Hagedorn v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 10 June 2011 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. 09C-09-211 RRC |
| Parties | Re: Troy Hagedorn v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company |
| Court | Delaware Superior Court |
RESIDENT JUDGE
NEW CASTLE COUNTY COURTHOUSE
500 North King Street, Suite 10400
Wilmington, Delaware 19801-3733
(302) 255-0664
Kenneth M. Roseman, Esquire
Kenneth Roseman, P.A.
Wilmington, Delaware 19899
Attorney for Plaintiff Troy Hagendorn
Colin M. Shalk, Esquire
Casarino, Christman, Shalk, Ransom & Doss, P.A.
P.O. Box 1276
Wilmington, Delaware 19899
Attorney for Defendant State Farm Mutual Insurance Company
On Plaintiff Troy Hagedorn's Motion for a New Trial.
On Defendant State Farm Mutual Insurance Company's Motion for Costs.
Dear Counsel:
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Troy Hagedorn ("Plaintiff") has moved for a new trial based on a jury verdict awarding $0 in damages. This award was contrary to theCourt's specific instructions to the jury that Plaintiff must be awarded some amount of money for damages he sustained in the instant motor vehicle accident because there was no dispute that he had incurred some injury caused by this accident.
Upon review of the facts, the law, and the parties' submissions, Plaintiff's motion for a new trial is GRANTED. It necessarily follows that Defendant's motion for costs based on the jury's verdict is DENIED AS MOOT.
The underlying facts of this case are not in material dispute. Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident on January 21, 2004.1 It is undisputed that uninsured motorist was at fault for this accident;2 Plaintiff accordingly brought an uninsured motorist claim against Defendant, his uninsured motorist insurance carrier.3
Trial in this case began on December 13, 2010. Plaintiff and his longtime live-in paramour, Wanda Kirby, testified. Their testimony contained many inconsistencies that raised significant credibility issues. For example, Plaintiff testified that his injuries were so debilitating as to have resulted in his total disability from gainful employment; to support this contention, Plaintiff alleged that he was unable to resume working as a delivery driver for the News Journal newspaper.4 However, in contrast to his assertion, it was undisputed that Plaintiff's employment relationship with the News Journal had in fact continued over the following six years, as the newspapers were delivered in accordance with his responsibilities; Plaintiff contended that this discrepancy was explainable due to the fact that Wanda Kirby delivered the newspapers during this six year period.5 Despite Plaintiff's testimony that his employment responsibilities required at least 40 hours, and sometimes as many as 70 hours, of work per week, Wanda Kirby nonetheless maintained that she completely covered Plaintiff's work responsibilities in addition to herown full-time employment schedule.6 Under cross-examination, Plaintiff Troy Hagedorn had testified at his deposition as follows:
Plaintiff's contentions that Wanda Kirby regularly completed his delivery route was further undermined by the fact that Plaintiff was involved in a subsequent motor vehicle accident at 4:54 a.m. on January 21, 2008, a time of day that he conceded was consistent with the time would havecompleted his delivery route.8 Although Plaintiff asserted that he was en route home after babysitting for his sister at the time of this accident, the emergency room report revealed that Plaintiff reported being employed by the News Journal and provided a health insurance policy number that was issued to him through the News Journal.9
Similarly, both Plaintiff and Wanda Kirby were cross-examined at length about their failure to have filed tax returns since 2003. Plaintiff testified that he failed to file his 2003 tax return because the News Journal sent him the "wrong" forms, and that he was unable to file a return in every subsequent year due to his failure to cure the 2003 delinquency.10 Wanda Kirby simply stated that her failure to file tax returns since 2003 was due to "stupidity;" she testified that her cessation of filing tax returns the same year as Plaintiff was "not a coincidence" but was instead "just life."11
The jury was instructed that it must award Plaintiff some amount of money to compensate him for his injuries. In relevant part, the jury instructions provided as follows:
You are instructed to award some amount of money to the plaintiff, Troy Hagedorn, for the damages that he sustained in the motor vehicle collision of January 21, 2004. The amount of damages that you award is entirely up to you. Your award of damages should be based solely upon the evidence presented and the law that I have just read to you.12
Significantly, Defendant did not dispute that the jury should be instructed to award Plaintiff some amount of damages. Indeed, in relevant part, Defendant's own proposed jury instruction on this issue read as follows:
There is evidence and testimony that Plaintiff suffered some injuries in the accident in the form of strains of the spine. You areinstructed to award some amount of money for his injuries from the accident of January 21, 2004.13
Notwithstanding the Court's foregoing instructions, the jury returned a verdict awarding $0 for Plaintiff's injuries.14 Although Defendant requested that the jury be specifically instructed to award Plaintiff some measure of damages and required to complete further deliberations on this point, the Court determined that further deliberations by this jury would be inappropriate because the jury chose to disregard the Court's unambiguous instruction.15
Plaintiff moves for a new trial, pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 59(a), on the ground that jury's award of $0, notwithstanding Defendant's admission that Plaintiff sustained an injury, was contrary to the evidence and inappropriate.16 To the extent Defendant seeks to retract its earlier admission that Plaintiff sustained some injury, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant remains bound by this judicial admission.17 Though Plaintiff concedes that the Court may order additur, Plaintiff contends that additur would be inappropriate in this case because "Plaintiff has not yet received a trial decided by a jury that has fairly applied the law as instructed by the Court."18
Defendant responds that the jury should not have been instructed that it must award Plaintiff some measure of damages, even though Defendant had consented to that instruction at trial.19 Defendant asserts that "upon reconsideration the Court should not have instructed the jury to award money to the Plaintiff" because "[t]here was no substantial evidence of injury."20 According to Defendant, the Plaintiff and Wanda Kirby's credibility issues, together with the disparity between Plaintiff's objective symptoms and hissubjective complaints, rendered it "within the purview of the jury to reject the claims of injury and disability for which monetary compensation should be awarded."21
A party's motion for a new trial is controlled by Superior Court Civil Rule 59, which provides, in relevant part, as follows:
A new trial may be granted as to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues in an action in which there has been a trial for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in the Superior Court.22
When reviewing a motion for a new trial, the Court's baseline presumption is that the jury's verdict was correct.23 Accordingly, "[b]arring exceptional circumstances, the trial judge should set aside a jury verdict pursuant to a Rule 59 motion only when the verdict is manifestly and palpably against the weight of the evidence, or for some reason, justice would miscarry if the verdict were allowed to stand."24
However, when there is uncontradicted medical testimony that a plaintiff has suffered an injury as a result of the accident at issue, an award of $0 is "inadequate and unacceptable as a matter of law."25 Likewise, "[w]hile a jury has great latitude, 'it cannot totally ignore facts that are uncontroverted and against which no inference lies.'"26 In short, "once the existence of an injuryhas been established as causally related to the accident, a jury is required to return a verdict of at least minimal damages."27
Based on the foregoing, this case fits squarely within Maier, supra,28and its progeny. That is, it was not disputed that Plaintiff sustained some degree of injury due to the instant accident. Defendant's pretrial and trial concessions that Plaintiff suffered at least some degree of injury is conclusive on this point; in the Pretrial Stipulation, Defendant's position was that Plaintiff's injuries are "not as serious as claimed," thereby implicitly acknowledging that Plaintiff suffered some injury.29 Defendant accordingly submitted proposed jury instructions that reflected Plaintiff's entitlement to "some amount of money for his injuries" sustained in the instant accident.30Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to a new trial, because, pursuant to Maier, the jury was required (and instructed) to "return a verdict of at least minimal damages," and it failed to do so.31
Though Defenda...
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