Hall v. Cox

• Decision Date: 16 February 1971
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 70-C-65-D.
• Parties: William E. HALL, Petitioner, v. James D. COX, Superintendent, Virginia State Penitentiary, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

324 F. Supp. 786

William E. HALL, Petitioner, v. James D. COX, Superintendent, Virginia State Penitentiary, Respondent.

Civ. A. No. 70-C-65-D.

United States District Court, W. D. Virginia, Danville Division.

February 16, 1971.

Overton P. Pollard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Richmond, Va., for respondent.

OPINION and JUDGMENT

DALTON, Chief Judge.

This case arises on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus which has been filed in forma pauperis and transferred to this district by order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

Hall alleges that two convictions of breaking and entering and grand larceny were obtained by unconstitutional means. At the trial of these offenses the petitioner was represented by two court-appointed attorneys. He pled not guilty to both charges and was tried by a jury, which imposed consecutive sentences of two and three years on the convictions. After the sentences were announced the petitioner indicated a desire to appeal and the court appointed one of the two attorneys to prepare a petition for a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. This was done but a writ of error was denied.

The petitioner raises two issues in this action. First, he contends that he was unfairly prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to furnish him civilian clothes in the stead of his prison uniform. Second, on the morning of the trial the court refused to grant a continuance so that the defendant could obtain a witness who was an alleged accomplice in the crimes. Both of these points were raised in the trial court and on direct appeal. Therefore, the court concludes that the petitioner has exhausted his state remedies as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Although Hall had been brought back from the penitentiary to the local jail several days before trial, the record indicates that he did not make known his desire for civilian clothes until the beginning of the trial. He did not advise his attorneys of his desire and although he apparently had some relatives in the area, he did not attempt to obtain clothing from them. Hall told the trial judge that he was a pauper and asked that the court furnish him with civilian clothing for the trial. The court responded that it would permit the defendant to wear civilian clothes furnished him by an outside party but that it would not require the Commonwealth to supply the clothing to him.

The court does not believe that this bare allegation is sufficient to entitle the petitioner to relief. The fact that the defendant was dressed in a prison uniform was not so prejudicial as to deprive him of due process of law. See May v. Peyton, 268 F.Supp. 928 (W.D.Va.1967), rev'd on other grounds, 398 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1968); Yates v. Peyton, 207 Va. 91, 147 S.E.2d 767 (1966). In fact there is no objective fact which indicates that the jury was prejudiced by the sight of the prison clothing. The court's conclusion is not changed by the fact that Hall could have purchased civilian clothing for himself if he had possessed the money. If Hall were denied the right to wear civilian clothing solely because of his poverty, it was not that kind of denial of a fundamental right which the Commonwealth was obligated to redress. See generally Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956). There must be a dividing line at some point on this problem and in the absence of any showing of prejudice, the denial of civilian clothing did not deprive the petitioner of due process. Furthermore, it seems that Hall would have contacted his attorneys or his family before trial about this problem if it had actually been that important to him.

Next to be considered is the petitioner's contention that the court should have granted a continuance to allow him to obtain a material witness, one Alton Moran. Counsel for Hall represented that this witness would contradict one of the primary prosecution witnesses. At the trial one Sowers testified that he was riding around with Hall and Moran on the night of the crime and that Hall, who was driving, parked the car across the street from Mick's Barbeque, which was the store where the breaking and entering and larceny occurred. Sowers testified that he remained in the car while the two others crossed the street, but he did not see where they we...