Hainze v. Richards

• Citation: 207 F.3d 795
• Decision Date: 07 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-50222,99-50222
• Parties: (5th Cir. 2000) KIM MICHAEL HAINZE, ET AL., Plaintiffs, KIM MICHAEL HAINZE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ED RICHARDS, Sheriff; STEVE ALLISON; and various unknown Williamson County Sheriff's deputies; WILLIAMSON COUNTY, Texas; KEVIN HALLMARK; SCOTT ZION, Williamson County Sheriff's Deputies, individually and in their official capacities, Defendants-Appellees
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Page 795

207 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 2000)

KIM MICHAEL HAINZE, ET AL., Plaintiffs, KIM MICHAEL HAINZE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ED RICHARDS, Sheriff; STEVE ALLISON; and various unknown Williamson County Sheriff's deputies; WILLIAMSON COUNTY, Texas; KEVIN HALLMARK; SCOTT ZION, Williamson County Sheriff's Deputies, individually and in their official capacities, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 99-50222

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

April 7, 2000

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Austin. A-97-CV-845-SS. Sam Sparks, US District Judge.

James C Harrington, Ted Anthony Ross (argued), Texas Civil Rights Project, Austin, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

R. Mark Dietz (argued), Jerry Lee Jarrard, Jr., Dietz & Associates, Round Rock, TX, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before POLITZ, GARWOOD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

POLITZ, Circuit Judge:

Kim Michael Hainze appeals an adverse summary judgment in his action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. For the reasons assigned, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

In the early morning hours of November 16, 1997, Alicia Cluck made a 911 call requesting that the police transport her suicidal nephew, Kim Michael Hainze, to a hospital for mental health treatment. Cluck advised that Hainze had a history of depression and currently was under the influence of alcohol and anti-depressants, carrying a knife, and threatening to commit suicide or "suicide by cop." ¹ Uniformed Williamson County Sheriff's deputies, defendants-appellees Steve Allison, Kevin Hallmark, and Scott Zion, were given this information and dispatched in marked police cars to a convenience store where Hainze was located. Upon arriving at the store the officers observed a man, believed to be Hainze, standing by the passenger door of a pickup truck occupied by two unidentified individuals. Hainze appeared to be holding the door's handle and talking to the individuals. He had a knife in his hand and was not wearing shoes, despite the cold temperature. Deputy Allison exited his vehicle, drew his weapon, and ordered Hainze away from the truck. Hainze responded with profanities and began to walk towards Allison. At this point, Zion, who was riding with Allison, and Hallmark had also exited their vehicles with their weapons drawn. Allison twice ordered Hainze to stop but Hainze ignored him. When Hainze was within four to six feet Allison fired two shots in rapid succession into Hainze's chest. Allison immediately called EMS. Hainze survived. Approximately twenty seconds elapsed from the time the officers pulled into the store parking lot until Hainze was shot.

On August 21, 1998, Hainze was convicted by a Williamson County jury of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon for his conduct at the convenience store on November 16, 1997. The instant action was filed on November 20, 1997, before Hainze was charged with the criminal offense of which he was convicted. Hainze asserted claims against Williamson County Sheriff Ed Richards, the county, and Deputies Allison, Zion, and Hallmark in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they acted with deliberate indifference to his fourth and fourteenth amendment rights by using "excessive, unreasonable, and deadly force against him." He also asserted the same claim against Williamson County and Sheriff Richards in his official capacity for failing to adopt or enforce policies to adequately handle individuals who are mentally ill and in crisis situations, and to protect against the use of excessive and deadly force in such situations. Hainze sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages. In addition, Hainze brought assault and battery claims against the three deputies under Texas law.

Hainze also sought declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against Williamson County and Sheriff Richards in his official capacity. These claims were based on the defendants' alleged failure to establish a policy or train deputies to protect the well-being of mentally ill individuals, for having actually discriminated against Hainze on the basis of his disability, and for failing to conduct a self-evaluation, all of which Hainze contends were the direct and proximate causes of the near-fatal shooting. Summary judgment was ultimately granted in favor of all defendants on all claims. Hainze timely appealed. ²

ANALYSIS

We review de novo a grant of summary judgment applying the same standard as the district court, viewing the facts and resolving all inferences in favor of the non-movant. ³ "The standard of review is not merely whether there is a sufficient factual dispute to permit the case to go forward, but whether a rational trier of fact could find for the non-moving party based upon the record evidence before the court." ⁴ Our review of the record and controlling law persuades that Hainze's claims fail as a matter of law and, thus, summary judgment was appropriate.

Section 1983 claims:

Hainze initially alleged that the defendants violated his rights under the fourth and fourteenth amendments. He has briefed the issue only with respect to the fourth amendment and his fourteenth amendment claim is deemed abandoned. ⁵ Defendants contend that Hainze's constitutional claims are barred as a matter of law under the Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey ⁶ which held that a civil tort action, including an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, is "not [an] appropriate vehicle[ ] for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments." ⁷ Heck dictates that when a person such as Hainze brings a section 1983 claim against the arresting officers the district court must first "consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence." ⁸ If so, the claim is barred unless the conviction has been reversed or declared invalid. ⁹ In ruling on the summary judgment motion in the instant case, the district court held that Heck did not bar Hainze's suit because "a conviction for aggravated assault against a police officer does not necessarily preclude a finding of excessive force against the 'assaulter.' " The court went on to find, however, that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because their actions under the circumstances were objectively reasonable.

Subsequent to the district court's decision we held that, based on Heck, an excessive force claim under section 1983 is barred as a matter of law if brought by an individual convicted of aggravated assault related to the same events. ¹⁰ In the case at bar, the jury found Hainze guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Thus, as in Sappington, the force used by the deputies to restrain Hainze, up to and including deadly force, cannot be deemed excessive. ¹¹ Concluding that Hainze has not established a violation of a constitutional right, we need not address whether the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. ¹²

Hainze's state law assault and battery claims against the officers are premised on the same basis advanced in support of his constitutional claim. For the above noted reasons, we conclude that these causes of action also were properly dismissed. ADA/Section 504 claims:

Title II of the ADA provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." ¹³ A "public entity" includes "any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government." ¹⁴ The language of Title II generally tracks the language of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, ¹⁵ and Congress' intent was that Title II extend the protections of the Rehabilitation Act "to cover all programs of state or local governments, regardless of the receipt of federal financial assistance" and that it "work in the same manner as Section 504." ¹⁶ In fact, the statute specifically provides that "the remedies, procedures and rights" available under Section 504 shall be the same as those available under Title II. ¹⁷ Jurisprudence interpreting either section is applicable to both. ¹⁸ Title II further directs the Attorney General to promulgate regulations to effectuate the statute's purpose.¹⁹

A disabled plaintiff can succeed in an action under Title II if he can show that, by reason of his disability, he was either "excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity," or was otherwise "subjected to discrimination by any such entity." ²⁰ Neither party disputes that Hainze is a disabled person or that the Williamson County Sheriff's Department is a public entity. The broad language of the statute and the absence of any stated exceptions has occasioned the courts' application of Title II protections into areas involving law enforcement. ²¹ There is some disagreement, however, whether an arrest falls within the ambit of Title II, ²² and only one court has considered whether Title II applies to in-the-field investigations by police officers that may or may not lead to an arrest.

In Gohier v. Enright ²³ the Tenth Circuit recently addressed a case strikingly similar to the one at bar. There the defendant, Officer Enright, responded to a disturbance call shortly after midnight and encountered Lucero, a paranoid schizophrenic, walking down the middle of the road clutching his right hand to his chest. ²⁴ Enright exited his vehicle armed with his nightstick, pepper spray and a pistol, identified himself and asked Lucero to talk to him. Lucero continued walking and Enright ordered him to stop. ²⁵...