Hafter v. Strange

• Decision Date: 21 November 1887
• Citation: 65 Miss. 323,3 So. 190
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: HANNAH HAFTER ET AL. v. ELIZA STRANGE

3 So. 190

65 Miss. 323

HANNAH HAFTER ET AL. v. ELIZA STRANGE

Supreme Court of Mississippi

November 21, 1887

APPEAL from the Chancery Court of Lauderdale County, HON. SYLVANUS EVANS, Chancellor.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.

Woods McIntosh & Williams, for the appellants.

This court, in Taylor v. Mosely, 57 Miss. 544, say "that open, notorious and exclusive possession of real estate, under an apparent claim of ownership, is notice to those who subsequently deal with the title of whatever the one in possession has in the fee, whether such interest be legal or equitable; that there are some exceptions to it, but this case does not fall within the exceptions. A possessor of land may be estopped under some circumstances from claiming that his possession is notice of his claim to the land," etc.

We submit that the exception, at least one of the exceptions alluded to, was as in this case, viz.: "Where an instrument by which the title to real estate is affected is properly recorded, the record thereof is constructive notice to subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers under the same grantee." See Wade on the Law of Notice, sec. 97, and note 2 and authorities there cited; also note 3, 7 Watts (Pa.) 385; Scott v. Gallagher et al., 14 Sergt. &amp R., 334.

In Bloomer v. Henderson, 8 Mich. (4 Cooly), page 405, the court says: "But the object of the law in holding such possession constructive notice where it has been so held, is to protect the possessor from the acts of others who do not derive title from him, not to protect him against his own deed. If a party executes and delivers to another a solemn deed of conveyance to land itself, and suffers that deed to go on record, he says to all the world: 'Whatever right I have or may have claimed in this land I have conveyed to my grantee; and though I am yet in possession, it is for a temporary purpose, without claim of right, and merely as a tenant at sufferance to my grantee.' This is the natural inference to be drawn from the recorded deed; and in the minds of all men would be calculated to dispense with the necessity of further inquiry upon this point: all presumption of right is rebutted by his own act and deed. One of the main objects of the registry law would be defeated by any other rule," and cites in support: Scott v Gallagher, 14 S. & R. 333; Newhall v. Pierce, 5 Pick., 450; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cutler, 3 Sanford Ch. 176; Leading Cases in Equity, vol. ii., 118, and further says: "The cases cited by complainant's counsel, I think, may all be reconciled with this view of the law." We, too, think that all the authorities cited by counsel for appellee may be reconciled with the view of the law above stated.

Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 11, Sec. 616 and 617. See also on this point, 15 Mich. 497; 63 Cal. 550; Wade on Notice, Sec. 97-8, cases cited, and Sec. 298, 226, 118 and cases cited.

Decree reversed.

M. H. Whitaker, for the appellee.

The Hafter's were not innocent purchasers. Eliza Strange, the complainant below, was in "open, notorious and exclusive possession" of the land bought by the Hafter's from Peter Shearer, which was sufficient to put them on inquiry--indeed it was notice of whatever interest she had in the property.

Taylor vs. Mosely, 57 Miss. 544 et seq.; Wade on Notice, Sec. 273; 1 S. & M., 443; 6 S. & M. 345; 7 S. & M., 456; 37 Miss. 546; 45 Miss. 694; 51 Miss. 146; 52 Miss. 546.

W. H. Ethridge, on the same side.

The evidence shows a state of facts sufficient to indicate to a person who was about to purchase property in good faith that Shearer had fraudulently obtained the deed to this block of land:--it was sufficient to put him on an inquiry which would lead defendants to a true knowledge of the fraudulent manner in which Shearer procured the deed, therefore, it was notice of the fraud to defendants, Hafters.

Parker vs. Foy, 43 Miss. 260.

OPINION

COOPER, C. J.

The appellee was the owner of block 4 in the town of Meridian and sold and conveyed two small lots thereof to other persons who caused their deeds to be recorded, and entered into possession of the lots. After this she conveyed to her grandson, Peter Shearer, all of block 4, reciting the consideration of the conveyance to be "natural love and affection and the sum of one dollar." Shearer at once recorded his deed and three days after its execution sold to the appellants a large part of the block, including a part of one of the lots previously conveyed by the appellee to other parties.

After the conveyances had been executed by Shearer to appellants and after they had paid the purchase price, the appellee exhibited the bill in this cause against Shearer and appellants to vacate and annul the conveyance made by her to him, and those made by him to appellants. The bill charges that the complainant is very old, feeble, and weak of mind that Shearer is her grandson, who had lived with her and in whom she reposed confidence; that he represented to her that he would soon be married and desired to build him a house on a part of the land; that appellee, moved by affection for him, agreed to give him a small lot upon which to build, and Shearer undertook to have a proper deed prepared for execution; that he falsely and fraudulently caused a deed to be prepared conveying the whole block; that appellee being unable to read or write did not discover the fraud, but executed the deed supposing it to convey only the small parcel of land she intended to give to Shearer; that she has from the date of the execution of the deed remained in the actual, adverse, notorious, and exclusive possession of all the block except that previously conveyed by her to other parties, claiming the same as her own; that appellants were chargeable with notice of her rights in the premises by reason of her occupancy, and that the exercise of reasonable diligence on their part would have led to a discovery of the fraud which had been perpetrated on her by Shearer; that appellants did not pay the fair market price for the land bought by them; the fact that Shearer was willing to sell at the price obtained should have admonished them of some defect in his title or right to the property. Shearer made no defence and the bill was taken as confessed as against him. The appellants answered...