Hagaman v. Andrews, 39237

Decision Date12 February 1970
Docket NumberNo. 39237,39237
Citation232 So.2d 1
PartiesLloyd C. HAGAMAN, Russell Stratton, Jr., Nancy Malloy (Mrs. W.P.), individually, and as employees of the Office of the Governor; and Wilbur Brewton and John C. Behringer, individually, Appellants, v. William C. ANDREWS, Chairman, Elvin L. Martinez, Vice Chairman, Harold G. Featherstone, William G. James, Joe Lang Kershaw, Charles Nergard, Jerome Pratt, and Leonard V. Wood, as and constituting the Elections Committee of the House of Representatives of Florida, and Capital City Second National Bank of Tallahassee, a banking association under the laws of the United States, Appellees.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Gerald Mager, Julius F. Parker, Jr., of Prker, Foster & Madigan, Tallahassee, for appellants.

William G. O'Neill, of O'Neill & Trammell, Ocala, Joseph C. Jacobs and E. C. Deeno Kitchen, of Ervin, Pennington, Varn & Jacobs and Charles S. Ausley, of Ausley, Ausley, McMullen, McGehee & Carothers, Tallahassee, for appellees.

ADKINS, Justice.

This is a direct appeal from a final judgment of the Circuit Court construing Sections 3(c)(1), 4(a) and 5, all contained in Art. III, Fla.Const. (1968), F.S.A.

This case arose when Capital City Second National Bank, herein referred to as 'the Bank,' filed its complaint seeking a declaratory judgment to determine the Bank's duty to respond to a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Committee on Elections of the House of Representatives of Florida requiring one of its officers to appear before the Committee and produce the Bank's records of deposits and disbursements of money by an organization known as 'The Governor's Club.' Five individuals, none of whom were connected with the Bank, but part of whom were admittedly connected with The Governor's Club were allowed to intervene.

The Bank is basically in the position of a stakeholder seeking a determination as to whether its legal duty to respect the privacy and confidence of its depositor must yield to the power of the Committee to subpoena its records. The real controversy is between those interested in The Governor's Club on the one hand (hereinafter referred to as the 'Appellants') and the Committee on Elections (hereinafter referred to as the 'Committee') on the other.

The trial judge ordered, inter alia, that the Bank respond to the subpoena duces tecum issued by the Committee and that the Appellants abide by the subpoena. The trial judge also held that the members of The Governor's Club or others having knowledge relating to The Governor's Club may be required to divulge their knowledge as to membership of The Governor's Club.

The Appellants first contend that Sec. 3(c)(1), Art. III, Fla.Const. (1968) does not authorize the conduct and initiation of investigation while the Legislature is in special session and in the absence of requisite consent by each House.

Sec. 3(c)(1), Art III, Fla.Const. (1968) reads as follows:

'The governor, by proclamation stating the purpose, may convene the legislature in special session during which only such legislative business may be transacted as is within the purview of the proclamation, or of a communication from the governor, or is introduced by consent of two-thirds of the membership of each house.'

On November 7, 1969, the Governor issued an Executive Proclamation calling the Legislature into special session for ten days and limiting such call as follows:

'* * * for the sole and exclusive purpose of adopting legislation to implement and properly fund the sixteen-year road building program for the State of Florida and to select 1973 election primary dates.'

On December 1, 1969, the Legislature convened in special session at which time the House of Representatives adopted House Resolution 18--A which provides as follows:

'* * *

1. It shall be the duty of the committee to make as complete an investigation as time permits of the course of conduct relating to the election process on the part of any person or group of persons which would constitute a violation of the Florida Statutes or which would interfere with the orderly processes of elections or which would hold up to disrepute the elective process.

2. Such investigations shall be conducted with the purpose of reporting to the house of representatives and to the legislature any activities of any person or group of persons which would indicate that corrective legislation requiring disclosure of the solicitation, collection, or disbursement of funds by or in behalf of candidates or public officials from private sources, fund raising, or contributors is desirable or necessary.'

This resolution was adopted by two-thirds vote of the House only and was never submitted to the Senate for its concurrence. Appellants contend that the resolution and the conduct of the investigation pursuant thereto by the Committee is null and void as not being in compliance with Sec. 3(c)(1), Art. III, Fla.Const. (1968).

This contention is without merit. Although Sec. 1, Art. III, Fla.Const. (1968) places the legislative power in a single entity, the Legislature of the State of Florida consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives, Sections 2 and 5, of this Article grant to each House, acting independently of the other, numerous powers such as judging the qualifications and elections of its members, electing officers, determining its rules of procedure, disciplining its own members and conducting investigations.

Immediately following each general election the Legislature is required to convene for the exclusive purpose of organization and selection of officers. Sec. 3(a), Art. III, Fla.Const. (1968). At the organiztion session held on November 12, 1968, the House of Representatives adopted the report of the Rules Committee requiring the Speaker to appoint the membership of standing committees, including the Committee on Elections, beginning with the organization session. Journal of the House of Representatives (organization session 1968) page 10. The Elections Committee was appointed at that time. Journal of the House of Representatives (organization session 1968) page 25.

Sec. 7, Ch. 69--52 (Sec. 11.141, Fla.Stat., F.S.A.) contains the following provisions:

'(2) The house of representatives is authorized to designate standing committees in such number as it may determine to be necessary, which shall include a committee on rules and calendar and a committee on house administration.

'(3) When created and designated by rule of the respective house, such standing committees shall exist until the next ensuing general election, both during and between sessions, and shall be empowered to exercise all lawful functions and authority heretofore exercised by both standing and interim committees, including, but without limitation to, those provided by Section 5, Article III, State Constitution and by this chapter.'

By this general law the Standing Election Committee continues to exist until the general election of 1970, 'both during and between sessions.' The calling of the special session did not diminish the powers or duties of the Committee. Just as the Senate's concurrence would be unnecessary in filling a vacancy in the office of Sergeant-at-Arms in the House of Representatives, and just as the concurrence of the House would be unnecessary when the Senante declines to confirm an appointment, so it is that the concurrence of the Senate is unnecessary in the adoption of a resolution of the House of Representatives directing the Elections Committee to make an investigation. Either the House of Representatives or the Senate, acting independently of the other during a special session, can perform many autonomous functions, one of which is conducting necessary investigations, since these are incidents to the proper functioning of a legislative body.

The adoption of Resolution 18--A cannot be regarded as 'legislative business' within the meaning of Sec. 3(c)(1), Art. III, Fla.Const. (1968), since the instructions of the House of Representatives to its Standing Committee on Elections does not require the concurrence or cooperation of the Senate. See In Re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 64 Fla. 16, 59 So. 782.

The Appellants cite State v. Schoonover, 146 W.Va. 1036, 124 S.E.2d 340 (1962) and State ex rel. Fatzer v. Anderson, 180 Kan. 120, 299 P.2d 1078, 1079 (1956) in support of their contention that the Legislature had no power to adopt Resolution 18--A during the special session. In each of these cases it appears that the resolution Creating the investigating committee was adopted at a special session, while in the case Sub judice the Committee was created at the organization session in November 1968, as authorized by Sec. 3(a), Art. III, Fla.Const. (1968). Furthermore, the Florida Committee is authorized to perform its functions under the provision of a general law, Chapter 69--52, which was concurred in by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, and became effective July 1, 1969.

Appellants further contend that the Committee is without authority to carry on its investigation subsequent to the adjournment of the Legislature. Chapter 69--52 is completely dispositive of this question by virtue of the following provisions:

'Each standing and select committee shall meet at such times as it shall determine and shall abide by the general rules and regulations adopted by its respective house to govern the conduct of meetings by such committees.' Sec. 8, Ch. 69--52, (Fla.Stat. § 11.142, F.S.A.)

'Each standing or select committee or subcommittee thereof, is authorized to invite public officials and employees and private individuals to appear before the committee for the purpose of submitting information to it. Each such committee shall be authorized to maintain a continuous review of the work of the state agencies concerned with its subject area and the performance of the functions of government within each such subject area, and for this purpose to request...

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    ...I, section 12. The First District's citation of our decisions in In Re Grand Jury Investigation, 287 So.2d 43 (Fla.1973); Hagaman v. Andrews, 232 So.2d 1 (Fla.1970); and Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So.2d 243 (1944), as supporting its conclusion that a state constitutional right of dis......
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    ...269 So.2d 682 (Fla.1972) (court had jurisdiction to declare the power of a sub-committee to issue a subpoena duces tecum); Hagaman v. Andrews, 232 So.2d 1 (Fla.1970) (court determined the power of a committee chairman to subpoena bank records); Johnston v. Gallen, 217 So.2d 319 (Fla.1969) (......
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