifts so that "the nonmoving party must set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.1987) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) (emphasis added) and citing Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103-04 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949, 107 S.Ct. 435, 93 L.Ed.2d 384 (1986) and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). With respect to these specific facts offered by the non-moving party, the court does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence, and is required to draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. See T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630-31 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).

Rule 56(c) nevertheless requires this Court to enter summary judgment, "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is insufficient: "[T]here must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party]." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must present significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint. See T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. This court thus applies to either party's motion for summary judgment the same standard as for a motion for directed verdict: "[W]hether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id.

B. Constitutionality of Section 47.5⁴

"The First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech . . . , or even expressive conduct . . . , because of disapproval of the ideas expressed." R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2542, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (internal citations omitted). "Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid." Id. However, certain "areas of speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content ..." Id. at 383, 112 S.Ct. at 2543. Defamation is such an area of speech that may be regulated, provided the regulations meet the constitutional standards set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). New York Times provides that defamation of public officials can only be proscribed if the statement was made with "actual malice." New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-280, 84 S.Ct. 710, 726, 11 L.Ed.2d 686.

The R.A.V. Court made clear that these categories of speech are not "entirely invisible to the Constitution." See id. at 383-384, 112 S.Ct. at 2543. Therefore, although the prohibition against content discrimination applies differently in the context of proscribable speech than in the area of fully protected speech, see id. at 387, 112 S.Ct. at 2545, there are still limits on the ability of government to regulate these categories of speech. See id. at 383-384, 112 S.Ct. at 2543. For example, "the government may proscribe libel; but it may not make the further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government." Id. at 384, 112 S.Ct. at 2543.

Proscribable speech, such as defamation, may be regulated: a) "[w]hen the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable," id. at 388, 112 S.Ct. at 2545; b) if a content-defined subclass of the proscribable speech "happens to be associated with particular `secondary effects' of the speech, so that the regulation is justified without reference to the content of the . . . speech," id. at 389, 112 S.Ct. at 2546; or c) if "the nature of the content discrimination is such that there is no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot," id. at 390, 112 S.Ct. at 2547. If the regulation of the proscribable speech is content-based and does not fall under one of the above three categories, it is subject to strict scrutiny. See Valley Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 107 F.3d 1328, 1330 n. 3 (9th Cir.1997) ("R.A.V. requires that the content-based regulation of proscribable content be subject to strict review.")

Under California Civil Code § 47 ("Section 47"), "most publications and broadcasts arising out of official government duties or proceedings are privileged, and therefore cannot be the subject of a defamation action." Gritchen et al. v. Collier et al., 73 F.Supp.2d 1148, 1150 (C.D.Cal.1999); see also Section 47.⁵ The privilege in Section 47 extends to complaints by citizens against public officials filed with an administrative agency. See Imig v. Ferrar, 70 Cal.App.3d 48, 55, 138 Cal.Rptr. 540 (1977). Section 47.5 creates an exception to this general privilege afforded citizen complaints against public officials in...