Hall v. Adkins
| Decision Date | 28 February 1875 |
| Parties | AARON HALL, Respondent, v. ALBERT C. ADKINS, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Andrew Circuit Court.
Heren & Strong, for Appellant.
I. The intent with which property is taken is always a question for the jury. (Thatch. Crim. Cas., 480, 484; State vs. Williams, 35 Mo., 229.) In this case whether the removal of the corn by respondent was a trespass or larceny, depends on the circumstances of the taking and intent with which it was done, and certainly from the evidence in this case, was a question for the jury to pass on.
II. The appellant admits the speaking of the words as charged, but denies their falsity or malice, and pleads the facts, circumstances and occasion under which the words were spoken, in order to justify the speaking. And where the occasion and circumstances seem to justify the charge, a malicious intent is not presumed; and malice in fact is essential to the right of action. (Pasley vs. Kemp, 22 Mo., 412; Weaver v. Hendrick, 30 Mo., 502; Atterbury vs. Powell, 29 Mo., 433.)
Allen H. Vories, for Respondent.
I. The words charged in the petition are actionable per se.
II. Plaintiff could not have been guilty of larceny, as he could not steal his own corn.
III. The principle of the law, as declared in the case of Pasley vs. Kemp, (22 Mo., 411, 412) has no application. For two of plaintiff's witnesses prove that the charge of stealing was made without any explanation or any statement.
This was an action for slander. The defamatory words charged to have been spoken by the defendant of the plaintiff, were: “He is stealing my corn; Aaron Hall, (plaintiff meaning) stole my corn and is swindling me, and the neighbors are helping him do it.”
The defendant admitted in his answer the speaking of the words charged; denied that the same were maliciously spoken; and pleaded in justification the truth of the words spoken, and in mitigation of damages, the facts and circumstances relied upon to constitute said stealing, and a reference by him to such facts and circumstances at the time of speaking the words.
The plaintiff replied, denying the facts relied upon to constitute the larceny charged; and averred that no explanation was made by defendant of the words charged at the time they were spoken, and that no reference was made by defendant to the facts and circumstances relied upon by him to constitute the larceny charged.
It appears from the testimony that the defendant leased to the plaintiff and one John Hall, jointly, a tract of land in Andrew county, from the 3d day of August, 1871, to the 1st day of March, 1873, on which a crop of corn was to be grown by the plaintiff and John Hall, they, in addition to other stipulations on their part, agreeing to pay defendant, on or before January, 1st, 1873, or before, if the crop was sooner sold, $475 in money for the use of the land and other benefits conferred by the lease, “the crop to be security for the payment of said sum, and to be gathered and penned on the premises on or before December, 1st, 1872.”
It further appears, that the plaintiff and defendant had an interview, in which plaintiff proposed to provide other security for the rent, so that he might dispose of the corn, but failed to do so; and afterwards told several parties that he and defendant had had a “fuss,” and that he intended to take the corn, and if they saw him taking it to say nothing about it. Before any of the rent was paid a portion of the corn was taken away in the night, without the consent, and against the will of defendant, and used to feed plaintiff's hogs. Plaintiff explained why it was taken in the night; but it is unnecessary to state the explanation here.
The testimony was conflicting as to whether the defendant at the time of speaking the actionable words, communicated to every person to whom and in whose presence he used them, the circumstances attending the taking of the corn by plaintiff.
At the instance of the plaintiff the court gave six instructions, to the giving of which defendant excepted. All of them seem to be unobjectionable, save the 4th, which is as follows: “That there is no evidence before the jury to sustain the defendant's plea of justification in this cause, and at all events their verdict must be in favor of the plaintiff, for such damages as they believe from all the evidence and circumstances in the case the plaintiff has sustained, not to exceed the sum of five thousand dollars.”
Nine instructions were asked by the defendant, the 3rd, 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th of which were refused; and defendant excepted. The...
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Cook v. Globe Printing Co.
...to or meant to be referred to. And in support of this contention counsel rely upon various decisions of this court, notably Hall v. Adkins, 59 Mo. 144, in which the action for slander was based upon a charge of stealing corn, and in defense to which the defendant offered evidence that the p......
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Cook v. Globe Printing Company of St. Louis
...not a subject of larceny, they will not be actionable. Trimble v. Foster, 89 Mo. 52; Johnson v. Post-Dispatch, 2 Mo.App. 565; Hall v. Adkins, 59 Mo. 144; Pasley v. 22 Mo. 409; Israel v. Israel, 109 Mo.App. 376; Grimes v. Thorp, 113 Mo. 652; Carpenter v. Hamilton, 185 Mo. 603; Alderson v. Au......
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Brown v. Globe Printing Company
...other words which rebut the idea of criminality, there is no libel. Johnson v. St. Louis Despatch Co., 2 Mo.App. 565, 65 Mo. 539; Hall v. Adkins, 59 Mo. 144; Trimble Foster, 87 Mo. 49; Carpenter v. Hamilton, 185 Mo. 603; Grimes v. Thorp, 113 Mo.App. 652; Israel v. Israel, 109 Mo.App. 366; A......
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State v. Moore
...assumes that proof of possession and title has been made without allowing the jury to pass on it. Alexander v. State, 5 S.W. 840; Hall v. Adkins, 59 Mo. 144; 2 Bish. Crim. sec. 808, p. 457; 2 Russ. on Crimes, 152. (3) The third instruction is erroneous because there is no evidence from whic......