Hairston v. Atlantic Greyhound Corporation
| Decision Date | 07 January 1942 |
| Docket Number | 743. |
| Citation | 18 S.E.2d 166,220 N.C. 642 |
| Parties | HAIRSTON v. ATLANTIC GREYHOUND CORPORATION. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
This was an action to recover damages for an assault upon the plaintiff while a passenger in defendant's bus station. The assault was committed by one of defendant's employees by burning defendant's feet with gasoline.
The plaintiff, a negro, was in defendant's bus station, at night, waiting for a bus upon which he intended to become a passenger. While he was asleep the defendant's porter and attendant on duty in the colored waiting room poured gasoline on plaintiff's feet and set them on fire, causing substantial injury. The material facts were admitted in the answer. The defendant's principal defense was a release executed upon the payment of $55. The release was attacked for fraud. Ratification was alleged in defendant's rejoinder.
Issues addressed to the execution of the release, fraud in its procurement, and ratification, as well as issues relating to the commission of the act causing the injury, and damages both compensatory and punitive, were submitted to the jury and answered in favor of the plaintiff. Compensatory damages in the sum of $500 and punitive damages in the sum of $1,000 were awarded.
From judgment on the verdict, defendant appealed.
Ratcliff Hudson & Ferrell, of Winston-Salem, for appellant.
J Erle McMichael, of Winston-Salem, and Andrew Joyner, Jr., of Greensboro, for appellee.
The defendant assigns as error the following excerpt from the trial judge's charge to the jury:
The vice of this instruction consists not so much in its effect upon the issue of damages, as to which it might be deemed harmless in view of the verdict of the jury, but we think it was prejudicial on the issues relating to the release set up in the answer upon which the case largely hinged. The court had instructed the jury that they might consider on the issue of fraud the inadequacy of the sum of money paid for the release. The amount paid in settlement was admitted to have been $55. This amount the defendant contended was an adequate compensation for the injury plaintiff sustained. Hence, the statement by the presiding judge that $55 or $100 should be considered as mere nominal damages was tantamount to an expression of opinion that the amount paid was inadequate.
The court's statement of the rule as to nominal damages was inexact. Nominal damages, consisting of some trifling amount, are those recoverable where some legal right has been invaded but no actual loss or substantial injury has been sustained. Nominal damages are awarded in recognition of the right and of the technical injury resulting from its violation. They have been described as "a peg on which to hang costs." Hutton & Bourbonnais v. Cook, 173 N.C. 496, 92 S.E. 355, 356; 15 Am.Jur. 390. "What is meant by nominal damages is a small trivial sum awarded in recognition of a technical injury which has caused no substantial damage." Wolfe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 211 N.C. 295, 189 S.E. 772, 773. In view of the evidence, the necessity for an instruction as to nominal damages does not appear.
Defendant contends its motion for judgment of nonsuit should have been allowed on the ground that plaintiff's evidence showed ratification of the settlement by the acceptance and spending of $15 cash which came to him out of the $55 paid for the release. It was admitted that of the consideration for the release, $25 was paid the doctor and $15 was paid to the attorney engaged to represent plaintiff at that time.
Taking the plaintiff's testimony in the light most favorable for him, and considering the evidence tending to show plaintiff's ignorance, the condition of his attorney at that time, the oppressive manner and language of those who procured the release and paid him the $15, we are unable to say that plaintiff "has proved himself out of court." Hayes v. Western Union Tel. Co., 211 N.C. 192, 189 S.E. 499. We think the question of ratification under all the circumstances was one for the jury. Butler v. Fertilizer Works, 193 N.C. 632, 137 S.E. 813; Hayes v. Atlanta & C. Air Line R. R., 143 N.C. 125, 55 S.E. 437, 10 Ann.Cas. 737.
The defendant excepted to the submission of the issue as to punitive damages, on the ground that the corporation should not be held liable for punitive damages for the assault upon the plaintiff, committed by its servant, since the act was outside the scope of the servant's employment and not in furtherance of defendant's business.
The general rule in this jurisdiction is that, in addition to compensatory damages, designed to compensate for the injury or loss sustained, punitive damages or smart money may be awarded by the jury, if they deem proper to do so, when they find that the tortious conduct complained of involves elements of malice, fraud, insult, or wanton and reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights. Roth v. News Co., 217 N.C. 13, 6 S.E.2d 882; Tripp v. Tobacco Co., 193 N.C. 614, 137 S.E. 871; Ford v. McAnally, 182 N.C. 419, 109 S.E. 91; 15 Am.Jur. 710; 25 C.J.S., Damages, § 119, p. 715. It is equally well settled that liability for punitive damages may be imposed upon a corporation or other principal when the injury is inflicted in a manner which would justify such an award, and the servant or agent causing the injury is acting within the scope of his employment and in the furtherance of the master's business. Picklesimer v. R. R., 194 N.C. 40, 138 S.E. 340, 52 A.L.R. 1330; Robinson v. McAlhaney, 214 N.C. 180, 198 S.E. 647. There the liability for punitive as well as compensatory damages is referable to the principle of respondeat superior.
There are cases, however, where the award of punitive damages has been upheld for injuries resulting from breach of duty directly owing from the corporation to the injured person growing out of the relationship between them, and this principle has been applied to cases of assaults by employees of common carriers committed upon passengers. This principle was stated and applied by Hoke, J., in the case of Clark v. Bland, 181 N.C. 110, 106 S.E. 491, 492. In that case the plaintiff Clark went to a railroad station intending to become a passenger, and, while waiting for the train, was called to one side by the assistant station agent and assaulted for reporting him for selling whisky. The assault occurred either on or near the railroad premises. An instruction by the trial court that punitive damages might be awarded by the jury, in their discretion, was upheld. The court said: "It is now fully recognized that corporations may be held liable for the malicious and willful as well as negligent torts of their agents and employees, when committed in the course of and scope of their employment, and also for injuries...
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