Hall v. Chastain, 36616
Decision Date | 16 December 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 36616,36616 |
Citation | 246 Ga. 782,273 S.E.2d 12 |
Parties | HALL v. CHASTAIN. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Hatcher, Stubbs, Land, Hollis & Rothschild, Jerry A. Buchanan, Columbus, for appellant.
Kenneth M. Henson, Columbus, for appellee.
Joseph B. Chastain, plaintiff, filed a complaint against Marvin J. Hall, defendant, alleging that the defendant had lost control of his vehicle and driven it into a brick wall surrounding the plaintiff's property, and further, that the defendant had acted in bad faith and been stubbornly litigious. The plaintiff prayed both for damages and expenses of litigation. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $10,000 and the defendant appeals. We affirm.
1. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict on the issue of negligence. We note, however, that the defendant admitted in his answer that "On or about January 20, 1979, (defendant) was operating a 1976 Ford automobile northerly on Hilton Avenue, (and) lost control of his vehicle and drove same into the brick wall surrounding plaintiff's property and knocked down a (small) portion of same."
Res ipsa loquitur Parker v. Dailey, 226 Ga. 643, 645, 177 S.E.2d 44 (1970).
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the issue of negligence.
2. Defendant argues that the trial court's acceptance into evidence of Columbus City Ordinance § 20-9.18 was error for two reasons: said ordinance establishes a standard of conduct so vague as to violate the notice requirement of due process and there was insufficient evidence of the defendant's violation of said ordinance.
Section 20-9.18 provides that "the operator of a motor vehicle at all times shall operate the vehicle in a manner which is safe for the condition on the highways, streets, alleys, driveways, bridges, viaducts, or underpasses, so they do not collide with stationary objects legally on or adjacent to the right of way."
In Strickland v. Whatley, 142 Ga. 802, 83 S.E. 856 (1914), where the statute challenged as unconstitutionally vague prohibited the operation of cars "at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper, having regard to the traffic and use of such highway, or so as to endanger the life or limb of any person or the safety of any property," this court held that Id. at 802, 83 S.E. 856.
Similarly, we hold that, in the context of the present civil litigation, Columbus City Ordinance 20-9.18 is not so vague as to violate the notice requirement of due process.
For the reasons stated in Division One of this opinion, we also hold that there was sufficient evidence of the defendant's violation of this ordinance. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in accepting said ordinance into evidence.
3. The trial court charged the jury that the proper measure of damages was "the actual value of the property to the owner, taking into account its cost, practicality and expense of repairing or replacing it, and such other consideration which affect its value to the owner." Appellant argues that said charge was not authorized by the evidence, and, was therefore, erroneous.
"For fencing, injured or destroyed, the recovery should be measured by the cost of restoring it and making its condition as good as that in which it was when injured or destroyed." Central R. etc. Co. v. Murray, 93 Ga. 256, 257, 20 S.E. 129 (1893); Accord, Buhl v. Sandy Springs Medical Center, 147 Ga.App. 176, 177, 248 S.E.2d 238 (1978); Dobbs, Remedies, Ch. 5, § 5.1, pp. 312-18 (1973).
Consequently, we agree with the appellant that the trial court's charge on the measure of damages was not authorized by the evidence and was erroneous.
An unauthorized charge on the measure of damages however is held to be harmless when the actual award of damages does not exceed the amount which the jury would have been authorized to award under an authorized charge. See, Broughton v. Winn, 60 Ga. 486, 489 (1878); Vangemert v. McCalmon, 68 Wash. 618, 414 P.2d 617 (1966).
In the present case, the evidence establishes the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Housing Authority of Atlanta v. Famble
...consequence showing negligence on the part of the defendant." Parker v. Dailey, 226 Ga. 643, 645, 177 S.E.2d 44. Accord, Hall v. Chastain, 246 Ga. 782, 273 S.E.2d 12. This court has criticized the doctrine of "exclusive control" in Smith v. Telecable of Columbus, 142 Ga.App. 535, 536, 236 S......
-
John Thurmond & Associates, Inc. v. Kennedy
...or restoring the damage, unless the cost of repair is disproportionate to the property's probable loss of value. Hall v. Chastain, 246 Ga. 782, 784, 273 S.E.2d 12 (1980); Central R & B Co. v. Murray, 93 Ga. 256, 257, 20 S.E. 129 (1893); Empire Mills Co. v. Burrell Engineering, etc., Co., 18......
-
Vega v. La Movida, Inc.
...20. (Citation omitted.) AT Systems Southeast v. Carnes, 272 Ga.App. 671, 673(2), 613 S.E.2d 150 (2005). 21. See Hall v. Chastain, 246 Ga. 782, 785(6), 273 S.E.2d 12 (1980). 22. 23. (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Id. at 438(1), 585 S.E.2d 628. 24. (Citation omitte......
-
F.A.F. Motor Cars, Inc. v. Childers
...be attributable not to lack of care but to lack of time to assess the situation.' (Emphasis supplied). [Cit.]" Hall v. Chastain, 246 Ga. 782, 785(5), 273 S.E.2d 12 (1980). The evidence at trial showed that when the sudden peril arose, appellant Azran "realized I couldn't do anything; that w......