Halim v. Donovan

• Decision Date: 01 July 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 12–00384 (CKK).
• Citation: 951 F.Supp.2d 201
• Parties: Ahmad HALIM and Sharif Abdelhalim, Plaintiffs, v. Shaun DONOVAN, Secretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

951 F.Supp.2d 201

Ahmad HALIM and Sharif Abdelhalim, Plaintiffs,

v.Shaun DONOVAN, Secretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 12–00384 (CKK).

United States District Court,

District of Columbia.

July 1, 2013.

Ahmad Halim, Ellicott City, MD, pro se.

Sharif Abdelhalim, Durham, NC, pro se.

Theresa Ekeoma Dike, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, Cathryn M. Little, Little & Little, PLLC, Raleigh, NC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COLLEEN KOLLAR–KOTELLY, District Judge.

Ahmad Halim (“Halim”) and his son Sharif Abdelhalim (“Abdelhalim”) (together “Plaintiffs”), each proceeding pro se, commenced this action against Shaun Donovan, Secretary, United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) and the city manager, mayor, and several members of the city council of the City of Henderson, North Carolina (the “City Defendants”), alleging discrimination based on nationality and religion in relation to contracts for several properties owned or desired to be owned by Halim and/or Halim together with Abdelhalim. On February 15, 2013, 2013 WL 595891, the Court dismissed without prejudice Plaintiffs' claims against the City Defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Memorandum Opinion (Feb. 15, 2013), ECF No. [52]; Order (Feb. 15, 2013), ECF No. [51]. As a result, all that remains in this action are Halim's claims against HUD.

Presently before the Court are two motions: HUD's [40] Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff Halim's [53] Motion to Tansfer [ sic ] the Case Against Henderson Defendants to a Court in North Carolina that Has Juirsdictions [ sic ] Over them. Also before the Court is Halim's self-styled [55] “Filinig [ sic ] of Legal Authorities to Supp. Juirsdictions [ sic ] of the Court over Henderson Defendents [ sic ] or Tansfer [ sic ] the Case Against Henderson Defendants to a Court in North Carolina That Has Juirsdictions [ sic ] Over Them,” wherein Halim requests that the Court reconsider its findings regarding personal jurisdiction and reiterates his request for a transfer in the alternative. Upon consideration of the parties' submissions,¹ the relevant authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court shall grant HUD's motion to dismiss and deny Halim's motion to reconsider or transfer. The Court shall address each motion in turn.

HALIM'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER OR TRANSFER

Subsequent to the issuance of this Court's February 15, 2013 [52] Memorandum Opinion and [51] Order dismissing Plaintiffs' case against the City Defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, Halim moved to transfer Plaintiffs' claims against the City Defendants to “a Court in North Carolina.” See Pl.'s Mot. to Transfer. Halim has also filed a self-styled “Filinig [ sic ] of Legal Authorities,” wherein he requests that the Court reconsider its findings regarding personal jurisdiction or, alternatively, transfer the case to North Carolina. See Pl.'s Filing of Legal Authorities. The Court shall construe the motions collectively as a motion to reconsider pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). See Roane v. Gonzales, 832 F.Supp.2d 61, 64 (D.D.C.2011) (“A motion to reconsider a final order is generally treated as a Rule 59(e) motion if it is filed within [28 days after the entry of judgment] and as a Rule 60(b) motion if it is filed thereafter.”) (citing Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, 355 F.Supp.2d 414, 420–21 (D.D.C.2005)).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) permits a party to file “[a] motion to alter or amend a judgment” within “28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Motions under Rule 59(e) are “disfavored” and the moving party bears the burden of establishing “extraordinary circumstances” warranting relief from a final judgment. Niedermeier v. Office of Baucus, 153 F.Supp.2d 23, 28 (D.D.C.2001). Rule 59(e) motions are “discretionary and need not be granted unless the district court finds that there is an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C.Cir.1996) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rule 59(e) does not provide a vehicle “to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n. 5, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 171 L.Ed.2d 570 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Halim has failed to establish that reconsideration is warranted with respect to this Court's dismissal of the City Defendants from this case. Halim argues that the Court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' claims against the City Defendants because jurisdiction over them is properly conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1332—the diversity statute. See Pl.'s Filing of Legal Authorities, at 1–2. However, the statutory diversity of citizenship provisions confer only subject-matter jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction is a separate and distinct requirement, which, for the reasons discussed at length in the Court's February 15, 2013 Memorandum Opinion, Halim failed to establish with respect to the City Defendants. Halim provides neither legal authority nor new facts which would warrant reconsideration of that finding.

Alternatively, Halim requests that in the event the Court declines to reconsider its finding that it lacks personal jurisdiction over the City Defendants, that it transfer the now dismissed case against them to “a Court in North Carolina.” See Pl.'s Mot. to Transfer; Pl.'s Filing of Legal Authorities, at 2. Preliminarily, it is not clear to the Court that it would have the authority to effectuate a piecemeal transfer of Plaintiffs' “case” against the City Defendants, while retaining jurisdiction over Halim's claims against HUD. See Hill v. United States Air Force, 795 F.2d 1067, 1070 (D.C.Cir.1986). But in any event, at no point prior to dismissal did either party move the Court to transfer this case. While a Court may on its own initiative transfer an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, “[t]he law of this Circuit also holds that sua sponte transfers pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 are committed to the discretion of the District Court where no party has moved to transfer a case brought in the wrong jurisdiction.” Jovanovic v. US–Algeria Business Council 561 F.Supp.2d 103, 112 (D.D.C.2008) (citing Hill v. United States Air Force, 795 F.2d 1067, 1070 (D.C.Cir.1986)).

For all of the foregoing reasons, and because Halim raises no other theories or facts warranting reconsideration of Court's dismissal order, Halim's motion to reconsider or transfer shall be denied. As the Court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims against the City Defendants was without prejudice, both Plaintiffs remain free to commence a new action against them in an appropriate forum.

HUD'S MOTION TO DISMISS

As the Court has previously observed, Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint—the operative complaint in this action—is vaguely worded and, by any reasonable measure, difficult to decipher. The Court finds particularly troublesome Plaintiffs' failure to relate their several factual allegations to any clearly articulated legal claims; indeed the only reference to potential legal bases for any of Plaintiffs' claims may be found within the section titled “Grounds for the Court[']s Jurisdiction” wherein Plaintiffs cursorily ground jurisdiction over “all of the defendants” in the action on 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act; and inexplicably, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(7) and Rule 19 and Capitol Medical Center, LLC v. Amerigroup Maryland, Inc., 677 F.Supp.2d 188 (D.D.C.2010). Based upon the Court's generous construction of Plaintiffs' allegations against HUD (all of which are expressly stated by Plaintiffs as relating exclusively to Halim, see Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ I–XXII), Plaintiffs appear to allege discrimination based on Halim's status as an Egyptian National and a Muslim in connection with a series of contracts between Halim and HUD related to Halim'spurchase and management of various properties.

Based upon the Court's understanding of the Second Amended Complaint, Halim purchased multifamily housing properties through HUD foreclosure sales in various locations throughout the United States, including in Schenectady, New York; Montgomery, Alabama; Meridian, Mississippi; and Henderson, North Carolina. See generally Second Am. Compl. To provide the requisite context, the Court shall adopt the description of HUD's Multifamily Property Disposition programs helpfully supplied by HUD in its opening brief, to which Plaintiffs have raised no objection:

The Multifamily Property Disposition (“MPD”) is the program through which HUD manages and disposes of multifamily housing projects that are owned by HUD or that are subject to a mortgage held by HUD in a manner that is consistent with the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1701, et. seq. The goals of the program, among other things, are to: 1) protect the financial interests of the Federal government; 2) preserve certain housing so that it can remain available to and affordable by low-income persons; 3) preserve and revitalize residential neighborhoods; 4) maintain the existing housing stock in a decent, safe and sanitary condition; and 5) maintain housing for the purpose of providing rental housing. 12 U.S.C. § 1701z–11. See also12 U.S.C. § 1715z–11a. Some properties are sold under the Multifamily Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 1981, 12 U.S.C. § 3701–3717. To effectuate the goals of the MPD program, multifamily properties are frequently sold with use agreements that specify repair requirements that must be completed within a set period of time, use restrictions to maintain the property as low-income residential housing, and affordability restrictions limiting the rent amount/levels at the property. 12 U.S.C. § 3706(b).

HUD Mot. at 6.

For the Schenectady, New...