Haddock v. Shelton

Decision Date14 January 1930
Docket NumberCase Number: 19186
PartiesHADDOCK et al. v. SHELTON.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court
Syllabus

¶0 1. Indians--Approval of Full-Blood Indian's Conveyance of Inherited Land by County Judge not a Judicial Act.

The approval of a conveyance of inherited Indian land by a full-blood Indian, under the provisions of section 9 of the Act of Congress of May 27, 1908 (35 Stat 315), is a "ministerial" and not a "judicial act."

2. Same--Purpose of Requirement of Approval by County Judge.

The purpose of section 9 of the Act of Congress of May 27, 1908, requiring the approval of a conveyance by a full-blood Indian heir, was to put the Indian upon an equality with the prospective grantee in the matter of business sense or acumen, to the end that he may have a square deal, or at least be in no greater danger of suffering pecuniary loss by getting the worse of the deal than is ordinarily incident to such a transaction between persons dealing with each other at arm's length.

3. Same.--Time and Place of Approval.

Where a full-blood Indian heir to allotted Indian land presents to a county judge a deed to the land and an application for the approval of the conveyance thereof, and the county judge outside of the county in which he is an officer, on Saturday night, examines the grantor and, after the examination, states that he will approve the conveyance upon the payment of the purchase price, and delivers the deed to the court clerk with instructions to hold the matter until Monday morning, when the county judge, would be in the county seat, where the county judge would then instruct the delivery of the deed and make the order approving it if the money had been paid, and on Monday morning, at the county seat, the county judge is informed of the payment of the consideration, instructs the delivery of the papers and the deed and instructs the court clerk to enter an order of approval thereof, the approval of the conveyance occurs at the county seat on Monday morning.

4. Same--Evidence--Parol Evidence to Show Time and Place of Order of Approval.

Where a grantor in a collateral proceeding attempts to impeach an order of approval of a deed from a full-blood heir to allotted Indian land by parol testimony tending to show the approval was not at the place named in the order, the defendants in the suit may, by parol testimony, show that the approval was at the place named in the order, but at a different date from that named in the order.

Error from District Court, Jefferson County; M. W. Pugh, Judge.

Action by Mulcy Shelton against M. M. Haddock and others. Judgment for plaintiff and defendants appeal. Reversed, with directions.

Keaton, Wells, Johnston & Barnes, Eugene S. Wells, and George E. Rider, for plaintiff in error.

J. B. Moore, Green & Pruet, and Anglin & Stevenson, for defendant in error.

ANDREWS, J.

¶1 The defendant in error, as plaintiff, filed her petition against the plaintiffs in error, as defendants, to quiet the title to certain real estate. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and defendants appealed. The parties, for convenience, will be referred to as plaintiff and defendants.

¶2 The allegations of the petition, as amended, essential on this appeal are that plaintiff is the owner of certain real estate; that the land was allotted to certain full-blood Choctaw Indians; that plaintiff is a full-blood Choctaw Indian; that plaintiff inherited the land; that the plaintiff executed a deed to the defendants E. T. Haddock and D. B. Taliaferro, which deed was void and of no effect for the reason that the same was not approved by the county court of Pushmataha county; that a purported order of approval was void for the reason that it was signed by the county judge of Pushmataha county at a time when he was out of Pushmataha county and when the county court was not in session; that the order was signed in the absence of the plaintiff, and plaintiff received for the land in consideration of $ 1,000, which was wholly inadequate; that plaintiff was induced to execute said deed by reason of the influence of one Ella Thurlow, a near relative, who conspired with the defendants E. T. Haddock and D. B. Taliaferro to defraud plaintiff of her land; that E. T. Haddock deeded the land to M. M. Haddock, who was his wife, and that the, defendants Travelers Insurance Company and Atkinson-Warren-Henley Company claimed some right, title, or interest in and to the land. The prayer was that plaintiff's title be quieted; that the purported order of approval be canceled and that defendant be required to account for the rents from the land. Attached to the petition as an exhibit was a general warranty deed dated September 30, 1922, reciting a consideration of $ 2,000. The deed was regularly acknowledged before a notary public on September 30, 1922, and was filed for record in the office of the county clerk on October 3, 1922. Indorsed on the deed was the following:

"Presented to me this 30th day of September, 1922, and approved, John Cooke, County Judge, of Pushmataha County, Oklahoma."

¶3 There was also attached to the petition as an exhibit a certified copy of an order of approval which was dated September 30, 1922. The certificate thereto was dated September 30, 1922, and was signed "O. L. Blanche, Court Clerk." This instrument was filed for record on the 3rd day of October, 1922.

¶4 Each of the defendants filed separate answers, and the defendants Travelers Insurance Company and Atkinson-Warren-Henley Company filed cross-petitions praying for foreclosure of their mortgages. These answers asserted the validity of the conveyance, and the two corporations alleged that they relied solely upon the record title in taking their mortgages.

¶5 Plaintiff filed a reply to the answer of the various defendants and answered to the cross-petitions of the defendants.

¶6 At the trial plaintiff offered in evidence the deed and the certified copy of the order of approval. The description of the land and the devolution of the title thereto was admitted. Plaintiff then testified to the following: Her parents died when she was young and she was put in school at the age of 5 years, where she remained until ten, months after she was 18 years of age. She left there with Miss Thurlow, who came for her in a car and took her to Durant, where they met E. T. Haddock and Mr. Dudley. The next morning Haddock produced the deed to the land and offered her $ 250 for it. She asked $ 1,000 and he finally agreed to pay her $ 1,000 for it. He told her that the land was not any good. She knew nothing of the land and had no business experience. They went from there to Antlers, where they arrived in the evening. They went to the courthouse and found that the county judge was away. They then went to the home of the court clerk, and from there to Boswell, in Choctaw county, where they found the county judge. At first she refused to say much, but Mr. Dudley and Miss Thurlow and Haddock told her not to be scared, and she then talked to the county judge, after which she thought that the judge signed the order approving the deed. This occurred on Saturday, September 30, 1922. They went to Durant, the court clerk accompanying them. The court clerk wanted to see if the money was in the bank. After the court clerk found that the money was in the bank, the court clerk gave plaintiff the check and gave Haddock the deed and order. Plaintiff and court clerk then went to Madill, and on Monday morning plaintiff cashed the check and drew $ 200 and Miss Thurlow drew $ 200. On Monday morning the plaintiff saw E. T. Haddock in his office. Plaintiff never went back to school. In the conversation with the county judge the plaintiff told him she was getting $ 1,000 for the land. He asked her all about the transaction, after which the county judge took the papers in the house, and she thought that he signed them. Mr. Haddock went with her to the bank on Monday morning to cash the check.

¶7 The other testimony shows that she did not cash the check, but drew $ 200 in cash and deposited $ 1,800, and eight days after she deposited the check she gave a check to the bank at Wapanucka for $ 1,800, and the bank gave her credit for $ 1,800. The check was in the sum of $ 2,000.

¶8 F. M. Dudley, county attorney of Carter county, testified. At the request of the defendant Haddock, he prepared the petition for the approval of the deed and the order of approval. He went with plaintiff to Antlers and found the county judge was away, and he then went to a place outside the county, where he found the county judge. The court clerk kept the check for $ 2,000 and deed.

¶9 At the conclusion of this testimony the defendants demurred, and the demurrers were overruled. The Travelers Insurance Company then introduced its mortgage and second mortgage from the defendant E. T. Haddock, and the Atkinson-Warren-Henley Company introduced the abstract of title on which those companies relied in making the mortgages.

¶10 O. L. Blanche, the court clerk, testified that on September 30, 1922, plaintiff, E. T. Haddock, and F. M. Dudley came to Antlers to see him and said that the plaintiff was going to school at Muskogee and that it was important that she get back to school. He telephoned the county judge, who was at Boswell, and made arrangements to meet him there. The petition for approval of the deed was filed with the court clerk, docketed and numbered. The court clerk took that petition with him and the court clerk, Dudley, Haddock, a lady, and plaintiff went to Boswell. When they got to Boswell, the plaintiff refused to talk to the judge, and the judge went back into the hotel. The lady then told the plaintiff that if she wanted the transaction to go through, she had better talk with the county judge. The plaintiff said she would talk with him. The county judge came out and the plaintiff talked with the county judge. The judge then left the plaintiff and went to where Haddock...

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5 cases
  • Coats v. Riley, Case Number: 20454
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • 8 Diciembre 1931
    ...of section 9 of the Act of Congress of May 27, 1908 (35 Stat. 315), is a 'ministerial' and not a 'judicial act'." Haddock v. Shelton, 142 Okla. 202, 286 P. 329. ¶38 That deed did not amount to an ouster of the cross-petitioners, under the law, though Zeno Weaver surrendered possession there......
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    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
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