Hadden v. Bowen
| Decision Date | 06 February 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. NC 85-0001J.,NC 85-0001J. |
| Citation | 657 F. Supp. 679 |
| Parties | Ruby May HADDEN, Plaintiff, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Utah |
Michael E. Bulson, Ogden, Utah, for plaintiff.
Gregory C. Diamond, Asst. U.S. Atty., Salt Lake City, Utah, for defendant.
This is an action for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) following plaintiff's successful action for disability benefits.
Ruby May Hadden applied for disability benefits in September 1983, claiming to have been disabled since July 1980 by alcoholism, seizures, mental retardation, personality disorder syndrome and degenerative disc disease. That application and Ms. Hadden's request for reconsideration were denied in late 1983. Upon Ms. Hadden's request, a hearing before an administrative law judge was held on April 10, 1984. The ALJ ruled that Ms. Hadden was not disabled, based on two findings: First, that her impairment did not meet or exceed any of the impairments listed in the Social Security Administration regulations, 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpart P, appendix 1 (1984) and second, that she was capable of returning to her past work as a maid or dishwasher. The Appeals Council denied further review in October 1984 and Ms. Hadden thereupon sought review in this court.
This court referred that case to the magistrate in January 1985. In his Report and Recommendation the magistrate found that the ALJ did not have substantial evidence to find that Ruby Hadden was capable of working as a maid or a dishwasher. Ms. Hadden's back problems, the magistrate noted, would preclude her from performing the lifting, walking and standing required of either a maid or a dishwasher. Moreover, the ALJ had failed to consider the effect that Ms. Hadden's mental problems might have on her ability to do these jobs. This court adopted the Report and Recommendation and then remanded the case to the Secretary for further proceedings.2 A second ALJ determined in January 1986 that, based on a new listing of impairments promulgated in August 1985, 20 C.F.R. § 404 subpart P, appendix 1 (1985), Ms. Hadden's mental and personality disorders constituted impairments sufficient to demonstrate that she was disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.
Ms. Hadden is now before this court requesting an award for her attorney's fees under the EAJA. That law reads, in pertinent part:
A court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, ... incurred by that party in any civil action ... including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The parties do not dispute the fact that Ms. Hadden is a prevailing party or that she has timely complied with all procedural prerequisites to an award of attorney's fees under the EAJA. Thus, the only issue in this case is whether the government has shown its position to have been "substantially justified."3
In this circuit the term substantial justification essentially requires an inquiry into reasonableness. Wyoming Wildlife Federation v. United States, 792 F.2d 981, 985 (10th Cir.1986); United States v. 2,116 Boxes of Boned Beef, 726 F.2d 1481, 1486 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 825, 105 S.Ct. 105, 83 L.Ed.2d 49 (1984).4 While this proposition has been somewhat obscured in the legislative history surrounding recent amendments to the EAJA,5 it remains the most logical construction of the Act.
In the case at hand, the merits of the case have already been examined for reasonableness. Moreover, under the 1985 amendments to the EAJA, it is now clear that "the position of the United States" includes the initial agency decision. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D). In overturning the first ALJ's determination as unsupported by substantial evidence, this court concluded that there was not "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Hadden v. Heckler, No. NC-85-0001 J, Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, as adopted by this court, at 2, quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). Therefore, the original agency position, viewed on the merits, has already been reviewed for reasonableness and has been found wanting.
It is too late now for the government to argue that the original decision was reasonable, or substantially justified.6 While the inquiry into the question of substantial justification was intended to be separate and distinct from the merits of the case,7 such cannot mean merely a repetition of the prior process, which determined the absence of a factual basis for the agency position. The government's burden is broader than that. It now becomes one of pointing to additional facts in the record that, taken with the facts previously relied upon and found inadequate, demonstrate the government's reasonableness in taking the action that it did. In short, the government must, in order to resist an award of attorney's fees in an action where the underlying agency action has been held to be unsupported by substantial evidence, show evidence of "the most extraordinary special circumstances" to demonstrate substantial justification. H.R.Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 9-10, reprinted in 1985 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 132, 138.
The government has made no such additional showing. Rather, it has simply chosen to reargue that the facts in the record justified the initial agency decision. This court's prior decision determined that those facts were insufficient to reasonably support the ALJ's original finding. Without more, in this case the government does not sustain its current burden of demonstrating substantial justification.
The government has not contested the amount of fees requested. This court specifically finds that the fee request is reasonable and well within the limits of an award under the EAJA for this type of case. The court therefore ORDERS that the amount of $1,687.50 be and hereby is awarded to the plaintiff for her attorney's fees, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Judgment shall forthwith be entered accordingly.
This case is once again before this court, this time on a motion by defendant, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, to alter or amend this court's memorandum opinion and order dated October 1, 1986. That decision granted the plaintiff, Ruby May Hadden, her attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). The court denies the Secretary's motion.
The facts of the case and the reasoning that led to the fee award are set out in the opinion dated October 1. In brief, that opinion held that because the Secretary's decision in originally denying Ms. Hadden's disability benefits was unsupported by "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," Hadden v. Heckler, No. 85-0001-J, Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, as adopted by this court, at 2, that position could not be "substantially justified" within the meaning of the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), unless the government could show some "extraordinary special circumstances" demonstrating substantial justification. Hadden v. Bowen, 657 F.Supp. 679, 682 (D.Utah 1986) (hereinafter Oct. 1 opinion). The Secretary filed this motion to amend under Fed.R. Civ.P. 59(e), arguing that the court did not apply the correct standard of law in evaluating the Secretary's position for substantial justification.
The Secretary emphasizes four points in arguing for amendment of this court's opinion. First, he argues that this court relied on a House Report that did not accurately represent the intent of Congress in enacting the 1985 amendments to EAJA. Second, he argues that this court failed to give appropriate weight to the statements made by some of the legislators and President Reagan when those amendments were voted and signed into law. Third, the Secretary contends that the standard applied by this court conflicts with that followed by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Finally, he maintains that this court's construction of the EAJA conflicts with the policy of that act. This court disagrees with each of these four points.
Contrary to the Secretary's first contention, this court did not "rely" on the House Report with which the Secretary finds fault. This court's reasoning was based on three simple propositions:
Given these three points, this court concluded that the Secretary failed to demonstrate any circumstances that could support a conclusion that the Secretary's position, although unsupported by evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate, was nevertheless reasonable.1 Inherent in a finding that a decision was made without enough "evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" is a finding that that decision was unreasonable. This court endorsed the House...
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Hadden v. Bowen
...to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) 1 after she successfully litigated her entitlement to social security disability benefits, 657 F.Supp. 679. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court used the correct legal standard in evaluating whether the government's position in the un......