Hahl v. Heyne, 33257
| Decision Date | 20 February 1953 |
| Docket Number | No. 33257,33257 |
| Parties | HAHL v. HEYNE. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. An accident within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act is defined as an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly and violently with or without human fault and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury.
2. The burden of proof is upon the claimant to show that the disability for which compensation is sought resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.
3. Awards for compensation benefits cannot be based upon possibilities or probabilities. They must be supported by evidence showing that claimant incurred disability from an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.
Rohn & Rohn and Cook & Cook, Fremont, for appellant.
Spear & Lamme, Fremont, for appellee.
Heard before SIMMONS, C. J., and CARTER, MESSMORE, CHAPPELL, WENKE, and BOSLAUGH, JJ.
The plaintiff, Helen G. Hahl, claims benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act for an injury alleged to have been sustained while in the employ of the defendant, Willard Heyne. The trial court found against the plaintiff and she appeals.
Plaintiff was a married woman approximately 25 years of age at the time of the accident on February 16, 1951. The defendant carried on a business known as the Hillside Dairy. He became the owner of a business known as the Dairy Bar at Hooper, Nebraska, and entered into an arrangement whereby plaintiff was to manage this latter business. Plaintiff contends that she was an employee, but defendant asserts that she was a partner. In view of the conclusions we have reached, a determination of this issue is not necessary to a decision of the case.
The record shows that two places of business were operated in the building housing the Dairy Bar. The left side of the building was occupied by the Dairy Bar and the right side by a grocery store. Each had a separate entrance but there was a common entranceway extending from the sidewalk to the doors of the two stores. The floor of the entranceway sloped slightly up from the sidewalk to the doors, the same being a distance of approximately 3 feet.
On the morning of February 16, 1951, shortly after 7 a. m., plaintiff parked her car in front of the Dairy Bar. There was ice on the sidewalk which extended a small distance into the entranceway. Plaintiff got out of her car, walked to the door of the Dairy Bar, which she unlocked, pushed a box of bread inside, and deposited some parcels on the counter. She started to return to her automobile to bring in some sandwich spread and cookies, which she had prepared at home for use in the Dairy Bar, when she slipped and fell two or three steps outside the door. After the accident she was lying on the sidewalk near the edge of the entranceway.
Dr. C. C. Nelson testified that he attended plaintiff on February 16, 1951, at the hospital immediately following the accident. The history of the accident as revealed by plaintiff showed that she was suffering pain in her back and that she was unable to move her left leg or thigh. He testified that there was no external evidence of injury. Laboratory and X-ray examinations were made, her reflexes were checked, and her reactions to pain were investigated. No organic reason was discovered for her inability to use her left leg. After remaining in the hospital at Fremont for 3 days she was taken to the University Hospital where she remained for examination and observation until March 10, 1951. Dr. Nelson examined her again on March 28, 1951, and came to the definite conclusion that she was suffering from hysterical paralysis. This conclusion is supported by the report of the University Hospital which Dr. Nelson took into consideration. Plaintiff, according to the evidence, had not regained the use of her left leg at the time of trial and was able to get around only by the use of crutches. The final conclusion of Dr. Nelson is that plaintiff has an hysterical paralysis of the left leg which is the result of a deep emotional condition often referred to as a mental block. He testified further that the paralysis thus existing is just as incapacitating as that induced by traumatic injury and that her disability could be permanent. As to whether the fall was the cause of her condition, Dr. Nelson stated that this might be presumed, although it is unusual for conditions of this type to be accompanied by a history of injury. The most that he would say was that he presumed that the fall might have set off this paralysis.
There is evidence that plaintiff was in an automobile-train accident in 1942 or 1943. There is no contention that this was a direct contributing...
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Johnson v. Holdrege Medical Clinic
...of his or her employment...." § 48-101. Accord, Mauser v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 192 Neb. 421, 222 N.W.2d 119 (1974); Hahl v. Heyne, 156 Neb. 599, 57 N.W.2d 137 (1953); Nelms v. Mahoney, 147 Neb. 626, 24 N.W.2d 558 (1946). The phrase "arising out of" describes the accident and its origin, c......
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Johnsen v. Taylor
...alone is not a valid basis for a finding of causal connection between the injury or disability and his accident. In Hahl v. Heyne, 156 Neb. 599, 57 N.W.2d 137, 139, the court said: 'We do not think the plaintiff established that her left leg was paralyzed as a result of the fall. * * * Ther......
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Cole v. Cushman Motor Works
...supra [146 Neb. 608, 20 N.W.2d 592].' Beam v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., supra [152 Neb. 663, 42 N.W.2d 295]. See, also, Hahl v. Heyne, 156 Neb. 599, 57 N.W.2d 137. Appellant would be entitled to an award if he has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he sustained an injury, resul......