Hale v. Cuyahoga County Welfare Dept., C84-705.

Decision Date19 December 1989
Docket NumberNo. C84-705.,C84-705.
Citation722 F. Supp. 349
PartiesLillian O. HALE, Plaintiff, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENT, Ronald Smith, and Jerome Havericak, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

Edward Geller, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff.

Patrick Murphy, Asst. County Prosecutor, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendants.

ORDER

BATTISTI, Chief Judge.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Lillian O. Hale, is a black woman who was employed by the Cuyahoga County Welfare Department ("CCWD," a defendant in this case) from 1961 until her retirement in August of 1987. Defendants Havericak and Smith were CCWD administrators who were involved in promoting Edmund Hanna, a white man, to the position of Coordinator, a post for which Mrs. Hale applied.

Mrs. Hale's complaint contains three charges:

(1) That CCWD discriminated against her because of her sex and race and in retaliation for her filing charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") by not seriously considering her for promotion and promoting Mr. Hanna to Coordinator. Such discrimination would be a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e, et seq. (West 1981).

(2) That CCWD breached the agreement it made with her in settlement of her 1981 EEOC charge by failing to follow its written personnel policies and failing to make the Coordinator's job promotion decision without regard to sex, race, religion, or national origin.

(3) That Mr. Havericak and Mr. Smith deprived her of her fourteenth amendment and Title VII rights under color of state law by discriminating against her on the basis of race and sex and in retaliation for her filing charges with the EEOC. This deprivation would be a violation of § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 42 U.S. C.A. § 1983 (West 1981).

Mrs. Hale seeks damages amounting to the difference between her actual salary and the salary she would have earned as Coordinator. She also seeks punitive damages against Mr. Havericak and Mr. Smith claiming that their actions were in willful, malicious, and in reckless disregard of her rights.

II. STIPULATIONS

The parties have stipulated to the following facts and they are taken as true.

These events took place in CCWD's SAU-WIN division. The Administrator is at the peak of that division's organization chart. Directly below the Administrator is the Coordinator, a Social Service Supervisor 2 level position. Directly below the Coordinator is the Assistant Coordinator, a Social Service Supervisor 1 level position. Mr. Hanna was promoted from Assistant Coordinator to Coordinator. Directly below the Assistant Coordinator the division is split into two locations: ongoing services (the location that provides welfare services) and "co-location" (the intake location where those seeking assistance first contact the division). When the events that culminated in this lawsuit began there were four Social Service Supervisor 1's, including Mrs. Hale, supervising social service workers at the ongoing services location. There were two Social Service Supervisor 1's supervising social service workers at the co-location. In late July or early August of 1981 defendant Ronald Smith was promoted from Coordinator to Administrator. Mrs. Hale took it upon herself to apply for the position vacated by Mr. Smith on August 10, 1981. CCWD did not seek applicants because it did not intend to fill the position immediately because of a county-wide hiring freeze. The position was left vacant but Mr. Hanna was temporarily assigned to perform the duties of the position as "Acting" Coordinator.

On September 18, 1981 Mrs. Hale filed charge number XXXXXXXXX with the EEOC claiming that she was discriminated against by not being chosen as "Acting" Coordinator. In settling this charge CCWD agreed:

(a) To follow all written personnel policies in filling the position of Coordinator.
(b) To review all candidates for this position under strict guidelines of Title VII without regard to sex, race, religion, or national origin.
(c) To notify the EEOC in writing when and if the Coordinator position was filled.
(d) To notify all Supervisor 1's in writing of the candidate selected as Coordinator.

Settlement Agreement, EEOC charge no. XXXXXXXXX (Nov. 5, 1981).

On February 24, 1983 the opening for the Coordinator's position was finally posted. The applications were screened for compliance with the minimum qualifications of the position. Ten finalists, including Mrs. Hale and Mr. Hanna, met the requirements for the position and were interviewed by defendants Smith and Havericak. Mr. Hanna was selected to fill the position. The CCWD staff was notified by a March 21, 1983 memorandum.

On April 1, 1983 Mrs. Hale filed another charge with the EEOC (charge number XXXXXXXXX). She alleged that CCWD discriminated against her in not choosing her as Coordinator. On December 6, 1983 the EEOC determined that there was no reasonable cause to believe that her charge was true and issued a right to sue letter. The EEOC reopened the case when Mrs. Hale questioned its determination. This suit was filed on March 5, 1984 and it was held in abeyance pending a final EEOC determination. On June 19, 1986 the EEOC again determined that there was no cause to believe that Mrs. Hale's charge was true. This case came to trial under the EEOC's right to sue letter.

III. DIRECTED VERDICT MOTIONS

At the close of the plaintiff's evidence the defendants moved for a directed verdict because the plaintiff failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination.1 The defendants claimed a prima facie case was not established because after Mrs. Hale's rejection the position did not remain open and CCWD did not continue to seek applicants (thus the fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas test was not met). This motion was denied because McDonnell Douglas' prima facie test was specific to the facts of the case.2 That a position must remain open and the employer continue to seek applicants is not required to establish a prima facie case when the plaintiff specifically claims that the employer violated the civil rights laws by hiring someone instead of her.

At the close of all of the evidence the defendants again moved for a directed verdict. This time they claimed that the plaintiff did not make out a prima facie case because the person chosen for the job was a member of a protected class in that he was over forty years old. This motion was denied. The civil rights laws require that employment decisions be based on racially and sexually neutral criteria. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801, 93 S.Ct. at 1823. Employers may not discriminate against one protected group by making sure that a member of another protected group benefits. "Discriminatory preference for any group ... is precisely ... what Congress has proscribed." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 853, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971).

At the close of the evidence a verdict was directed for the defendants on the issue of race discrimination. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Mrs. Hale reasonable people could reach but one conclusion, that the defendants were not motivated by an intent to discriminate against her on the basis of her race.

Also a verdict was directed for the defendants on part of the contract claim. There was no evidence of CCWD's failure to follow their written EEOC guidelines or failing to make their promotion decision without regard to religion and national origin. A verdict was directed for CCWD on these issues.

After the elimination of the race discrimination and several contract issues plaintiff's counsel withdrew the claims that were to be tried to the jury. What remains is a Title VII claim that CCWD discriminated against Mrs. Hale on the basis of her sex and in retaliation for her 1981 EEOC charges by not seriously considering her for promotion and by promoting Mr. Hanna to the position for which she applied. These issues are tried to the Court.

IV. FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Mrs. Hale had been a CCWD supervisor for seventeen years prior to her 1983 application for the Coordinator's position.
2. Mr. Hanna had been an office manager in a real estate firm before coming to CCWD.

3. Mrs. Hale's performance evaluations were always excellent, even for "willingness to cooperate" in 1982 and 1983 after her EEOC complaint. These later evaluations were made by Mr. Hanna.

4. Mrs. Hale had significant experience with the provision of welfare services to clients.

5. Mrs. Hale was well versed in government regulations.

6. Mrs. Hale was respected and well liked by her co-workers. They went to her with their problems.

7. Mrs. Hale was an innovative problem solver.

8. Mrs. Hale was actively involved in the administration of the ongoing services location including recommending needed changes and presiding over meetings.

9. Mrs. Hale was considered by Mr. Smith to be a good worker and a good employee.

10. In the intake co-location Mr. Hanna had more interaction with people in outside agencies than Mrs. Hale had in the service provision location.

11. Mr. Hanna was a good liason between CCWD and other agencies.

12. When Mr. Smith would leave the office (which was not very often) Mr. Hanna would be in charge.

13. Mr. Smith enjoyed working with Mr. Hanna.

14. The position of Assistant Coordinator was created for Mr. Hanna to allow him to gain supervisory experience to overcome the disadvantage that his lack of a college degree may have become to his advancing within the department.

15. Mr. Hanna was chosen as Assistant Coordinator in 1974. He was selected over a woman who was, at the time, deemed less desirable because she was "aggressive."

16. Although Mrs. Hale was not considered for Coordinator in 1981 because there was a prepared list, Mr. Hanna was asked to be "Acting" Coordinator in spite of any list or hiring freeze.

17. Mrs. Hale was not considered for "Acting" Coordinator.

18....

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  • Hale v. Cuyahoga Co. Welfare Dept., 88-3839
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • 19 Diciembre 1989
    ...proceeded to trial before the district court on the Title VII claim and before a jury on the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. The district court, 722 F.Supp. 349, entered judgment, however, in favor of the defendants on the issue of race discrimination only, having accepted plaintiff's withdrawal of......

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