Haddock v. Tarrant Cnty.
| Decision Date | 01 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-11327,19-11327 |
| Citation | 986 F.3d 893 |
| Parties | Diane Scott HADDOCK, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS; Patricia Baca-Bennett; Kenneth Earl Newell; Jesus Nevarez, Jr.; Honorable Judith Wells; Jerome S. Hennigan ; James B. Munford ; Alex Kim, Defendants—Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Walter L. Taylor, Hart Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Colleyville, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Melvin Keith Ogle, Esq., District Attorney's Office for the County of Tarrant, Fort Worth, TX, for Defendant-Appellee Tarrant County, Texas.
Natalie Deyo Thompson, Lanora Christine Pettit, Office of the Attorney General, Office of the Solicitor General, Benjamin Walton, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, General Litigation Division, Austin, TX, for Defendants-Appellees Patricia Baca-Bennett, Kenneth Earl Newell, Jesus Nevarez, Jr., Honorable Judith Wells, Jerome S. Hennigan, James B. Munford, Alex Kim.
Before Clement, Ho, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Diane Haddock sued the seven district judges of Tarrant County's family law courts (the "District Judges") in their official capacities, District Judge Patricia Baca-Bennett in her personal capacity, and the County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that she was fired for refusing to support a political candidate and for her husband's political activity. Holding that Haddock was both a policymaking and confidential employee lawfully subject to patronage termination, the district court dismissed her suit. We AFFIRM.
Tarrant County family courts are presided over by seven elected district judges, who, in turn, are assisted by seven appointed associate judges. Haddock was an associate judge for nearly twenty years. Because they serve more than one district judge, Texas law requires Tarrant County associate judges be appointed with the unanimous approval of the district judges; they can be removed, however, by a majority vote. TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 201.001(d), 204(b).
In 2016, Haddock and fellow associate judge James Munford indicated interest in running for a district judge position. It was believed they would run against one another for the 322nd district seat. Around the same time, the grandparents of a child who died while in her mother's custody—after Haddock had signed the order giving the mother custody—circulated claims that Haddock had mishandled the case, going so far as to allege that she had taken a bribe.1 Munford's wife allegedly repeated these harsh allegations publicly, presumably to gain political advantage for her husband. Haddock decided not to run, but she and her husband do not appear to have reconciled with Munford and his wife.
During the campaign, although Haddock herself allegedly did not engage in any overt political activity, her husband campaigned against Munford. Mr. Haddock and a political group with which he was associated accused Munford of being a "RINO" (Republican In Name Only), violating the Second Amendment by signing protective orders requiring litigants to surrender their firearms on inadequate evidence, physically abusing and sexually assaulting his first wife, and terrifying his current wife by threatening her and a male friend of hers with a gun.
District Judge Patricia Baca-Bennett, who supported Munford's candidacy, allegedly sought to put a stop to Mr. Haddock's opposition by demanding that Haddock publicly support Munford and "get her husband under control." Haddock refused to do either. Baca-Bennett allegedly subjected Haddock to "badgering, threats, back-biting, undermining and maligning, and a campaign to orchestrate the termination of [Haddock's] employment." She also allegedly sought to intimidate Haddock's husband by reminding him "who Diane works for" and spread rumors about Haddock resigning that "undermined [Haddock's] authority as a judge."
During the campaign, Haddock also learned that the district judge for her own District 233 was retiring. Kenneth Newell won the Republican primary (he then ran unopposed, meaning he knew then that he would become District 233's district judge), so he spoke with Haddock about her future as the District 233 associate judge. He indicated that he was concerned about the political situation and had "not made a decision about what to do with" Haddock.
Following unsuccessful complaints to Tarrant County's human resources department, Haddock eventually sued Baca-Bennett and Tarrant County for subjecting her to a hostile work environment in retaliation for her husband's political activity and her own refusal to support Munford. Fewer than ninety days later, she was terminated by a majority of the seven district judges, including Newell. She amended her complaint to address her termination, add the District Judges in their official capacities as defendants, and demand reinstatement or front pay in lieu thereof.
The district court dismissed Haddock's claims for money damages against the District Judges in their official capacity under Rule 12(b)(1), holding that the suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment because the District Judges are state officials, meaning "the state was the real, substantial party in interest," and the state has not waived sovereign immunity. See Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart , 563 U.S. 247, 255, 131 S.Ct. 1632, 179 L.Ed.2d 675 (2011) (cleaned up). Haddock does not appeal this ruling.
The district court also dismissed Haddock's claim for injunctive relief against the District Judges under Rule 12(b)(6). The First Amendment generally prohibits adverse employment actions against government employees based on political affiliation, Elrod v. Burns , 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), but, where "an employee's private political beliefs would interfere with the discharge of [her] public duties, [her] First Amendment rights may be required to yield to the State's vital interest in maintaining governmental effectiveness and efficiency," Branti v. Finkel , 445 U.S. 507, 517, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). Sometimes called the Elrod / Branti exception, this maxim most often applies to employees in policymaking or confidential positions.
Finding that Haddock's position involved both policymaking and confidential relationships with the District Judges and, "[t]herefore, an associate judge's political ideology, associations, and activities may rationally influence a district judge's assessment of the individual's suitability for a position as an associate judge," the district court held that she had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted against the District Judges and dismissed Haddock's demands for injunctive relief under Rule 12(b)(6). Haddock v. Tarrant Cnty. , No. 4:18-cv-00817-O, 2019 WL 7944073, at *7–8 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2019).
The district court dismissed all claims against Tarrant County under Rule 12(b)(6), both because Haddock had failed to allege an underlying constitutional violation and because she had failed to allege a county policy or policymaker that caused the alleged violation. Finally, the district court dismissed all claims against Baca-Bennett under Rule 12(b)(6) on the basis of qualified immunity. Haddock timely appealed.
We review a dismissal on the pleadings under Rules 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6) de novo, "accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs." Wolcott v. Sebelius , 635 F.3d 757, 762–63 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). "Generally, a court ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion may rely on the complaint, its proper attachments, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Id . at 763 (cleaned up).
Haddock argues on appeal that the district court erred in applying the Elrod / Branti exception to her First Amendment claims because she claims that she is neither a policymaker nor a confidential employee. She also argues that her intimate association claim (allegedly, Baca-Bennett retaliated against Haddock for her husband's speech, not her own) is—categorically—not subject to the Elrod / Branti exception. We disagree.
Haddock also argues that the Supreme Court's balancing test in Pickering v. Board of Education , 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968), would be more appropriate than an Elrod / Branti analysis. We need not analyze this argument in any great depth; where the Government's interest in political loyalty is weighed against an employee's First Amendment interests, the tests frequently merge. See Maldonado v. Rodriguez , 932 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2019) (). Generally speaking—and applicable here—if the Elrod / Branti exception applies, the Pickering analysis is also concluded.
We also note that the test, strictly speaking, is not about whether an employer is a policymaker or confidential employee. "[R]ather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved." Branti , 445 U.S. at 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287. That said, "where a public employee ... occupies a confidential or policymaking role, the employer's interests more easily outweigh the employee's First Amendment rights." Maldonado , 932 F.3d at 392 (alteration in original) (quoting Gentry v. Lowndes Cnty. , 337 F.3d 481, 486 (5th Cir. 2003) ).
(1)
Haddock's pleadings, combined with Texas law, make clear that she is a policymaker subject to the Elrod / Branti exception, and political affiliation is relevant to her qualification for the associate judge position.
The reason the Elrod / Branti exception typically applies to policymakers is that...
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...all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs." Haddock v. Tarrant Cnty., Texas, 986 F.3d 893, 897 (5th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Stratta v. Roe, 961 F.3d 340, 349 (5th Cir. 2020). First, Brown argues t......