Haggard v. Haggard

Decision Date11 July 1921
Docket NumberNo. 21496.,21496.
Citation233 S.W. 18
PartiesHAGGARD v. HAGGARD et al.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court, Texas County; L. B. Woodside, Judge.

Action by Sarah Haggard against Jack Haggard and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Lamar, Lamar & Lamar, of Houston, for appellant.

Barton & Imney, of Houston, for respondents.

BROWN, C.

This is an action to partition four separate tracts of land in said county designated in the petition as tracts number 1, 2, 3, and 4. The plaintiff is the widow of R. C. Haggard, a physician, who resided adjoining the little crossroads town of Raymondville with his wife, Sarah, who is the plaintiff in this case. He died childless and intestate on April 19, 1918. The defendants are his collateral kindred.

The petition states that tract No. 1, upon which he resided at the time of his death, contained about half an acre of ground, and that tract No. 2, which was separated from it a quarter of a mile approximately in an air line, and considerably farther by the usual course of travel over the public road to its entrance by gate, was a farm of about 65 acres, under cultivation, which had been rented and occupied by one Dietrick for several years under an arrangement which does not seem to have been reduced to writing, by which he cultivated it or a portion of it for a crop rental. If it was corn or hay, he delivered it to the farm of Dr. Haggard, where it was fed to his horses and hogs. If it was wheat, he delivered it to the mill, which furnished Dr. Haggard with his flour, paying him in cash the remainder of the price. The doctor also pastured his own stock upon the meadow land after the removal of the hay. The farm was worth about $2,500, and was incumbered by an interest-bearing mortgage of $1,500. The value of his residence was variously estimated in the testimony at from $500 to $800. The doctor was married to plaintiff in 1904.

The plaintiff had duly elected to take one-half the estate in lieu of dower. The prayer of the petition was in substance that the homestead, consisting of tracts Nos. 1 and 2, be set off to the plaintiff as her homestead, that the remaining land be sold, and that the incumbrances mentioned be paid out of the proceeds, and that the remainder be distributed to the respective parties as their interests might appear, and for general relief.

After hearing the evidence the court, of its own motion, made the following declaration of law:

"The court declares the law to be that in order to hold as a part of the homestead lands not contiguous thereto they must be used in connection therewith, and the court finds from the evidence in this case that the 65-acre tract which is continuously rented out to tenants was not used in connection with the land upon which the deceased lived, and is therefore not a part of the homestead." To which action of the court the plaintiff duly objected and excepted at the time. It then found the issues in favor of the defendant as follows:

"Judgment in partition and sale of land except the homestead, consisting of the lot of ground of about one-half acre held to be the homestead. Balance of land not set apart as homestead to be sold and divided one-half to the plaintiff and balance according to their interests.

"Plaintiff found to have collected $467.25 from land not part of the homestead as follows:

                              "Rented 60 Acres
                Wheat .............................. $372 25
                Corn ...............................   35 00
                Hay ................................   60 00
                                                     _______
                     Total ......................... $467 25
                

"Plaintiff to account for half of this amount to the defendants."

To all of which the plaintiff at the time objected and excepted, and the court rendered final judgment accordingly, to which plaintiff again excepted. After motion for a new trial overruled and exception thereto saved, this appeal was duly taken. No supersedeas bond was given.

The controlling question in this appeal is whether the 65-acre farm included in this case was during the lifetime of Dr. Haggard a part of the homestead which the law transmits to his widow. The facts are before us, and, in so far as they are material to this issue, are undisputed.

The deceased householder was a country doctor who had acquired all the property he owned at the time of his death during the 14 years of his married life with the plaintiff. He was childless, and there was no other person in existence to whom either he or his wife owed any obligation to acquire, hold, or transmit it. The defendants are his adult brothers and sisters, the latter being married and presumably having homes of their own, and depend solely upon the terms of the statute providing for the transmission by inheritance of the property of deceased persons in the absence of heirs having a natural right to such consideration. In the use of the words "natural right" we have in mind children, for whose existence the ancestor is responsible, and who are reared to full maturity under his direction and control, and the wife, who is a factor not only in the accumulation of the estate, but in the making and preservation of the home which is the subject of the title we are considering.

These observations are suggested by the expression of this court in Balance v. Gordon, 247 Mo. 119, 152 S. W. 358, that—

"The correct judicial attitude toward homestead laws is one of as great liberality in construction as their words and spirit permit."

The public reasons upon which this rule of construction rests are forcibly stated in that case, which has been approved and followed in that respect in many cases, among which are Pocoke v. Peterson, 256 Mo. 501, 517, 165 S. W. 1017, and Keeline v. Sealy, 257 Mo. 498, 165 S. W. 1088. The most of these cases have dealt with the rights of creditors, but, there being in this case no equity intervening, we will simply discuss the terms of the statute...

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13 cases
  • Borchers v. Borchers
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • February 7, 1944
    ...(5) It is not necessary to continuously live upon land in order for it to constitute a homestead. Prouty v. Hall, 31 S.W.2d 103; Haggard v. Haggard, 233 S.W. 18; Mills Mills, 141 Mo. 195, 42 S.W. 709; Pocoke v. Peterson, 256 Mo. 501, 165 S.W. 1017; 29 C.J. 935, sec. 351; whereat this langua......
  • Borchers v. Borchers
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • February 7, 1944
    ...It is not necessary to continuously live upon land in order for it to constitute a homestead. Prouty v. Hall, 31 S.W. (2d) 103; Haggard v. Haggard, 233 S.W. 18; Mills v. Mills, 141 Mo. 195, 42 S.W. 709; Pocoke v. Peterson, 256 Mo. 501, 165 S.W. 1017; 29 C.J. 935, sec. 351; whereat this lang......
  • Security State Bank v. Dent County
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • March 6, 1940
    ...are used in connection with the dwelling and its appurtenances. [Overfield v. Overfield, 326 Mo. 83, 30 S.W.2d 1073, 1076; Haggard v. Haggard (Mo.), 233 S.W. 18.] think that the evidence presented on the hearing of the motion to quash the levy was sufficient, prima facie, to show that the l......
  • Overfield v. Overfield
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • September 4, 1930
    ...lands be contiguous or physically connected so long as they be used in connection with the dwelling and its appurtenances. Haggard v. Haggard (Mo. Sup.), 233 S.W. 18. C.C. Fogle for SEDDON, C. Action for the ascertainment and determination of title to 140 acres of real estate in Scotland Co......
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