Haley v. State

• Decision Date: 20 July 2021
• Docket Number: 2020-CP-00105-COA
• Citation: 331 So.3d 36
• Parties: Russell HALEY, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

331 So.3d 36

Russell HALEY, Appellant

v.STATE of Mississippi, Appellee

NO. 2020-CP-00105-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

July 20, 2021

Rehearing Denied October 26, 2021

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: RUSSELL HALEY (PRO SE)

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BRITTNEY SHARAE EAKINS

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., GREENLEE AND McDONALD, JJ.

GREENLEE, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Russell Haley appeals from the Warren County Circuit Court's denial of his motion for post-conviction collateral relief (PCR). Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. In October 2015, a Warren County grand jury indicted Haley on two counts of child exploitation in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-5-33(5) (Rev. 2014). Haley's trial was initially set for May 2016 but was continued twice after Haley requested additional time to review discovery, prepare for trial, and pursue plea negotiations. The court set a deadline of February 24, 2017, for Haley to enter a plea. That date was later continued to March 3, 2017. The court's order stated that if Haley missed the deadline, he would have to proceed to trial or enter an open guilty plea. The State offered a plea deal recommending forty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) with thirty-five years suspended and five years to serve. Haley also would have been required to register as a sex offender and pay all costs, fees, and assessments, including $1,000 to the crime victim's fund, a $50,000 fine, and $1,000 to the children's fund.

¶3. On March 6, 2017, Haley appeared to enter a guilty plea. Haley asked the court to defer sentencing to allow him to donate a kidney to a personal friend, Malcolm Davis. The State did not oppose the request for continuance. However, the State informed the court that it was unfamiliar with the court's policy on deferred sentencing and would defer to the court. The court informed Haley that it was the court's policy to only defer sentencing when a defendant enters an open guilty plea. After conferring with his attorney and confirming that he understood, Haley entered an open plea. The trial court accepted Haley's guilty plea and ordered a presentence investigation report. At a hearing on June 30, 2017, the judge sentenced Haley to forty years in the custody of the MDOC, with ten years to serve and thirty years suspended.

¶4. Haley filed a timely pro se PCR motion claiming that his plea was involuntary, he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and a condition of his post-release supervision was "overbroad." In support of his claims, Haley attached a written statement from his wife, Patricia Davis. However, the circuit court found no merit to Haley's PCR motion. Aggrieved, Haley appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶5. Absent a finding that the circuit court's decision was clearly erroneous or an abuse of its discretion, we will not reverse a circuit court's denial or dismissal of a PCR motion. Lawrence v. State , 293 So. 3d 848, 851 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). When reviewing issues of law, the proper standard of review is de novo. Id.

DISCUSSION

¶6. Haley challenges the voluntariness of his guilty plea on several grounds and he requests that his plea be set aside. Haley claims that his plea was involuntary because (1) the circuit court participated in the plea-bargaining process; (2) the court made unfulfilled promises; (3) he did not have enough time to consider the plea offer; and (4) he did not receive a presentence investigation report or presentence hearing. Haley also claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the court imposed an "overbroad" condition regarding his post-release supervision.

I. Whether Haley's guilty plea was involuntary.

¶7. "A guilty plea is binding where it is entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." Hill v. State , 60 So. 3d 824, 828 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Alexander v. State , 605 So. 2d 1170, 1172 (Miss. 1992) ). "A plea will be deemed to meet this standard where ‘the defendant is advised concerning the nature of the charge against him and the consequences of the plea.’ " Id . (quoting Mason v. State , 42 So. 3d 629, 632 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) ). Haley "bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of [the] evidence that [his] guilty plea was involuntary." Roby v. State , 282 So. 3d 477, 481 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). He failed to meet his burden. We again state that "[g]reat weight is given to statements made under oath and in open court ...." Berry v. State , 230 So. 3d 360, 364 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). Therefore, "[a] defendant may not rely on bare assertions in his brief." Neal v. State , 186 So. 3d 378, 381 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Watson v. State , 100 So. 3d 1034, 1038 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) ).

¶8. For ease of discussion, we address each of Haley's assertions below.

A. Whether the circuit judge impermissibly engaged in the plea-bargain negotiations.

¶9. Haley claims that his plea was rendered involuntary when the judge impermissibly participated in the plea-bargaining process, which coerced him into pleading guilty. Specifically, Haley claims that the judge presented a plea deal that "the Judge preferred," and that in turn Haley felt that if he did not accept the judge's deal, he "would be risking punishment." He asserts that the judge went further than merely informing the parties of the court's policy regarding deferred sentencing, but instead claims the judge suggested and "formulated a plan of action."

¶10. Mississippi law is clear that a "trial judge shall not participate in any plea discussion." MRCrP 15.4(b). However, the judge may set a "cut-off date for plea discussions and may refuse to consider the recommendation after that date." Id . Furthermore, any "recommendation [made] to the [circuit] court for a particular sentence ... will not be binding upon the court." MRCrP 15.4(a)(2)(B). Therefore, whether to accept or reject a plea agreement falls within the circuit judge's discretion. See MRCrP 15.4(a)(2)(C). Our supreme court has explained the role of the judge in regard to the plea bargaining process, stating as follows:

While a trial judge must control the sentencing phase of a criminal trial and has the responsibility and duty of approving or disapproving a recommendation by the prosecutor, he should never become involved, or participate, in the plea[-]bargaining process. He must remain aloof from such negotiations. The trial judge always must be circumspect and unbiased, at all times displaying neutrality and fairness in the trial, and consideration for the constitutional rights of the accused.

Magee v. State , 759 So. 2d 464, 470 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Fermo v. State , 370 So. 2d 930, 933 (Miss. 1979) ).

¶11. In the present case, the judge did not involve himself in the plea-bargaining process. Initially, the State recommended that Haley serve forty years in the custody of the MDOC, with thirty-five years suspended and five years to serve. Haley would also have been required to register as a sex offender and pay all costs, fees, and assessments, including $1,000 to the crime victim's fund, a $50,000 fine, and $1,000 to the children's fund. At Haley's plea hearing, in addition to the State's plea offer, Haley requested a deferred sentence so that he could donate a kidney to a friend. While the State did not oppose a continuance, the State explained to the court that it was unfamiliar with the court's policy on deferred sentencing and would leave the decision to the court. At that moment, the court informed Haley that it was its policy to only defer sentencing if the defendant entered an open guilty plea. The court explained that Haley could enter an open plea and defer sentencing or continue with the plea deal he negotiated with the State, leaving the ultimate decision in Haley's hands. Haley decided to take an open plea after discussing it with both his attorney and his wife. The court did not make any statements that could be perceived as participating in the plea process or as pressuring Haley to decide one way over another. Furthermore, a defendant pleading guilty out of fear that he will receive a harsher sentence does not render the plea involuntary. Mayhan v. State , 26 So.3d 1072, 1076 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). By advising Haley of the court's policy and informing him of his choices, the judge was acting within his authority and discretion. Accordingly, there is no merit to this claim.

B. Whether the court made unfulfilled promises to Haley.

¶12. Haley next contends that his plea was the product of unfulfilled promises made by the circuit court. He claims several promises were made to him including "the promise to honor the plea bargain, the promised PSR report and [the] opportunity to address its contents, [the] promise of no witnesses, etc[.]"¹ In particular, Haley claims that it was his and his attorney's understanding that by entering the open plea, he would be accepting the terms of the State's plea recommendation. However, the plea transcript does not support Haley's contention. At the plea hearing, the following colloquy occurred:

[COURT]: Well, the - - off the top of my head, the - - I think the only time I have accepted a plea and deferred sentencing - - or at least I know the time or two that I have done that, it has been when it's been an open plea, and so I've accepted the plea and given some time for a presentence investigation, people to write letters, and all of that kind of stuff.

And so would your client be amendable to pleading? It would be an open plea, and then we could defer sentencing, if the State has no objection.

[COUNSEL]: Judge, I believe he would. I think we want to accept the benefit of the agreed upon plea bargain that we've negotiated back and forth with the State on, and we made our arrangements to have an answer and have everything signed, sealed, and delivered Friday afternoon on the deadline. We previously got the deadline

...