Hagan v. Feld Entertainment, Inc.
| Decision Date | 15 April 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. ACT. 2:04CV663.,ACT. 2:04CV663. |
| Citation | 365 F.Supp.2d 700 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | Frank HAGAN, Plaintiff, v. FELD ENTERTAINMENT, INC. d/b/a Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus, Defendant. |
Amberley G. Jochens, Esquire, Saunders Barlow Riddick Babineau Farmer & Brewbaker, P.C., Suffolk, VA, Lisa A. Bertini, Esquire, Norfolk, VA, Counsel for Plaintiff.
Susan R. Blackman, Esquire, Brett A. Spain, Esquire, Willcox & Savage, Norfolk, VA, Eugene D. Gulland, Esquire, Covington & Burling, Washington, DC, Counsel for Defendant.
This matter is before the court on plaintiff's motion to remand and defendant's motion to dismiss. For the reasons outlined below, plaintiff's motion to remand is GRANTED in part and MOOTED in part. Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Plaintiff, Frank Hagan ("Hagan"), is a resident and citizen of Virginia. (Compl.¶ 1). Defendant, Feld Entertainment, Incorporated ("Feld"), is a Virginia corporation with its principal place of business in Virginia. (Compl. ¶ 2). Beginning in March 1993, Hagan was hired by Feld to work for Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus ("Ringling Bros."). (Compl.¶ 4). Hagan worked intermittently for Feld from March 1993 until 2000. (Compl.¶ 4). Beginning on or about March 7, 2000, Hagan worked continuously for Feld without interruption until he was terminated on July 21, 2004. (Compl.¶ 5).
In December 2003 Feld assigned Hagan to work as a lion handler for Ringling Bros. (Comp.¶ 6). As part of his job, he fed and watered the lions, cleaned their cages, cared for their transport on the train, and cared for them at the performance site. (Compl.¶ 7). He spent between twelve and fourteen hours every day with the lions. (Compl.¶ 8).
On or about 11:00 a.m. on July 12, 2004, the Ringling Bros. train left Phoenix, Arizona, headed for Fresno, California. (Compl.¶ 10). At the three train stops during the day, Hagan checked on the lions, during which time the lions seemed healthy. The next day, July 13, 2004, Hagan watered down the lions at approximately 8:30 a.m. (Compl.¶ 12). That day the train traveled through the Mojave desert where temperatures reached upwards of one hundred degrees. (Compl.¶ 13). At approximately 9:30 a.m. Hagan called Ringling Bros.' Train Master Gene Petis ("Petis") to inform him that the train needed to be stopped so that Hagan could again water down the lions. (Compl.¶ 14). Petis advised Hagan that the train could not stop because it was behind schedule. (Compl.¶ 15). Thereafter Jarak, another lion handler, attempted without success to contact Jeff Steele, General Manager of Ringling Bros., to request a train stop to water down the lions. (Compl.¶ 17). Finally, at 2:45 p.m., the train stopped in Arizona. (Compl.¶ 19). Between 8:30 a.m. and 2:45 p.m. the lions had no drinking water and they were not watered down. (Compl.¶ 18).
When the train stopped, Hagan immediately went to the lion car where he discovered that a two-year-old lion named Clyde was unresponsive and was lying in the fetal position with his tongue hanging out, eyes rolled back in his head, and barely breathing. (Compl.¶¶ 19, 20). When Hagan placed his hands on Clyde in an attempt to help him, he realized that Clyde's body was extremely hot. (Compl.¶ 21). As Hagan attempted to help Clyde, the lion died. (Compl.¶ 21). After sitting and crying with Clyde's body for a period of time, Hagan once again tried to contact Steele, but was unsuccessful. He was, however, able to reach Ringling Bros.' Operations Manager, John Griggs ("Griggs"), who told him to move Clyde's body to the meat truck and to not say a word about it to anyone. (Compl.¶¶ 22, 23).
The train arrived in Fresno, California, shortly before midnight on July 13, 2004. On or about July 14, 2004, Hagan was ordered to move Clyde's body from the meat car to a Ryder rental truck. (Compl.¶ 25). He was also ordered to pressure wash the meat car to remove Clyde's hair and blood before the United States Department of Agriculture ("U.S.D.A.") inspectors arrived. (Compl.¶ 26). When the U.S.D.A. inspectors arrived, Hagan was taken to another location where he was questioned by Feld's legal counsel. (Compl.¶ 27). Hagan was told not to talk to anyone about Clyde's death, which Hagan understood to mean no conversations with the U.S.D.A. inspectors. (Compl.¶ 27). Hagan continued to talk about Clyde's death and was threatened and intimidated by Steele not to talk about it with anyone. (Compl.¶¶ 28, 29). On July 21, 2004, while still in California, Hagan was terminated and he and his daughter were left in California with no way to get home. (Compl.¶¶ 30, 31). The reason given for the termination was that Hagan caused a power outage. (Compl.¶ 31).
On October 8, 2004, plaintiff filed a Motion for Judgment in the Norfolk Circuit Court; an Amended Motion for Judgment was filed on October 13, 2004. Plaintiff asserts claims of wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress ("emotional distress"). On November 4, 2004, defendant filed a notice of removal to federal district court on the grounds that plaintiff's claims are completely preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. On November 12, 2004, defendant filed a motion to dismiss. On December 8, 2004, plaintiff filed a response to the motion to dismiss and defendant filed a reply on December 16, 2004. On December 3, 2004, and December 8, 2004, plaintiff filed motions to remand the case to state court.1 Defendant responded to the remand motion on December 16, 2004. All outstanding motions are ripe for review.
Plaintiff seeks this court to remand the action, based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The removal statute states that "[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party seeking removal. See Wagner v. Regent Investments, Inc., 903 F.Supp. 966, 968 (E.D.Va.1995). Furthermore, Id. at 968.
A defendant may remove a case from state court to any federal court that would have had original jurisdiction over the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Thus, the propriety of defendant's removal of plaintiff's state law claims depends on whether this court had original jurisdiction over the case. Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having subject matter jurisdiction only if there is a federal question or the parties are diverse and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 28 U.S.C. § 1332. There is no diversity jurisdiction in this case, as both parties are citizens of Virginia. In order to determine whether there is federal question jurisdiction, courts use the well-pleaded complaint rule. Under the rule, federal question jurisdiction only exists "when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). Generally, a plaintiff may avoid federal court jurisdiction by relying exclusively on state law claims.
An important exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule is the doctrine of "complete preemption." Under the complete preemption doctrine, federal law can so completely preempt state law that "any complaint that comes within the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily `arises under' federal law," and is removable to federal court. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constructive Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). The state law claim is transformed into a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987).
In the case at bar, defendant argues that while plaintiff only alleged state law claims in his complaint, plaintiff's state law claims are completely preempted by federal law because plaintiff and defendant are parties to a collective bargaining agreement. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (" § 301") grants federal courts jurisdiction over cases involving collective bargaining agreements and authorizes federal courts to establish a body of federal law interpreting collective bargaining agreements. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957). Additionally, "if the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement, the application of state law ... is pre-empted and federal labor-law principles — necessarily uniform throughout the nation — must be employed to resolve the dispute." Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 406, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988). However, if the state law cause of action is independent from the collective bargaining agreement, meaning that resolution of the state law claim does not require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, the state law claim is not preempted. See id. at 413, 108 S.Ct. 1877. Thus, in order to determine whether the plaintiff's state law claims are preempted by federal law, it is necessary to determine whether an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is required to resolve the state law claims.
Furthermore, because the preemptive effect of § 301 is dependent upon the elements of the state law claims, "a federal district court has the discretion to address the validity of the alleged state-law claim during the...
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