Hahnel v. Highland Park College

• Decision Date: 10 May 1915
• Docket Number: 30074
• Citation: 152 N.W. 571,171 Iowa 492
• Parties: EUGENE HAHNEL, Appellant, v. HIGHLAND PARK COLLEGE, Appellee
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

152 N.W. 571

171 Iowa 492

EUGENE HAHNEL, Appellant, v. HIGHLAND PARK COLLEGE, Appellee

No. 30074

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

May 10, 1915

REHEARING DENIED SATURDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1915.

Appeal from Polk District Court.--HON. C. A. DUDLEY, Judge.

ACTION at law to recover a balance alleged to be due for services rendered by plaintiff to the defendant as a teacher of music from September 1, 1912, to September 1, 1913. The petition was in two counts. In the first, the plaintiff alleged a parol contract of employment at the rate of $ 1,800 per year and the payment of $ 1,650. In the second count, plaintiff sought to recover the same amount, $ 150, upon a quantum meruit. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the defendant moved for a directed verdict, because, as to the first ground, no evidence was introduced showing a verbal contract for one year,--that the evidence, if it proves anything, proves a verbal contract for three years,--and because the evidence so far shows that there had been a written contract for five years, which had expired, and these services rendered afterwards were without any special contract other than the three year contract; that no recovery could be had upon a quantum meruit, there being only an implied contract for services upon the terms of the previous written contract, the terms of which are not shown, and therefore there could be no recovery at all. Before the ruling upon this motion, by agreement of parties, the defendant offered the evidence of Dr. Longwell, president of the defendant college, who identified the prior written contract of employment between plaintiff and defendant from September 1, 1907, to September 1, 1912, at $ 1,500 per year and by agreement, the contract was offered in evidence. This written contract was complied with by both parties. Dr Longwell also testified as to the conversation between plaintiff and himself in regard to the employment of plaintiff after the expiration of the written contract from September 1, 1912, which will be later referred to. Thereafter, defendant's motion was sustained and judgment rendered against plaintiff for costs. Plaintiff appeals.

Reversed.

Dunshee & Haines, for appellant.

R. L. Parrish, for appellee.

PRESTON, J. DEEMER, C. J., WEAVER and EVANS, JJ., concur.

OPINION

PRESTON, J.--

1. There is a controversy between counsel as to whether the trial court did or should have considered the testimony of Dr. Longwell, introduced pending the motion for a directed verdict. It does not appear whether or not defendant had introduced all its testimony. It is stated in argument that the testimony of this witness was taken as a matter of accommodation, because the witness could not be present later. We do not know whether the court considered the testimony thus introduced on behalf of defendant or not. If the court did not consider it, then, for reasons stated later in the opinion, we think there was a jury question on the undisputed evidence of plaintiff. If the court did consider the defendant's evidence, as we assume it did, because the evidence was offered and received before the ruling, then we think there was a conflict in the evidence of plaintiff and defendant for the determination of the jury.

2. Defendant in its answer admitted the payment of $ 1,650 and alleged that this was all plaintiff's services were worth, and filed a counterclaim alleging that about September 1, 1912, the prior written contract was extended by verbal arrangement, by which plaintiff was to continue in the employ of defendant for a term of three years more upon substantially the same conditions, except that plaintiff was to have, during the first year, a salary of $ 1,800, the second year, $ 1,900, the third year, $ 2,000 per annum; that plaintiff entered upon the performance of said verbal agreement, but left the employment of defendant and repudiated the contract, causing defendant damages for the breach thereof in the sum of $ 200.

Plaintiff demurred to the counterclaim on the ground that the three-year verbal contract was void under the statute of frauds. The demurrer was sustained. It is contended by appellee that plaintiff, having induced the court to hold such a contract void, may not change his position and now rely upon the same contract. But we do not understand plaintiff to claim there was a three-year contract, or to rely thereon. His contention is that the contract between plaintiff and defendant is enforceable for the year during which plaintiff performed services for the defendant, at the rate of $ 1,800 per year. Plaintiff testified:

"During the year commencing September 1, 1912, and ending September 1, 1913, I was teaching in Highland Park College. I know the reasonable value of such services. They were worth $ 3,060. About the first of September, 1912, I talked with Acting President Dr. Longwell; I was asked how much salary I wished, and I told him $ 2,000 a year. To this he replied that it was too much, but he would give me a sliding scale for three years, beginning with $ 1,800, then $ 1,900, and finally $ 2,000. There was nothing definite stated as to how long I was to remain with the college. There was no written agreement between the college and myself after my talk with Dr. Longwell. August 30th, upon receipt of a telegram from St. Louis, I handed in my resignation to take effect September 1st. At first Dr. McGill said he would not let me go, but upon my stating further circumstances he accepted my resignation and wished me well and God-speed."

Dr. Longwell, whose testimony was taken under the circumstances before indicated, testified in regard to this conversation and gives it substantially as plaintiff, except that he says:

"As I remember, Mr. Hahnel said he thought that he ought to have the $ 2,000, but that he was willing to accept the contract on the sliding scale. Q. That is, for three years? A. For three years. If plaintiff had simply stayed one year, I should not have considered his services worth more than $ 1,600. I make the distinction between working for three years and one year because we plan ahead, and if we can have a man two or three years, or five years, we can get more income than to have a man just for one year and the students don't know whether he is going to be there the next year or not."

It will be noticed that the testimony of defendant's witness, Dr. Longwell, was introduced after plaintiff's demurrer to the counterclaim was sustained, and the defendant is the one who is now claiming that the contract was for three years, if there was any contract at all.

3. It is contended for appellee that where a contract is entered into by which one person agrees to perform services for...