Hall v. Cnty. of Fresno
| Decision Date | 29 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | 1:18-cv-01678-DAD-GSA-PC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | CURTIS HALL, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF FRESNO, et al., Defendants. |
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, RECOMMENDING THAT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL BE DENIED AND THIS CASE PROCEED WITH PLAINTIFF'S FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT FRESNO COUNTY, THAT ALL OTHER CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
(ECF No. 8.)
Curtis Hall ("Plaintiff") is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On December 11, 2018, Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action. (ECF No. 1.) On January 13, 2020, the court dismissed the Complaint for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend. (ECF No. 7.) On February 18, 2020, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint which is now before the court for screening. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF No. 8.)
Notwithstanding any filing fee, the court shall dismiss a case if at any time the Court determines that the complaint "(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) ().
"Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice," Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)), and courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences," Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled." Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).
Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.
In reviewing the pro se complaint, the court is to liberally construe the pleadings and accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.89, 94 (2007). Although a court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability . . . 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Therefore, the complaint must contain sufficient factual content for the court to draw the reasonable conclusion that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Plaintiff is a civil detainee presently detained as a Sexually Violent Predator ("SVP") pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act, Welf. & Inst.Code, § 6600 et seq., at Coalinga State Hospital (CSH) in Coalinga, California, in the custody of California's Department of State Hospitals.1 The events at issue in the First Amended Complaint allegedly occurred while Plaintiff was detained as an SVP in the custody of the Fresno County Sheriff at the Fresno County Jail. Plaintiff names as defendants Fresno County and Sheriff Margret [sic] Mimms (collectively, "Defendants"). Plaintiff sues defendant Fresno County in its official capacity, and defendant Mimms in her individual capacity, claiming that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Plaintiff's allegations follow:
Plaintiff was detained as a civil detainee at the Fresno County Jail ("Jail") under Welfare and Institutions Code §6600, beginning on July 24, 2018. Jail staff housed Plaintiff with criminal detainees in a section known as Protective Custody ("PC"). According to Cal. Pen. Code § 4002, Plaintiff could only be housed with criminal detainees if he signed a waiver in front of a Judge. This was never done. Plaintiff told the booking deputies he was a civil detainee and could not
///be housed with criminals. He told three deputies and they all told Plaintiff to shut up, he was going to be housed wherever classification wanted to place him.
In the PC Unit there were criminal inmates who did not have sex offenses, so they did not have the same criminal history as Plaintiff. Plaintiff continued to tell deputies he needed to be housed separately, but they all said that classification put him here so this is where he would stay. Being housed with non-sex offenders put Plaintiff's life in danger of physical harm, and the entire time he was housed with criminal detainees he was in fear of physical harm. Being an SVP placed Plaintiff's life at more risk than if he were only a sex offender. Deputies would [front] Plaintiff off as a sexually violent predator in front of other inmates. Plaintiff was in the same PC Unit for four and a half months.
Plaintiff was given the same amount of dayroom time, recreation time, phone time, shower time, visiting time, and other privileges as the criminal detainees. Sometimes the non-sex offenders would bully the sex offenders to use the phone and showers and control the TV. Deputies knew that the non-sex offenders pushed the sex offenders around and controlled the phone, showers, and TV which limited Plaintiff's privileges. Some of the non-sex offenders would beat up the sex offenders. Plaintiff got into an altercation with two other inmates. It was a shoving match and the deputies came in and stopped it. This was all because other prisoners knew Plaintiff was an SVP, because Plaintiff was fronted off [sic] by the deputies in front of some of them. From then on Plaintiff was in real fear and had to watch his back closely. Plaintiff was housed in PC from his arrival date of July 24, 2018, until he was transported to Coalinga State Hospital for treatment, and afterward when he returned to the Jail for trial.
Housing Plaintiff with criminal detainees violated state penal code §§4001 and 4002 because civil detainees are to be kept separately from other classes of inmates. Therefore, the Jail's policy in housing SVP civil detainees was in violation of statutory law. Deputies would tell the white shot caller [sic] of his housing unit who the sex offenders were, so the inmates could harass them and take their property more than from the other inmates in the unit. It was clear that the deputies' practice was to treat Plaintiff and other SVP inmates worse than other
///inmates. So, by the practices of the deputies on all shifts, Plaintiff's conditions housed with criminal detainees were worse than theirs were.
Every time Plaintiff went to court the transportation officers treated him badly. They would front him off [sic] to other inmates as being a child molester, a sexually violent predator, rapist, and a piece of sh**. By doing this they knew that Plaintiff would be yelled at on the bus and called names by other inmates on the bus. This was a common practice.
According to Cal. Penal Code §4001, the jail is supposed to have a housing unit for each class of inmates. Under Cal. Penal Code §4002, the jail can house Sexually Violent Predators in an administrative segregation setting as long as they do not lose any privileges, according to the Jones2 standard. Plaintiff received no additional privileges, or more considerate conditions than the criminal detainees. This is in violation of the Jones standard.
All of the policies [at the Jail] for the treatment and conditions of SVP civil detainees are drafted to make their treatment and conditions equal to those of criminal detainees. Therefore, the top policy maker, Sheriff Margret [sic] Mimms, can be found liable. Sheriff Mimms is responsible for implementing policies that do not cause SVP civil detainees' rights to be violated. This is a mandatory duty pursuant to Cal. Code Regs title 15 §1050-1080. Because the conditions are in violation of rights according to Jones and King3, and these conditions are practiced according to policy, Sheriff Mimms is liable for deficient policies.
Fresno County and the Sheriff have been sued by other SVP civil detainees in previous years according to a court search on conditions of confinement under Jones, so the county and sheriff are aware of the Jones standards, but they have not taken appropriate measures to follow them. All of the policies about treatment or conditions of confinement are followed by the deputies working at the jail, so for three months Plaintiff suffered under the policies of the Sheriff's Department. Policies alleged to be deficient are, and not...
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