Hagerman v. Bates

• Decision Date: 05 April 1897
• Citation: 24 Colo. 71,49 P. 139
• Parties: HAGERMAN et al. v. BATES et al.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

49 P. 139

24 Colo. 71

HAGERMAN et al. v. BATES et al.

Supreme Court of Colorado

April 5, 1897

Error to court of appeals.

Action by J. J. Hagerman and others against John C. Bates and others on a contract for a conveyance of land. A judgment in favor of defendants was affirmed by the court of appeals (38 P 1100), and plaintiffs bring error. Reversed.

In 1880 there were located in what was then Gunnison county, Colo two mining claims,--one, the Little Giant, in January; the other, the Bonnybel, in July. By an act of the legislature becoming operative May 23, 1881, that portion of Gunnison county in which these properties were situate became a part of Pitkin county. The two claims overlapped, so that there was common to both a triangular strip of ground of about three acres. The owners of the Bonnybel made the first application for a patent, and subsequently such proceedings were taken by the owners of the Little Giant under the statutes of the United States providing for settling conflicting interests in mining claims that adverse suits were brought and pending,--one, an adverse suit proper, in the district court of Lake county; the other, an action in the nature of ejectment, in the form of an adverse suit, in the district court of Pitkin county; each having for its object the recovery of the possession of the conflicting ground. An attempt to file an adverse suit in the district court of Gunnison county within the statutory period failed probably owing to a miscarriage of the mails. After the suit in Lake county was brought, and before that in Pitkin county was begun, a receiver's receipt was issued to the owners of the Bonnybel, in May, 1881, possibly upon the production of a certificate from the clerk of the district court of Gunnison county that no suit was there pending in support of the adverse claim filed in the land office. There were three defendants in both of these actions,--Charles J. Moore Thomas Bracken, and J. M. Daniel, who were the original locators of the Bonnybel claim. In July, 1881, judgment was rendered in the cause pending in the district court of Pitkin county against all three defendants for the possession of the tract in dispute, which was thereafter, in November of the same year, vacated as to the defendants Moore and Daniel upon the ground that the attorney representing them had no authority to enter their appearance, but the judgment against the defendant Bracken still stood. Thereafter Moore and Daniel filed their joint answer, and issues were made up. While the case was in this condition, and at the July, 1882 term, the parties to the litigation were present in court, with their witnesses, ready to proceed to a trial. Before the case was set, however, a settlement of the litigation was effected, and the plaintiffs dismissed, not only this action, but also the one pending in the district court of Lake county, in accordance with the terms of the agreement of settlement, and four days thereafter a patent for the Bonnybel was issued. The parties disagreeing as to the terms of the contract, on August 5, 1884, in the district court of Pitkin county, the present action was instituted by the then owners of the Little Giant to compel the defendants, as owners of the Bonnybel claim, to perform their obligations under the agreement. In this action there were many steps taken and interlocutory orders made, not important to the present discussion, even the bare recital of which would unduly extend the statement and the opinion, and tend to obscure, rather than elucidate, the vital questions in the case. It may be said, however, that before the trial of this action, which was had in June, 1891, and the argument heard in September of that year, and decree rendered in March, 1892, the cause, in March, 1890, was transferred, by stipulation, to the district court of Arapahoe county. Before the time of trial the ownership of both claims had entirely changed, and there was a substitution of parties plaintiff and defendant; the plaintiffs at the time of the trial being the then owners of the Little Giant, and the defendants the owners of the Bonnybel. Upon the part of the plaintiffs it was alleged and contended that the contract, which was the principal point in controversy, was that after the patent for the Bonnybel was issued the owners of the latter claim were to convey absolutely and unconditionally to the owners of the Little Giant a portion of the conflicting ground described in the pleadings, and an additional strip adjoining the same, for dumping purposes, in consideration that the owners of the Little Giant would first consent to have the judgment against Bracken vacated, and then dismiss both actions against all of the defendants, and pay to the owners of the Bonnybel $100, being costs and expenses incurred by them in the litigation. The plaintiffs aver performance by their grantors of their covenants, and the refusal upon the part of the defendants' grantors to perform. Upon the other hand, the defendants assert that the contract was that their grantors were to convey a small strip of ground in dispute to the Little Giant owners for dumping purposes only, and that plaintiffs and their grantors, by their noncompliance with their part of the contract, had lost even the right to the conveyance of this easement. The plaintiffs alleged, and their proof was to the effect, that the contract, as finally agreed upon, was drawn by Charles R. Bell, an attorney, and signed in behalf of the owners of the Little Giant by Taylor & Ashton, their attorneys, and by Bracken himself, one of the defendants, and by Henry Moody as the attorney for the other two defendants, Moore and Daniel. The defendants claimed, and their testimony so tended, that the contract as made was drawn by Moody, and executed by the individual owners of the rival lodes, except by Daniel, and the contract, as signed by all of the parties except Daniel, was then delivered to Moody, to be sent to Texas for Daniel's signature. The principal question in the case was therefore as to the nature and terms of this contract, and the largest part of the voluminous testimony was directed to this issue. The trial court, though not so finding, assumed, for the purposes of its decision, that the evidence was sufficient to establish the contract as alleged by the plaintiffs, but refused them specific performance, and dismissed their complaint, upon the ground that no sufficient authority was shown from Daniel to Moore, or to Moody for them, or either of them, to make the settlement alleged, or to sign the agreement declared upon, and that no ratification by Daniel of the acts of Moody or Moore was shown. Plaintiffs then appealed the case to the court of appeals, and in an elaborate opinion (5 Colo.App. 391, 38 P. 1100) that learned court affirmed the judgment, largely, if not wholly, upon another and different ground, viz. that the plaintiffs' laches in the prosecution of the suit defeated their rights to the equitable relief sought. It should be added that the court stated further that its decision might also be justified upon the other ground that no sufficient authority from Daniel to Moore was shown for the making of the contract. From this judgment of the court of appeals the plaintiffs have appealed to this court, assigning numerous errors. Such additional facts as are material are found in the opinion.

Rogers, Cuthbert & Ellis, Hugh Butler, and Charles S. Wilson, for plaintiffs in error.

Thomas, Hartzell, Bryant & Lee and Wolcott & Vaile, for defendants in error.

CAMPBELL, J. (after stating the facts).

From the foregoing statement it will at once be seen that the main issue in the case (the nature and scope of the contract of settlement) was determined neither by the district court nor by the court of appeals, and this is one of the grievances which the plaintiffs urge here. The general rule undoubtedly is, as appellees assert, that the reasons given by a court for its decision are not material, so long as its conclusion is right. As otherwise expressed, very poor reasons are sometimes given for a correct decision. But, where the facts upon which the decision is based are insufficient to support the conclusion, then not faulty reasoning, but the unwarrantable effect given to the facts, constitutes the prejudice. After a most diligent examination of the entire record in this case, including all the evidence, we are satisfied that the judgment against the plaintiffs ought not to stand, and that the grounds given by both courts are not tenable. The learned judge of the district court held that the employment of Moody by the owners of the Bonnybel as their attorney in the ejectment action did not, as an incident, carry with it the power to compromise the suit, or to agree to a conveyance of real estate. Upon this, as a legal proposition, the authorities are conflicting, and possibly the ruling is right. However that may be, we do not find it necessary to express our views upon it. Previous to the making of the contract which is the subject of the controversy here, Daniel was living in the state of Texas. He knew that an application for a patent had been made by his co-locators in their own and in his behalf; was conversant with the different steps in relation thereto, and cognizant of the obstacles thrown in their way by the owners of the Little Giant claim. The three locators were desirous of securing a patent at the earliest date possible, and, as is manifest from the correspondence passing between them, thought that it might be facilitated by applying for a patent during the inclement season of the year, when the deep snows and the stormy weather would probably render opposition less effective. Daniel had written to Moore,--and the correspondence is in...