Haddick v. District Court of Polk County

• Decision Date: 14 March 1914
• Citation: 145 N.W. 943,164 Iowa 417
• Parties: LEWIS T. HADDICK, Plaintiff, v. THE DISTRICT COURT OF POLK COUNTY, IOWA, and HON. W. H. MCHENRY, one of the Judges thereof, Defendant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

145 N.W. 943

164 Iowa 417

LEWIS T. HADDICK, Plaintiff, v. THE DISTRICT COURT OF POLK COUNTY, IOWA, and HON. W. H. MCHENRY, one of the Judges thereof, Defendant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

March 14, 1914

Certiorari to Polk District Court.

THIS is an original certiorari proceeding in this court, wherein a writ has issued to the district court directing it to certify up its record in a certain contempt proceeding against the plaintiff herein, wherein the plaintiff was adjudged guilty. The proceeding here is in the nature of an appeal from the order complained of, and casts upon us the duty to review such order and the proceedings leading up thereto.--Annulled and Reversed.

Annulled and Reversed.

B. J Cavanagh, Parker, Parrish & Miller, and Jacob Sachs, for plaintiff.

George Wambach, R. O. Brennan, and H. W. Byers, for defendants.

EVANS J. LADD, C. J., and WEAVER and PRESTON, JJ., concur.

OPINION

EVANS, J.

The proceedings in contempt against the plaintiff were had December 17 and 18, 1913. The preceding history, upon which the contempt proceeding rested, was as follows: Haddick was administrator of the Hans Bohstedt estate pending in Polk county. He became involved in more or less controversy with alleged foreign heirs. His due administration of his office as administrator was also hampered by the fact that his father was a claimant against the estate, and that himself and wife were also claimants against the same. He was at one time peremptorily removed from office by one of the judges of the district court. That order was subsequently annulled by this court as having been made in excess of power, and in disregard of the statute. Haddick v. District Court, 160 Iowa 487, 141 N.W. 925. In August, 1913, the plaintiff presented to the court his resignation, and filed therewith his final report. His report was approved in all respects except as to certain specific items of expense incurred by him in the prosecution of the case above cited, and amounting to a total of $ 393. These items of expense were not allowed by the district court, and the amount thereof was charged against him. The sum total in his hands, concerning which there was no dispute, amounted to over $ 9,000. A new administrator was appointed, and Haddick was ordered to turn over to such person the full amount in his hands, including the disputed items. Thereupon Haddick appealed to this court from the order of the district court refusing the allowance of the disputed items, and filed a supersedeas bond in compliance with the statute, and this was duly approved. He also tendered to the administrator the full amount in his hands, except the amount involved in his appeal, namely, $ 393. Thereupon contempt proceedings were instituted against him. He was charged therein with a refusal to comply with the order of the court. He was thereupon cited to appear and show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. He appeared and showed cause as above indicated, namely: That he had appealed to the Supreme Court from the order of disallowance, and that he had duly filed a supersedeas bond, and that the order of the district court was thereby suspended so far as its enforcement was concerned, and that the district court was without power to enforce such order until after disposition of the appeal in the Supreme Court. Upon hearing had, the district court entered an order adjudging the plaintiff guilty of contempt, and ordering that he be imprisoned in the county jail until full compliance was made with the previous order of the court.

I. The defendant concedes that the order of disallowance of the expense items was an appealable order. The appeal, therefore, had the effect to confer upon this court jurisdiction of the subject-matter. It is ordinarily true that, if a party has the right to appeal in any case, he has the statutory right to file a supersedeas bond, and thereby to stay all proceedings, under the order or judgment appealed from, looking to its enforcement. This general rule is not disputed by counsel for defendants.

It is urged, however, that the rule was not applicable to the case under consideration, because the order appealed from was a self-executing order, and could not therefore be affected by a supersedeas bond. It may be conceded that, if the order was self-executing, a supersedeas bond availed nothing. The function of a supersedeas bond is to maintain the status quo and to supersede...