Hale v. State

• Decision Date: 22 January 1918
• Docket Number: 9288.
• Citation: 94 S.E. 823,21 Ga.App. 658
• Parties: HALE v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

94 S.E. 823

21 Ga.App. 658

HALE v. STATE.

No. 9288.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Second Division

January 22, 1918

Syllabus by the Court.

So much of the act approved November 30, 1915 (Acts Ex. Sess. 1915 p. 113, § 11), regulating the use of automobiles, as undertakes to make penal the failure of any operator of a motor vehicle, when meeting any vehicle approaching in the opposite direction, to "turn his vehicle to the right so as to give one-half of the traveled roadway, if practicable and a fair opportunity to the other to pass by without unnecessary interference," is too uncertain and indefinite in its terms to be capable of enforcement.

Error from City Court of Cairo; W. J. Willie, Judge.

M. M Hale was convicted of a violation of the motor vehicle law and he brings error. Reversed.

S. P. Cain, of Cairo, for plaintiff in error.

Ira Carlisle, Sol., of Cairo, for the State.

HARWELL J.

The defendant was indicted for a violation of section 11 of the law approved November 30, 1915, regulating the use of automobiles on public highways, which provides, inter alia, as follows:

"Whenever any operator of a motor vehicle or motorcycle shall meet, on a public street or highway, any person or persons riding or driving one or more horses, or any other draft animal, or any other vehicle, approaching in the opposite direction, the operator shall turn his vehicle to the right so as to give one-half of the traveled roadway, if practicable, and a fair opportunity to the other to pass by without unnecessary interference."

He demurred to the indictment upon the ground that this statute is too vague and indefinite for penal enforcement, and his demurrer was overruled.

The language of this court in Hayes v. State, 11 Ga.App. 371, 75 S.E. 523, is peculiarly applicable in this case:

"It is the duty of the judicial department, wherever possible, to construe an act of the legislative department so as to make it valid and binding and give due effect to all of its terms. Hence, a statute ought not to be held void for uncertainty if it is possible to give a reasonably particular construction to its terms, so as to make them capable of enforcement. But while this is true, the state cannot make an act penal without defining the act in terms sufficiently clear for any person to understand that in performing the act he is guilty of a violation of the statute. The maxim that 'ignorance of the law is no excuse for crime' is founded upon the theory that the citizen may ascertain the law and know that the act which he is performing has been condemned. If it is impossible for him to ascertain that a given act has been made penal, it would be manifestly unfair for the state to punish him for a commission of the act. If the law is of such doubtful construction, and describes the act denominated as a crime in terms so general and indeterminate, as to make the question of criminality dependent upon the idiosyncrasies of individuals who may happen to constitute the court and jury, and of such a nature that honest and intelligent men are unable to ascertain what particular act is condemned by the state, the law

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