O'Hair v. Winchester Police Dep't, Civil Action No. 5: 15-97-DCR
| Decision Date | 26 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 5: 15-97-DCR |
| Parties | ROBERT ALLEN O'HAIR, Plaintiff, v. WINCHESTER POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
Plaintiff Robert O'Hair, an inmate confined at Northpoint Training Center in Burgin, Kentucky, has filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants Monty Corbett, Matthew Reed, Michael Keffer, William Jackson, and the Winchester Police Department violated his federal constitutional rights. [Record No. 1] O'Hair has also filed several documents that amend the contentions in the Complaint. [See, e.g., Record Nos. 14; 47] Specifically, he asserts a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against the officers and the entity defendant based on the events surrounding his arrest on February 4, 2015. [Record No. 1, pp. 4-5]
On March 28, 2016, O'Hair filed pleading captioned "Dispositive Motion" in which he attempts to explain why he is entitled to judgment in his favor. [Record No. 50] He subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. [Record No. 63] The defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on March 28, 2016, as well. [Record No. 51] The defendants' motion has been fully briefed, including a sur-reply by O'Hair [Record Nos. 52; 57; 65], whereas the plaintiff failed to file replies regarding his motions within the appropriate timeframe. The three motions were referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for review and issuance of a Report and Recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). On July 8, 2016, Magistrate Judge Robert E. Wier recommended that the defendants' motion be granted and O'Hair's motions be denied. [Record No. 71] On July 20, 2016, O'Hair filed objections to the Recommended Disposition. [Record No. 76] Having conducted a de novo review of the portions of the Recommended Disposition to which O'Hair objects, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Wier and will grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
On February 4, 2015, O'Hair was incarcerated at the Clark County jail on charges of receiving stolen property. [Record No. 51-2, p. 2] Around 3:00 a.m., he escaped and went to his wife's residence. [Id., p. 3; Record No. 51-3, p. 1] Upon notification of the plaintiff's location, the officers went to that residence at approximately 4:00 a.m., confirming with her that O'Hair was in the home. [Id., p. 7] O'Hair admits that he went to the residence with the intent to overdose on drugs he kept stashed there. [Record No. 51-2, pp. 6-7] When O'Hair realized that the officers were outside the apartment, he began "eating" the drugs. [Id., pp. 4-5] When the officers entered, he bolted the door, moved to the kitchen, and concealed himself behind a doorway or wall. [Id.]
At that point, O'Hair heard the officers order him to show his hands. [Id., p 5] Initially, the plaintiff did not comply because he was still "chewing on the dope." [Id.] He also concedesthat he responded with "f--- you, I want to die."1 [Id., p. 6] Next, O'Hair reached into his pocket, where he pulled out cigarettes and a white and silver lighter with his right hand. [Id., pp. 5-6] O'Hair already had a black cell phone in his left hand. [Id., p. 5] After more commands to show his hands, O'Hair complied, sticking out his hands, which were holding those items. [Id., p. 6] At that moment, Officer Reed fired a shot at O'Hair, allegedly believing the plaintiff had a gun. [Id.; Record Nos. 51-3, p. 7; 51-6, p. 2]
The shot missed O'Hair, who retreated behind a refrigerator and stove, where he barricaded himself by placing the kitchen table in front of the window. [Record Nos. 51-2, p. 9; 51-3, p. 8] Officers then attempted to re-enter the kitchen, with Officer Reed warning that he was going to tase O'Hair. [Record No. 51-3, p. 9] And when he tased O'Hair, the plaintiff fell forward and hit his face on the stove; however, O'Hair was not fully incapacitated. [Id.] As a result, Officer Keffer used his taser on the plaintiff, who continued to resist arrest. [Id.] Next, Reed used the drive stun feature of the taser, which brought O'Hair to the ground, where he struck his head again. [Id.]
O'Hair continued to resist arrest. As Officer Corbett tried to handcuff him, Corbett claims that O'Hair shoved his hands under his face and chest. [Id.] The officers employed other maneuvers to subdue the plaintiff, such as kicks at his hands, with one kick striking O'Hair's face. [Id.] Corbett tased O'Hair a final time, and Keffer struck O'Hair on the legs with his baton. [Id.] At that point, the officers were able to handcuff O'Hair, and they allegethat they removed the taser probes and checked for trauma. [Id.] The parties dispute whether O'Hair was conscious at that point, but he was "unresponsive" upon arriving at the Clark Regional Medical Center. [Id., pp. 9-10; Record Nos. 50, p. 4; 50-1]
O'Hair pleaded guilty to escape, terroristic threatening, resisting arrest, and wanton endangerment as a result of the events of February 4, 2015. [Record No. 51-2, p. 13] He was sentenced to three years of imprisonment. [Id.] On April 10, 2015, O'Hair filed the present Complaint, asserting claims against the Winchester Police Department and Clark County Sheriff's Office, subsequently naming the individual officers. [Record Nos. 1; 1-3, p. 2; 14] The Clark County Sheriff's Office was dismissed from the action on July 23, 2015. [Record No. 34]
O'Hair largely contends that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the severity of his injuries and the number of tases employed by the officers on February 4, 2015. [Record Nos. 50, pp. 1-7; 63, pp. 1-5] Conversely, the defendants argue that the force employed was not excessive under the circumstances presented and acknowledged by O'Hair. [Record No. 55, p. 6] Further, the officers assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity. [Record No. 51, p. 1]
Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine disputes regarding any material facts and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Chao v. Hall Holding Co., 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). A dispute over a material fact is not "genuine" unless a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. That is, the determination must be "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury orwhether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986); see Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 516 (6th Cir. 2008).
In deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the Court views all the facts and inferences drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). With cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court evaluates each motion on its own merits, drawing all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration. Beal ex rel. Putnam v. Walgreen Co., 408 F. App'x 898, 902 (6th Cir. 2010). For a movant bearing the burden of persuasion at trial, his burden is higher in that the evidence must be "so powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it." Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2002). For a movant who does not bear the burden of persuasion at trial, he may either submit affirmative evidence negating an essential element of the other party's claim or demonstrate that the other party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the claim. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The defendants argue that they did not violate O'Hair's constitutional rights on February 4, 2015, by employing excessive force. [Record No. 51-1, pp. 7-10] In addition, the officers contend that, even if they did violate his rights, they are entitled to qualified immunity because those rights were not clearly established. [Id., pp. 11-13] The Court agreeswith the magistrate judge that the defendants did not violate O'Hair's Fourth Amendment rights2 and that the officers are protected by qualified immunity. [Record No. 71, pp. 17-18]
Government officials performing "discretionary functions" are shielded from civil damages liability "as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated." Solomon v. Auburn Hills Police Dep't, 389 F.3d 167, 172 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). First, the Court determines whether the facts as pleaded "show the officer[s'] conduct violated a constitutional right." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Second, the Court examines "whether the right was clearly established." Id. Once a defendant raises this defense, the plaintiff bears the burden of alleging facts demonstrating that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 311 (6th Cir. 2006).
"[I]ndividuals have a constitutional right to be free from excessive force during an arrest." Baker v. City of Hamilton, 471 F.3d 601, 606 (6th Cir. 2006). Excessive force is determined under the "objective reasonableness" standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). The Court must balance the quality of the intrusion against the countervailinggovernmental interests. Id. at 396. The Supreme Court has identified three factors that influence the analysis: (1) the severity of the crime; (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the officers' or others' safety; and (3) whether the suspect actively resisted arrest or attempted to flee. Id. An officer can be held liable for excessive force if he actively participated in the use of force, supervised the officer who used such force, or owed a duty of protection against the use of...
To continue reading
Request your trial