Hailey v. Ano
| Decision Date | 17 January 1893 |
| Citation | 136 N.Y. 569,32 N.E. 1068 |
| Parties | HAILEY v. ANO. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from supreme court, general term, third department.
Action of trespass by Jeremiah Hailey against Sophia Ano. From a judgment of the general term (16 N. Y. Supp. 589) affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.
J. P. Kellas, for appellant.
S. L. Wheeler, for respondent.
This is an action of trespass. The complaint alleged an unlawful entry by the defendant upon lands of the plaintiff on lot 20, Franklin county, in 1889, and the cutting and carrying away hay therefrom, and demanded damages in the sum of $200. The answer contained a general denial of the complaint, and alleged that the defendant was the owner of the land upon which the alleged trespass was committed, and had a right to cut and carry away the grass. The action was originally commenced in justice's court, and, on plea of title being interposed, the action there was discontinued, and a new action for the same cause was brought in the supreme court. The contest on the trial turned on the true location of the line between lots 19 and 20. It appeared that plaintiff had been in possession of lot 20 for more than 20 years, and that in 1882 he took a contract to purchase from the owner, under which he held possession at the time of the alleged trespass. The defendant is the wife of Francis Ano, who in 1880 went into possession of 80 acres, or lot 19, adjoining lot 20, under, as may be inferred, a contract of purchase from one John Rowley, the owner, who on the 10th day of June, 1885, conveyed the 80 acres to Francis. On the 20th of July, 1885, Francis Ano and his wife conveyed 40 acres of the land to their daughter Lena, and 40 acres to their son Joseph, but upon what consideration the record is silent. In 1889, Lena and Joseph conveyed the land to their mother, Sophia Ano, the defendant. The hay cut by the defendant in 1889 was cut from about six acres of land, either on lot 20 or on lot 19, the question from which lot it was taken depending upon the true location of the line between the respective lots. Evidence was given in support of the claim of each party as to the true location of the line.
The question on this appeal relates to the correctness of the ruling of the trial judge that a certain judgment rendered in a former action brought by the present plaintiff against Francis Ano concluded the question of title to the six acres in the present action. The trial judge directed a verdict for the plaintiff in this action on the question of title, on the ground that the judgment in the former action was a conclusive adjudication as against the present defendant, Sophia Ano, upon the question of title. For a proper understanding of the question presented some facts need to be stated. The former action was brought in the supreme court in 1884. The plaintiff in his complaint alleged that the defendant, Francis Ano, in July and August of that year wrongfully entered upon premises owned and occupied by the plaintiff on lot 20, county of Franklin, and took therefrom a quantity of hay, the property of the plaintiff, of the value of $200, and converted it to his own use, wherefore the plaintiff demands judgment for that sum, etc. The defendant, Francis Ano, answered by a general denial, and set up that at the time complained of he was the owner and in possession of the lands from which the hay was taken, and was the owner of the hay. The answer is under date of October 10, 1884. No judgment was entered until November, 1888. It appears from the recitals in the judgment that at the November term of the court in that year the cause, being on the calendar, was moved for trial by the plaintiff, and that the attorneys for the parties thereupon agreed in open court that the plaintiff have judgment on the merits for $40 damages, and costs, and it was so adjudged. It will be observed that, when the former action was commenced, neither party thereto had the legal title to any land on lots 19 and 20. Both were in possession of the land occupied by them under contracts with the respective owners. After the commencement of the former action, Francis Ano, the defendant, obtained a deed of the 80 acres on lot 19, his deed being dated June 10, 1885. The plaintiff, so far as appears, has never obtained a deed of lot 20. It is also important to notice that the judgment in the former action was rendered three years after Francis Ano had conveyed the 80 acres to his children. It does not appear that when they took their deeds they had any knowledge of the pendency of the suit against Francis Ano. The deed to the present defendant was given after the rendition of the judgment.
We shall assume, in determining the question now presented, that the controversy in the former suit related to the same identical premises which are involved in the present controversy. It is settled in this state that, under an issue of soil and freehold in an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, the verdict and judgment on that issue determine the title as between the parties at the time of the alleged trespass, and that in a subsequent action of trespass between the same parties, where the same title is put in issue, the former judgment is conclusive. Burt v. Sternburgh, 4 Cow. 559. The same rule obtains when the second action is ejectment. Dunckle v. Wiles, 5 Denio, 296. If the title existing in either party when the former judgment was obtained was determined before the second action, or a new title had been acquired by the party against whom the judgment was rendered, this may be shown in avoidance of the estoppel of the former judgment. Dawley v. Brown, 79 N. Y. 390. The rule that estoppels barred parties and privies would, we suppose, affect a grantee of a party to the judgment in the trespass suit, who acquired title from such party after the judgment. In Dunckle v. Wiles, which was ejectment, and where the defendant relied upon a judgment in a former action of trespass between his grantor and the plaintiff as an adjudication upon the...
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... ... 196, 197; Moragne v. Doe, ex dem. Moragne, 143 Ala. 459, 39 ... So. 161, 111 Am. St. Rep. 52, 5 Ann. Cas. 331; McCollum ... v. Burton, 220 Ala. 629, 127 So. 224; 17 R. C. L., p ... 1019, § 13; Houston v. Timmerman, 17 Or. 499, 21 P ... 1037, 4 L. R. A. 716, 11 Am. St. Rep. 852; Hailey v ... Ano, 136 N.Y. 569, 32 N.E. 1068, 32 Am. St. Rep. 764, ... 767, and notes. There is an early statement of the rule by ... Chancellor Kent in Cook v. Mancius, 5 Johns. Ch. (N ... Y.) 89 (L. Ed. p. 1019), and our cases are collected in ... Thompson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 315, 78 So. 91. And ... ...
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