Hagan v. Director of Revenue, 80467

• Decision Date: 26 May 1998
• Docket Number: No. 80467,80467
• Citation: 968 S.W.2d 704
• Parties: John R. HAGAN, Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 704

968 S.W.2d 704

John R. HAGAN, Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, Appellant.

No. 80467.

Supreme Court of Missouri En Banc.

May 26, 1998.

Rehearing Denied June 16, 1998 .

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Ronald D. Prigin, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for Appellant.

Bruce B. Brown, Roy W. Brown, Kearney, for Respondent.

HOLSTEIN, Judge.

The Director of the Missouri Department of Revenue suspended John R. Hagan's driver's license for repeated convictions for driving while intoxicated. Hagan applied for hardship driving privileges. The trial court granted Hagan limited driving privileges. The Director appeals. Following opinion by the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, this Court granted transfer. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10. The trial court's judgment granting Hagan hardship driving privileges is reversed.

From 1977 through 1989, Hagan was convicted four times for driving while intoxicated and twice for driving with a suspended or revoked driver's license. On June 6, 1990, Hagan pleaded guilty to a felony charge of driving while intoxicated. Because of Hagan's earlier convictions, the Director imposed a ten-year minimum denial pursuant to sec. 302.060(9), RSMo. Supp.1990, making Hagan eligible for reinstatement on June 6, 2000. On January 7, 1997, Hagan filed an application for hardship driving privileges under sec. 302.309.3(6)(a), RSMo Supp.1997. The trial court granted a limited hardship driving privilege and the Director appealed.

In relevant part, sec. 302.309.3(5) provides:

Except as provided in subdivision (6) of this subsection, no person is eligible to receive hardship driving privilege whose license has been suspended or revoked for the following reasons:

....

(b) A conviction of any felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle was used;

(c) Ineligibility for a license because of the provisions of subdivision ... (9) ... of sec. 302.060 [providing a ten-year ineligibility for a license to one convicted more than twice of an offense related to intoxicated driving].

....

As amended in 1996, sec. 302.309.3(6)(a) states in part:

Provided that pursuant to the provisions of this section, the applicant is not otherwise ineligible for a limited hardship driving privilege, a circuit court or the director may, in the manner prescribed in this subsection, allow a person who has had such person's license to operate a motor vehicle revoked where that person cannot obtain a new license for a period of ten years, as prescribed in subdivision (9) of section 302.060, to apply for limited driving privileges ... if such person has served at least three years of such disqualification or revocation....

(Emphasized language was added by the 1996 amendment.)

When the legislature amends a statute, the amendment is presumed to have some effect. Wollard v. City of Kansas City, 831 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Mo. banc 1992). In deciding the effect of the amendment, the Court looks to the words used in the statute and the plain and ordinary meaning of those words. Id. The provisions of the entire legislative act must be considered together and all the provisions must be harmonized if possible. Id.

Giving the language of sec. 302.309.3(6)(a) its plain and ordinary meaning, an applicant is only eligible for a hardship license if: (1) he was ineligible to obtain an operator's license for ten years pursuant to section 302.060(9); (2) he had served three years of the ineligibility; and (3) he was not "otherwise ineligible for a limited hardship driving privilege" under "this section" which includes subsection .3(5).

Hagan could qualify under sec. 302.309.3(6)(a) if the sole basis of his ineligibility for hardship driving privileges was the ten year revocation. However, Hagan was ineligible for hardship driving privileges on a basis other than the ten year revocation. Specifically, he was ineligible due to the felony conviction involving the use of a motor vehicle. See sec. 302.309.3(5)(b). Thus, he did not meet the third requirement. The trial court erred in granting the hardship driving privileges.

Claiming ambiguity, Hagan makes a series of arguments attempting to apply rules of construction to the statute in such a way as to entitle him to a hardship driving privilege. Specifically, he argues that sec. 302.309 must be read in pari materia with statutes providing for the assessment of twelve points for felony violations involving the use of motor vehicles, a one-year revocation for a twelve-point assessment, and the prohibition on the Director issuing a license during a period of suspension or revocation. See secs. 302.302.1(10), 302.304.7, and 302.060(3). He argues that sec. 302.309(5)(b) only bars eligibility for a hardship driving privilege for one year.

The statutes relating to assessment of points for specific violations and the provisions prohibiting the Director from issuing a license and driving privileges to those against whom points are assessed have some overlap with sec. 302.309. However, the provisions of sec. 302.309 specifically relate to the grant or denial of hardship driving privileges by the circuit court. Those provisions provide clear guidance. Reference to the provisions of other sections as a guide to construing when the circuit court may grant a hardship driving privilege is unnecessary.

Second, Hagan argues that sec. 302.309 is remedial in nature and should be construed favorably to granting a hardship driving privilege. However, a remedial statute is a statute enacted for the protection of life and property and in the interest of public welfare. City of St. Louis v. Carpenter, 341 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Mo.1961); State v. Miles...