Haines v. Territory
| Decision Date | 08 February 1887 |
| Parties | HAINES et al. v. TERRITORY |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Error to district court.
Alanson L. Haines, William W. Russell, John Faulds, and A. W. Branner were indicted for obtaining goods from Oscar Walker by false pretenses, and convicted. They assign error. Affirmed as to Russell and Haines; reversed as to Branner.
Indictment for obtaining property on false pretenses. The indictment omitting the introductory part, proceeds as follows "Alanson L. Haines, William W. Russell, John Faulds, and A. W. Branner, whose first and Christian name is to the jurors aforesaid unknown, late of the county aforesaid, on the twenty-third day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-six, at the county of Albany, in the territory of Wyoming, unlawfully, knowingly falsely, designedly, and feloniously, devising and intending to cheat and defraud one Oscar Walker of certain of his personal goods, chattels, and personal property, that is to say, thirty-three horses, commonly called geldings, each of the value of one hundred dollars, and all of the total and aggregate value of three thousand three hundred dollars, did then and there unlawfully, falsely, fraudulently, knowingly designedly, and feloniously falsely pretend and falsely represent to the said Oscar Walker, for the purpose of inducing him, the said Oscar Walker, to part with the said personal goods, chattels, and property of him, the said Oscar Walker, to wit, the said horses, commonly called geldings, of the value aforesaid, that the said John Faulds then and there desired to purchase of him, the said Oscar Walker, the said horses, commonly called geldings, and that the said John Faulds was then and there a ranchman and farmer doing business and engaged then and there in ranching and farming near Granger, in the territory of Wyoming aforesaid, and desired and wanted the said horses, commonly called geldings, to ditch with and to work upon the said farm and ranch of him, the said John Faulds, near said Granger aforesaid, and that the said John Faulds had then and there moneys and credits in a bank at Evanston, in the said territory of Wyoming, sufficient to pay for said horses, if purchased then and there by him, the said John Faulds, of and from the said Oscar Walker, as soon as said money could be obtained from said bank, and that the said John Faulds had previously theretofore been sent for by the said William W. Russell, through and by means of a certain letter written, addressed, mailed, and sent by the said William W. Russell to the said John Faulds, who had theretofore duly received the said letter, to come and purchase the said horses, and that, by and through a misunderstanding of the terms and contents of said letter, he, the said John Faulds, had theretofore been thereby led to believe that said horses were owned and held for sale by the said William W. Russell, and that the said John Faulds, by reason of his said misunderstanding of the terms and contents of the said letter, as aforesaid, had previously thereto come from the said Granger to the city of Laramie, in the county of Albany, in the territory of Wyoming, and then and there to purchase said horses from the said William W. Russell, but was then and there unprepared to pay for the said horses, as the said William W. Russell would have then and there trusted and given credit to the said John Faulds for the said horses, if the said John Faulds had purchased the same of the said William W. Russell, if the said William W. Russell had owned the said horses and had the same for sale then and there, he, the said William W. Russell, then and there knowing him, the said John Faulds, to be a safe person to trust and give credit to, and that the said John Faulds was then and there able to pay large sums of money, and was then and there able to pay, within a short time, the said Oscar Walker for the said horses, if purchased by him, the said John Faulds, then and there of the said Oscar Walker, and that the said John Faulds then and there desired to purchase of the said Oscar Walker the said horses for the use and benefit of him, the said John Faulds, and that the said John Faulds was then and there good and all right, and was then and there a safe person to trust and give credit to; and that the said John Faulds was then and there perfectly responsible, financially and pecuniarily; whereas, in truth and in fact, the said John Faulds did not then and there desire to purchase of him, the said Oscar Walker, the said horses, commonly called geldings, and whereas, in truth and in fact, the said John Faulds was not then and there a ranchman nor farmer, [etc., alleging the falsity of all the representations;] which said pretense, pretenses, representation, and representations the said Alanson L. Haines, William W. Russell, John Faulds, and A. W. Branner, whose first and Christian name is to the jurors aforesaid unknown, then and there well knew to be false and untrue; by color and means of which said false pretense and false pretenses and false representation and false representations they, the said Alanson L. Haines, William W. Russell, and A. W. Branner, whose first and Christian name is to the jurors aforesaid unknown, did then and there unlawfully, knowingly, falsely, designedly, and feloniously obtain from the said Oscar Walker the said thirty-three horses, commonly called geldings, each of the value of one hundred dollars, and all of the total and aggregate value of three thousand three hundred dollars, and each and all of said horses, commonly called geldings, being then and there of the personal goods, chattels, and personal property of the said Oscar Walker, with intent then and there to cheat and defraud the said Oscar Walker of the same, to-wit, the said horses, commonly called geldings, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the territory of Wyoming."
Defendants were convicted, and brought error.
Judgment affirmed. Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Brown, Blake & Arnold, for plaintiffs in error.
Corlett, Lacey & Riner and Mr. Corthell, for the Territorv.
Plaintiffs in error moved below to quash the indictment, which motion was overruled, and exception taken. They then interposed a demurrer to the indictment, which was overruled. These are the first two and principal assignments of error.
The first question suggested by the motion and demurrer grows out of a misapprehension as to the scope and effect of section 138 of the crimes act in the Compiled Laws of 1876. Section 139 of that act, as amended March 5, 1884, is substantially the statute of 7 & 8 Geo. IV.; and it seems to be conceded that had section 138 not been enacted, the facts as developed in the court below would have constituted a breach of section 139 of the false pretenses act. It remains, therefore, to inquire what effect section 138 has upon section 139 in withdrawing this or any other case from the provisions of the latter section. Section 138 provides that, "if any person, by false representations in writing of his own responsibility, wealth, or mercantile correspondence or connection, shall obtain a credit, and thereby defraud any person," etc., "or if any person shall cause or procure others to report falsely of his honesty, wealth, or mercantile character," etc., he shall be punished. It is a fundamental principle that a statute which is in effect a limitation upon a general act limits the general act only so far as the words of the limiting statute go. In other words, where there is a general act creating and punishing an offense, which may be committed in a number of ways, and another statute prescribing a particular punishment for that offense when committed in a particular manner, such offense, unless committed in such particular manner, is subject to punishment under the general act; and it is equally true that a penal statute must be construed strictly. Counsel, we think, when they impute to section 138 the effect of providing, or attempting to provide, for all matters of false pretenses in which the element of credit enters, misapprehend the effect of such statute. If the wording of section 138 was not perfectly clear and intelligible in itself, the history of section 139 would cast sufficient light upon the scope which the legislature intended it to have. Section 139, as passed and incorporated in the Compiled Laws of 1876, contained the provision: "This section shall not apply to sales of property on credit." In 1884 the legislature struck out the clause quoted above, leaving section 139 to apply to any matter in which credit was an element, and which was not otherwise provided for. Section 138 only provides a punishment for the offense of obtaining goods upon credit by the representation in writing of the party himself as to his responsibility, or by his procuring others to make such representations for him; and it will be noticed that the representations are of a particular kind. In the case at bar, it is doubtful whether the representations made were such as is contemplated by section 138. See Lyde v. Barnard, 1 Mees & Welsb. 101. But, without deciding that question, it seems to us that upon other grounds the case at bar cannot be construed as within the contemplation of section 138.
Plaintiffs in error, for their own benefit, procured a person to perpetrate the fraud, not by any representations as to their responsibility, etc.; nor did they themselves make such representations, in writing or otherwise. Clearly, the offense not being within the letter of the act, they are not punishable under section 138. 2 Bish. Crim. Law, § 415. Faulds...
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