Halas v. Executor of Halas' Estate
Decision Date | 14 February 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 82-235,82-235 |
Citation | 68 Ill.Dec. 411,445 N.E.2d 1264,112 Ill.App.3d 940 |
Parties | , 68 Ill.Dec. 411 Therese M. HALAS and Thomas S. Chuhak, Guardian ad Litem, Petitioners- Appellants, v. EXECUTOR OF the ESTATE OF George S. HALAS, Jr., Deceased, Respondent-Appellee. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
William J. Harte, Ltd., William J. Harte, David J. Walker, and Thomas S. Chuhak, Guardian ad Litem, Chicago, for petitioners-appellants.
Kirkland & Ellis, Cornelius J. Harrington, Jr., William L. Rowder, John T. Hickey, Jr., and Alan C. Brown, Chicago, for respondent-appellee.
Petitioner, Therese M. Halas, appeals from the dismissal of three petitions whereby she sought to have certain trust amendments declared invalid, to increase the amount of child support awarded in dissolution of marriage proceedings, and to set aside and vacate certain provisions of a judgment for dissolution of marriage. Thomas Chuhak, guardian ad litem appointed to represent the interests of two minor children, was granted leave to intervene. He joined Therese in the first two petitions, but opposed the latter.
On appeal, petitioner and the guardian ad litem contend (1) the trial court erred in finding that a partial revocation and an amendment of a trust were valid, and (2) petitioner should have been granted an increase in child support. Additionally, petitioner contends the trial court erred in dismissing with prejudice her section 72 petition to vacate portions of a judgment for dissolution of marriage.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Therese and George M. Halas, Jr. were married in 1963. Two children were born during the marriage. In 1975, Therese and George were divorced. George Halas, Jr. died on December 16, 1979. At the time of his death, he was married to Patricia Navalio Halas, whom he had wed in 1978.
The judgment for dissolution of marriage incorporated a settlement agreement entered into by the parties, each of whom was represented by counsel during the settlement negotiations. Part of the settlement agreement provided that decedent was to pay petitioner $50,000 as alimony in gross during the first year after the divorce and $35,000 per year for up to nine years thereafter. The alimony in gross payments also included child support. The parties also agreed that alimony in gross payments would continue after decedent's death. Paragraph 5 of the settlement agreement insured continued payments and provided as follows:
"The husband further covenants and agrees that he will keep and maintain in full force and effect insurance upon his life by doing any and all things necessary thereto in any amount no less than the unpaid balance of the alimony in gross due and owing the wife at any time, naming the wife or a trust for the benefit of wife as irrevocable beneficiary thereof until the husband's said obligation to pay alimony in gross to wife has ceased."
In order to comply with paragraph 5 of the settlement agreement, decedent in 1976 executed an amendment (the 1976 amendment) to an insurance trust originally established in 1972. The 1976 amendment directed the trustee, upon decedent's death, to pay the alimony in gross out of the insurance proceeds as the payments became due. Any trust property remaining thereafter was to be paid to the trustee of the testamentary trusts for the benefit of the children. The 1976 amendment also contained the following provision which is one subject of this appeal:
In 1978, decedent again amended the trust (the 1978 amendment). In this amendment, decedent directed the trustee to retain only insurance proceeds in an amount equal to the unpaid alimony in gross. Funds in excess of that amount were to be distributed to a new trust established by decedent in 1978 (the 1978 trust). Under the terms of the 1978 trust, Patricia Halas was to receive one-third of the proceeds after decedent's death. The remainder was to be divided equally between two trusts established for the children. In order to fund the new 1978 trust, decedent executed a partial revocation of the 1972 trust, as amended in 1976, directing the trustee to surrender one of nine insurance policies used to fund the trust.
After decedent's death, petitioner sought to have the 1978 amendment and partial revocation declared invalid and to prohibit reliance by the executor and trustee on the amendment and revocation. She alleged in her petition that the amendment and revocation were void because they were executed without her consent. The guardian ad litem appointed to represent the interests of the minor children joined in this petition. After a hearing the trial court dismissed the petition.
In another petition filed after decedent's death, petitioner sought increased child support. She alleged that inflation operated to reduce the original support payments by forty per cent and that the support costs had increased since the time the original support order had been entered. The guardian ad litem joined in this request. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition on the ground that decedent had provided adequately for the needs of the children after his death.
Petitioner also filed a section 72 petition seeking to vacate certain portions of the judgment for dissolution of marriage. She alleged that the settlement agreement incorporated into the judgment for dissolution of marriage was invalid because it was predicated on decedent's fraudulent representations regarding the value of his assets. She specifically alleged that decedent submitted false financial data and failed to disclose ownership of municipal bonds valued at about $400,000. It was further alleged that decedent represented the value of his Chicago Bears Football, Inc. stock as $200,000, but the actual value was approximately $5,000,000. Petitioner stated her waiver of permanent alimony and child support was secured solely by the fraud and misrepresentation of decedent and had she known of decedent's true net worth, she would not have accepted the agreement. Additionally, the petition alleged that decedent concealed the existence of the bonds and actual value of Chicago Bears stock from the time the judgment was entered until his death and petitioner was unable to discover these matters. The executor's motion to strike and dismiss the petition joined in by the guardian ad litem, was granted. The petition was dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend.
First, petitioner and the guardian ad litem contend the trial court erred in dismissing their petition to set aside the partial revocation of and the 1978 amendment to the trust. They maintain paragraph 12(a) of the 1976 amendment clearly and unambiguously prohibits changes in the trust provisions without petitioner's consent. Consent was not given for the 1978 revocation and amendment and the petitioner and guardian ad litem therefore contend the partial revocation and amendment were invalid and unenforceable.
When read alone, paragraph 12(a) seems to require petitioner's consent to any changes in the trust. However, the entire agreement, not merely one isolated provision, must be considered in construing the trust instrument. (The First National Bank of Chicago v. Canton Council of Campfire Girls, Inc. (1981), 85 Ill.2d 507, 55 Ill.Dec. 824, 426 N.E.2d 1198; American Rubber & Plastics Corp. v. The First National Bank of Chicago (1971), 50 Ill.2d 172, 277 N.E.2d 840; Vournazos v. Vournazos (1979), 71 Ill.App.3d 672, 28 Ill.Dec. 37, 390 N.E.2d 19.) Thus, paragraph 12(b) of the 1976 amendment must also be considered. In this latter paragraph, decedent reserved the right to exercise various options and privileges accorded him under the policies, to assign, transfer or pledge the policies, and to withdraw policies so long as sufficient funds in the amount of unpaid alimony remained in the trust. Paragraph 12(b) is clearly inconsistent with paragraph 12(a). Provisions which appear to be inconsistent or conflicting must be reconciled and harmonized. (First National Bank of Joliet v....
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Estate of Halas, In re, s. 85-2422
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...to prevent discovery of a cause of action or grounds for relief and silence alone does not constitute fraudulent concealment." Halas v. Executor of Estate of Halas, 112 Ill.App.3d 940, 950, 68 Ill.Dec. 411, 445 N.E.2d 1264, 1271 The appellate court's decision in In re Marriage of Tzoumas, 1......
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