Hales v. Griffin

• Decision Date: 31 December 1839
• Citation: 22 N.C. 425,2 Dev. 425
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: JOHN J. HALES et al. v. RICHARD GRIFFIN et uxor et al.

2 Dev. & Bat.Eq. 425

22 N.C. 425

JOHN J. HALES et al.

v.RICHARD GRIFFIN et uxor et al.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December Term, 1839.

Where a testator devised and bequeathed all his estate, consisting of land, slaves and perishable property, such as household furniture and live stock, to his wife for life, and then proceeded, “and at the death of my wife, the property then remaining to go to my son A. H. And provided he should be then dead, to go to his lawful heirs, if any; and provided the said A. H. should die before his mother, and die childless, then the remaining property, after the death of my wife, to be sold, and to be applied” to certain specified purposes; it was held, that the wife took but a life estate in the land and slaves, that the son did not take a vested but only a contingent interest in this property, and that upon the death of the son, in the life time of his mother, leaving children, the children took such an interest in the slaves as entitled them to apply to a Court of Equity to restrain the tenant for life from selling the slaves out of the State, and to compel her and her vendees to give security for the forthcoming of the slaves at her death.

Daniel Hales made his will, and therein devised and bequeathed as follows:

“I give and bequeath to Sarah Hales, my wife, all my estate real and personal, during her life; and at the death of my wife, Sarah Hales, the property then remaining to go to my son, Alexander Hales. And provided he should be then dead, to go to his lawful heirs, if any; and provided the said Alexander Hales should die before his mother, and die childless, or without lawful heirs, then the remaining property, after the death of my wife, Sarah Hales, to be sold, and the money to be applied to maintain worn out travelling Methodist preachers.”

The testator's son, Alexander, died in the life time of his mother, leaving the plaintiffs, his two children. The testator's estate consisted of land, slaves and perishable property, such as household furniture and live stock. The widow sold to the other defendants several of the slaves; and the bill charged that she threatened to sell others of the slaves to persons who would carry them beyond the limits of the State to parts unknown; so that the plaintiffs would lose all benefit of them. It charged further, that the other defendants intended to send the slaves purchased of the widow out of the jurisdiction of the Court. The bill then prayed for an injunction, and that the defendants should be compelled to give security for the forthcoming of the slaves upon the death of the tenant for life; and for general relief.

After the filing of the bill, the widow, Sarah Hales, intermarried with Richard Griffin, who was thereupon made a party defendant.

The defendants by their answer insisted that, under a proper construction of the will, the widow had a right to dispose of all or any of the slaves, or such of the other property as should conduce to her comfort and respectability. They denied any intention of removing the slaves beyond the jurisdiction of the Court; and insisted further, that if the clause in the will made a good executory devise of the slaves, the...