Hahn v. Fletcher

Decision Date03 June 1925
Docket Number535.
Citation128 S.E. 326,189 N.C. 729
PartiesHAHN v. FLETCHER.
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

Appeal from Superior Court, Watauga County; Harding, Judge.

Action by E. N. Hahn against J. C. Fletcher before a justice of the peace. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed in the superior court, and defendant appeals. Error.

Mere allegation that title is in controversy will not oust justices' jurisdiction.

Plaintiff on September 4, 1923, procured the issuance of a summons, by a justice of the peace, against the defendant "to answer the complaint of E. N. Hahn for the nonpayment of $118.70 with interest due thereon by account and demanded by said plaintiff." On the hearing, defendant moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the justice of the peace had no jurisdiction. The written motion is as follows:

"This action is brought for the recovery of a sum of money alleged by the plaintiff to have been expended by him to discharge certain incumbrances on lands conveyed by defendant to plaintiff by a warranty deed and therefore the title to real estate is in controversy. Shankle v Ingram, 133 N.C. 254, 45 S.E. 578; Brown v. Southerland, 142 N.C. 225, 55 S.E. 108; Consolidated Statutes, § 1473, etc. The action should therefore be dismissed at the cost of the plaintiff."

On the trial, judgment was rendered for plaintiff, and defendant appealed to the superior court. On appeal to the superior court, the following facts were found by the court below:

"That the plaintiff purchased a certain lot of land in Watauga from the defendant; that at the time of the purchase there was an assessment amounting to $118.70, for which the said lot was liable for certain improvements, and that said amount was a lien on the property; that, after plaintiff had purchased and received deed from the defendant, plaintiff was called upon to pay the assessment, and that plaintiff paid it in order to recover the lien of such assessment, and brings this action to recover the money that he paid out.

The court, being of the opinion that a question of warranty does not arise in this case, nor a question of the title between the plaintiff and defendant, overrules the motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction on the part of the justice of the peace, and defendant excepts.

Counsel for the parties tell the court that the foregoing facts are the facts in this case, and counsel for the defendant telling the court they are the facts in the case, and it is agreed that the court may render judgment upon such findings of fact. Whereupon it is ordered and adjudged that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of $118.70 with interest from September 15, 1923, the date of the judgment before the justice of the peace, and the costs of this action."

The defendant excepted to the judgment, assigned error, and appealed to the Supreme Court.

Brown & Bingham, of Boone, and Squires & Whisnant, of Lenoir, for appellant.

F. A. Linney, of Charlotte, for appellee.

CLARKSON J.

Constitution of North Carolina, art. 4, § 27, in part, is as follows:

"The several justices of the peace shall have jurisdiction, under such regulations as the General Assembly shall prescribe, of civil actions founded on contract, wherein the sum demanded shall not exceed two hundred dollars, and wherein the title to real estate shall not be in controversy," etc. C. S. § 1473.

The sole question involved in this appeal is whether, under the facts found the "title to real estate" is in controversy. If the title is in controversy, the justice of the peace had no jurisdiction, and the action should have been dismissed. The facts found indicate that the plaintiff purchased a piece of land from the defendant. The title was in defendant, and he transferred the title by deed to plaintiff. At the time the title passed from defendant to plaintiff, an assessment for $118.70 was on the lot for improvements--this was a lien on the property.

In Bank v. Watson, 187 N.C. 111, 121 S.E. 181, we said:

"Under the statute (chapter 56, § 9, Public Laws 1915), the street assessment, 'from the time of such confirmation, the assessment embraced in the assignment roll shall be a lien on the real property against which the same are assessed, superior to all other liens and incumbrances.' Kinston v. Railroad, 183 N.C. 14." C. S. § 2713.

C. S. § 2717, makes provision how payment enforced. In Kinston v. Railroad [183 N.C. 14, 110 S.E. 645] supra, it is termed a "statutory mortgage."

Plaintiff paid the lien and now sues to recover it from defendant, who made the title to him with warranty. To get a good title to the land, plaintiff had to pay the lien on the land. If the land was sold, as it could be under the lien, plaintiff would have no title unless he purchased at the sale. "Title is the means whereby the owner of lands has the just possession of his property." Horney v. Price, 189 N.C. 820, 128 S.E. 321.

Title in the present case may not be the means whereby plaintiff may have the "just possession of his property" with a lien on it. If sold to pay the lien, he may have no title. Plaintiff brings this action before a justice of the peace to recover the amount paid; defendant sets up the defense that the title to real estate is involved in the controversy and the question of warranty arises, and contends that the action should have been brought in the superior court. Plaintiff, in his action before the justice of the peace, would introduce the deed made by defendant--from the facts found, this was admitted. Then by the deed would arise the warranty and covenants in the deed. This would automatically involve the title to the real estate. If the owner of the "statutory mortgage," instead of selling...

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