Hagan v. Ellis

• Decision Date: 14 July 1897
• Citation: 39 Fla. 463,22 So. 727
• Parties: HAGAN et al. v. ELLIS.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

22 So. 727

39 Fla. 463

HAGAN et al. v. ELLIS.

Florida Supreme Court

July 14, 1897

Error to circuit court, Holmes county; John W. Malone, Judge.

Ejectment by Joseph Ellis against Calvin Hagan and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants bring error. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. Under the provisions of section 3, c. 1869, Laws 1872 approved February 27th, limitation by adverse possession as against one deriving title from the United States begins to run from the date of the patent, and not from the date of the entry of, or final payment for, the land embraced in such patent.

2. Equitable estoppels are proper defenses in actions of ejectment in this state, and evidence of such estoppels is admissible under the plea of not guilty.

3. Equitable estoppel, so far as it relates to the trial of title to land, is a doctrine by which a party is prevented from setting up his legal title because he has, through his acts, words, or silence, led another to take a position in which the assertion of the legal title would be contrary to equity and good conscience.

4. If one man knowingly, though he does it passively, by looking on, suffers another to purchase and expend money on land under an erroneous opinion of title, without making known his claim, he shall not afterwards be permitted to exercise his legal right against such person.

5. Where plaintiff in 1855 entered and paid for land from the United States, and in 1861 sold and delivered possession thereof, under a bond for title, to a third person, and for 30 years thereafter stood by and saw defendants and their predecessors, tracing title from his vendee, purchase, claim possess, and improve the property under the belief, and some with positive assurances from plaintiff that he claimed no title to the property, during which time plaintiff made no claim to the property, though living as a neighbor to the occupiers thereof, the plaintiff will be estopped from recovering possession of such property from the defendants under a patent issued upon his original entry in the year 1891.

6. While the naked legal title to land of the United States remains in the government until the issue of a patent therefor, the beneficial ownership or equitable title is vested in an entry man from the time he receives a certificate of purchase from the government, showing full payment therefor.

7. A patent from the United States, issued in pursuance of, and based solely and exclusively upon, a prior entry accompanied by full payment of the purchase price, does not convey to the entry man a new or independent title disconnected with his equitable title derived from such entry and final payment but converts the imperfect or equitable title into a perfect legal one, enabling the patentee to seek and maintain legal remedies where theretofore he was, in the absence of statute, confined to equitable ones.

COUNSEL

D. L. McKinnon, for plaintiffs in error.

W. O. Butler, for defendant in error. On March 16, 1893, defendant in error instituted in the circuit court of Holmes county an action of ejectment against plaintiffs in error to recover title to and possession of lots Nos. 1, 2, and 3 of section 20, township 7 N., of range 14 W., the declaration being substantially in the statutory form. Defendants pleaded not guilty, upon which issue was joined, and a trial had at the fall term of the court, 1893, resulting in verdict and judgment for plaintiff, from which this writ of error was taken. The evidence, all of which was admitted without objection, was to the following effect: Plaintiff testified that in 1854 or 1855 the land sued for was entered by him from the United States under the 'graduation act'; that he then paid all the purchase money, and received a certificate from the government to this effect; that in 1861 or 1862 he sold the land to one T. Day, and gave him the certificate of purchase, and bond for title. Witness, being in Elba jail, sold the land to Day to procure money to sue out a writ of habeas corpus. Witness did not sell the land to Day in good faith, because Day never paid him all he was to pay for it. Witness had never been in possession of the land since he sold it to Day; nor did witness ever claim the land thereafter until he received his patent for it, in 1891; nor did witness pay any taxes on it from the time he sold to Day until within two years of the trial. Witness secured his patent without being required to pay any money other than that paid when he entered the land. After witness sold the land to Day, the latter sold it to William Loftin, Loftin sold to Adam Hicks, Hicks sold to Alexander Pate, and Pate sold to defendant Calvin Hagan. Day, Loftin, and Hicks died previous to the trial. The purchasers, on down from Day, went into possession of the land; and the defendants purchased it, and had been in possession of it for 10 or 15 years previous to the trial, improving and cultivating it. Witness lived near the land most of the time, and knew that the purchasers were in possession of and improving the land, and witness did not tell any of them that he claimed the land until he told the defendants. Witness did not tell Calvin Hagan, Alexander Pate, William Lindsay, or any other person, that he had deeded the land to Day. Witness could neither read nor write. The patent referred to in plaintiff's testimony was introduced in evidence. It was executed by President Harrison, on behalf of the United States of America, on April 13, 1891, and recited that Joseph Ellis, of Dale county, Ala., had deposited in the general land office a certificate of the register of the land office at Tallahassee whereby it appeared that full payment had been made by said Joseph Ellis, according to the provisions of the act of congress of April 24, 1820, entitled 'An act making further provision for the sale of the public lands,' and the act supplemental thereto, for the lands sued for, among others, which had been purchased by said Joseph Ellis, in consideration of which the United States of America did thereby give and grant to said Ellis, his heirs and assigns, the tracts of land aforesaid.

Alexander Pate, on behalf of defendants, testified that he purchased the land in dispute from Adam Hicks, who had purchased it from William Loftin, and witness remained in possession of it until he sold it to defendant Hagan, 16 or 17 years previous to the trial, and defendant and those holding under him had been in possession of the land ever since. Witness did not make Hagan a deed to the land, but gave him all the papers witness had concerning the land, and put him in possession of it under the purchase. At the time witness purchased the land from Hicks, plaintiff told him that he had sold and deeded the land to Day. Plaintiff made no claim to the land then, and witness had never heard of his making any claim until within the last year or two, or a short time before the suit was brought.

William Lindsay and W. A. Bateman, on behalf of defendants, testified that about a year before the trial plaintiff told them that he had sold the land to Day during the war, and had not claimed it since that time. Bateman further testified that after the suit was brought plaintiff told him that he did not instruct his attorney to bring suit for this land, but for another parcel east of this land, but his counsel told him that, if he sued for any, he would have to sue for all.

Calvin Hagan, one of the defendants, testified that he purchased the land in dispute from Alexander Pate 16 or 17 years previous to the trial, and that he and his vendees and tenants had been in possession of it ever since; that he had a gristmill as well as a farm, upon it; that the principal inclosures on the land were upon lots 2 and 3, which were about 15 acres of open land. Only a small portion of lot 1 was under cultivation, but all the other portions of the same land not inclosed had been used by defendant for procuring fencing material, fuel, and for other usual farm purposes, ever since defendant purchased it. Plaintiff had repeatedly told defendant that he had sold and deeded the land to Day during the war, and that he had no claim to it. Plaintiff lived about a mile from defendant when plaintiff purchased the land, and has lived near the land nearly ever since, and witness had never heard plaintiff make any claim to the land until about a year before the trial, although plaintiff and defendant had been neighbors and acquaintances, visiting each other, for a long time.

At plaintiff's request the court instructed the jury: 'If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff in this case acquired title by patent from the U.S. government within less than seven years before the commencement of this action, then the defendants cannot set up title by adverse possession against the title of the plaintiff.'

The defendants requested the court to give five several instructions which were all refused, but no exception was taken to this ruling, except as to the second and fifth instructions, reading as follows: '(2) If you believe from the evidence that the defendants, or those through whom he claims (that is, any of the previous owners through whom the defendants claim), had a written title to it, entered into possession of the land under claim of title, exclusive of any other right, and that there has been a continued occupation and possession of the land by the defendants, or those through whom they claim, for seven years previous to the institution of this suit, they were holding adversely to the plaintiff, and you will find for the defendant. (5) A man cannot sleep over his rights for a long period of time, when he has a legal right to enforce them, until innocent parties become involved, and then enforce his rights in...