Halas v. Parkway Hosp., Inc.

• Decision Date: 13 February 1990
• Citation: 158 A.D.2d 516,551 N.Y.S.2d 279
• Parties: Paul HALAS, et al., Respondents, v. PARKWAY HOSPITAL, INC., Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 279

551 N.Y.S.2d 279

158 A.D.2d 516

Paul HALAS, et al., Respondents, v. PARKWAY HOSPITAL, INC., Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

Feb. 13, 1990.

Gordon & Silber, P.C., New York City (David Henry Sculnick, of counsel), for appellant.

Steven S. Orlow, P.C., Flushing (Leonard Ziegler, of counsel), for respondents.

Before BROWN, J.P., and RUBIN, KOOPER and HARWOOD, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Graci, J.), dated July 12, 1988, which denied its motion pursuant to CPLR 3017(c) to strike the ad damnum clauses from the complaint on the ground that the action sounds in medical malpractice.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Upon his admission to the defendant hospital, a physical examination disclosed that the 79-year-old plaintiff Paul Halas was very weak and appeared chronically ill with a 105 degree fever. The complaint alleges that Mr. Halas was in his hospital bed with an intravenous tube in his arm when he fell to the floor and broke his hip. The side rails on his bed were in a down position at the time of the fall. The complaint further alleges that the defendant was negligent in permitting Mr. Halas to remain in a hospital bed which lacked proper and adequate safeguards, and in failing to properly supervise him and/or to render him any assistance.

CPLR 3017(c) prohibits any statement of specific monetary damages in a complaint based on medical malpractice (see, Fox v. White Plains Med. Center, 125 A.D.2d 538, 509 N.Y.S.2d 614). Pursuant to this statutory provision, the defendant moved to strike the ad damnum clauses from the complaint. Upon a review of the record, we conclude that the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's motion.

The critical question in determining whether an action sounds in medical malpractice or simple negligence is the nature of the duty to the plaintiff which the defendant is alleged to have breached (see, Bleiler v. Bodnar, 65 N.Y.2d 65, 489 N.Y.S.2d 885, 479 N.E.2d 230; Stanley v. Lebetkin, 123 A.D.2d 854, 507 N.Y.S.2d 468). It is well established that hospitals have a duty to exercise reasonable care and diligence in safeguarding a patient, based in part on the capacity of the patient to provide for his or her own safety (see, Hendrickson v. Hodkin, 276 N.Y. 252, 11 N.E.2d 899; Papa v. Brunswick Gen. Hosp., 132 A.D.2d 601, 517 N.Y.S.2d 762; Alaggia v. North Shore Univ. Hosp., 92 A.D.2d 532, 459 N.Y.S.2d 96). When the duty arises from the physician-patient relationship or is substantially related to medical treatment, the breach gives rise to an action sounding in medical malpractice, not simple negligence (Stanley v. Lebetkin, supra ). "The distinction between ordinary negligence and malpractice turns on whether the acts or omissions complained of involve a matter of medical science or art requiring special skills...