Hadden v. Aitken

• Decision Date: 21 November 1952
• Docket Number: No. 33214,33214
• Citation: 35 A.L.R.2d 1003,156 Neb. 215,55 N.W.2d 620
• Parties: , 35 A.L.R.2d 1003 HADDEN v. AITKEN et al.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Page 620

55 N.W.2d 620

156 Neb. 215, 35 A.L.R.2d 1003

HADDEN v. AITKEN et al.

No. 33214.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

Nov. 21, 1952.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Article III, section 14, of the Constitution of the State of Nebraska provides: 'No bill shall contain more than one subject, and the same shall be clearly expressed in the title.'

2. This constitutional provision does not require that the title be a synopsis of the law.

3. The purpose of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act is to protect the public on the highways against the operation of motor vehicles by financially irresponsible persons and thus is referable to the police power of the state. This power is inherent in every sovereignty and permits the enactment of laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the general welfare of its citizens. Therefore, in the interests of the public the state may make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of all who use its highways.

4. A license to operate an automobile is not property, but a mere privilege, the suspension of which does not deprive the licensee of his property without due process of law.

5. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'

6. This equality of the Constitution is the equality of right and not of enjoyment. A law that confers equal rights on all citizens of the state, or subjects them to equal burdens, is an equal law.

7. A license to operate an automobile upon the highways of the state is a privilege and not a property right, and the power given the Department of Roads and Irrigation to suspend such operating privileges is an administrative and not a judicial function.

Clarence S. Beck, Atty. Gen. and Clarence A. H. Meyer, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellants.

Leonard Dunker, Lincoln, for appellee.

Heard before SIMMONS, C. J., and CARTER, MESSMORE, YEAGER, CHAPPELL, WENKE and BOSLAUGH, JJ.

WENKE, Justice.

Keith M. Hadden filed his petition in the district court for Lancaster County on November 23, 1951, wherein he made Harold L. Aitken, State Engineer of the State of Nebraska and Director of the Department of Roads and Irrigation, the Department of Roads and Irrigation of the State of Nebraska, and Roy W. Blazek, Division Assistant of the Motor Vehicle Division of the Department of Roads and Irrigation of the State of Nebraska, defendants. The purpose of the action is to permanently enjoin the enforcement of an order of the Motor Vehicle Division of the Department of Roads and Irrigation of the State of Nebraska dated October 30, 1951. This order was issued pursuant to the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, Laws 1949, c. 178, p. 482, hereinafter called the Act. As a basis for such relief plaintiff contends the Act, now sections 60-501 to 60-569, R.R.S.1943, is, in several respects, unconstitutional.

Defendants demurred to the petition and, upon the demurrer being overruled, elected to stand thereon. The court thereupon entered judgment for the plaintiff wherein it directed the defendants, and each of them, to suspend the order of October 30, 1951. The court also ordered that the license, registration certificate, and license plates of the plaintiff 'be and remain' in full force and effect and that plaintiff have all the privileges evidenced thereby. The defendants have appealed from ths decree.

The petition sets forth the following factual situation: That plaintiff is a resident of Lancaster County; that there had been issued to him by the State of Nebraska an operator's or driver's license; that he was the owner of a 1948 Ford automobile; that on August 26, 1951, while operating this car, it became involved in an accident with another car owned and driven by Leona N. McConnell; that the accident happened at or near the intersection of Third and Hereford Streets in West Lincoln; that plaintiff was not responsible for the accident; that plaintiff reported the accident to the Department of Roads and Irrigation of the State of Nebraska; and that plaintiff did not carry liability insurance or bond for the payment of any damages that might result from the operation of his car.

This report was made pursuant to the following requirements of the Act: 'The operator of every motor vehicle which is in any manner involved in an accident within this state, in which any person is killed or injures or in which damage in excess of fifty dollars is sustained to the property of any one person including such operator, shall within ten days report the matter in writing to the department.' Section 60-505, R.R.S. 1943.

'* * * Department means Department of Roads and Irrigation; * * *.' Section 60-501, R.R.S.1943.

The Act provides, when such report is made, that: 'Within sixty days after the receipt of a report of a motor vehicle accident within this state which has resulted in bodily injury or death, or damage to the property of any one person in excess of fifty dollars, the department shall suspend (1) the license of each operator and all registrations of each owner of a motor vehicle in any manner involved in such accident, * * * unless such operator, owner or both shall deposit security in a sum which shall be sufficient, in the judgment of the department, to satisfy any judgment or judgments for damages resulting from such accident which may be recovered against such operator or owner; Provided, notice of such suspension shall be sent by the department to such operator and owner not less than ten days prior to the effective date of such suspension and shall state the amount required as security.' Section 60-507, R.R.S.1943.

In view of the accident being reported and in accordance with the provisions of the Act hereinbefore quoted, appellee not coming within any of the situations enumerated in sections 60-508 and 60-510, R.R.S.1943, to which the provisions of section 60-507, R.R.S.1943, are not applicable, the Department of Roads and Irrigation, through its Motor Vehicle Division, delivered to appellee the order of October 30, 1951. This order notified appellee of the financial security requirements of the Act and advised him that unless he complied therewith his privilege of operating a motor vehicle on the public streets or highways of the state, together with the license evidencing that privilege, and his privilege of using any motor vehicle owned by him on the public streets or highways of the state, together with the registration certificates and plates evidencing such privilege, were being suspended as of November 11, 1951, and would remain suspended until the financial security requirements of the Act had been fully complied with.

It is the enforcement of this order which the appellee seeks to have permanently enjoined. He has not complied with the financial security requirements of the Act or the order.

No question is raised by appellee that the procedures provided by the Act, were not followed. It is his claim that, although followed, they are not sufficient to protect his constitutional rights.

Appellants again raise their motion to dismiss the proceedings. This motion we have already denied. The basis for the motion is that appellee did not file his petition during the time within which section 60-503, R.R.S.1943, provides that appeals must be taken. This section provides: 'Any person aggrieved by an order or act of the department, under the provisions of sections 60-501 to 60-569, may, within ten days after notice thereof, file a petition in the district court of the county where the aggrieved person resides * * * for a review thereof; * * *.'

If this proceeding is an appeal from the order of October 30, 1951, then it is out of time and the motion should be sustained. See Rhoades v. State Real Estate Commission, 152 Neb. 701, 42 N.W.2d 610. However, we do not think the petition was for the purpose of perfecting an appeal from the order of October 30, 1951, but that it was filed as an original action in equity seeking to permanently enjoin the enforcement of the order of October 30, 1951, on the grounds that the legislation is, in several respects, unconstitutional.

The petition sets forth:

'j). That the Act is broader than its title in violation of the Constitution of the State of Nebraska.

'k). That the Act contains more than one subject and the same is not clearly expressed in the title in violation of Article III of the Constitution of the State of Nebraska.'

Insofar as here material the title in as follows: 'An Act relating to the giving of proof of financial responsibility of owners and operators of motor vehicles; to provide for the cancellation and suspension of motor vehicle registrations and operators' licenses under certain contingencies; to provide a construction and a savings clause; to provide penalties for violation thereof; to provide for the administration of the act; * * *.' Laws 1949, c. 178, p. 482.

Article III, section 14, of the Constitution of the State of Nebraska provides 'No bill shall contain more than one subject, and the same shall be clearly expressed in the title.'

We have carefully examined the Act as passed by the 1949 Legislature. It consists of 71 sections and its provisions are too numerous to analyze in detail. Appellee's objections to the title do not specifically point out in what respect the Act is broader than its title, contains more than one subject, or the subject is not clearly expressed in the title.

As said in Maher v. State, 144 Neb. 463, 13 N.W.2d 641, 646, by quoting from Lennox v. Housing Auhority of the City of Omaha, 137 Neb. 582, 290 N.W. 451, 291 N.W. 100: "The constitutional provision does not require that the title be a synopsis of the law."

We find the Act has but one general object that it contains no matter which is not germane thereto, and that the title fairly...