Hall v. Crocker

• Decision Date: 16 June 1951
• Citation: 28 Beeler 506,192 Tenn. 506,241 S.W.2d 548
• Parties: , 192 Tenn. 506 HALL et al. v. CROCKER.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 548

241 S.W.2d 548

28 Beeler 506, 192 Tenn. 506

HALL et al. v. CROCKER.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

June 16, 1951.

Rehearing Denied July 27, 1951.

A. Bradley Frazier, Camden, for appellants.

Peeler & Hollis, Camden, for appellee.

BURNETT, Justice.

This is a suit to construe a deed and have the rights of the complainants declared therein. The bill was demurred to for want of equity on its face; because under the provisions of the deed these provisions are repugnant to a fee simple estate and are ineffective, invalid and void; because under the provisions of the deed in question they are in restraint of and a restriction on alienation of the land conveyed; because under the terms of the deed they are so uncertain as to render it ineffective, invalid and void and because the complainants have no right, title, claim or interest in the land described in the bill. The chancellor sustained the demurrer as a whole and the complainants have seasonably appealed to this Court and assigned errors.

The pertinent portions of the deed which is exhibited to the bill of complaint is: 'That I, W. L. Morris, have this day bargained and sold and do hereby transfer and convey to Mrs. Leehentz Bowles, her heirs and assigns forever, for the consideration of Love and Affection Dollars paid and secured to be paid as follows' (Then follows the description of the land conveyed. Immediately after the description of the land the following paragraph follows without any punctuation whatsoever.) 'It is hereby expressly agreed and understood that should the said Leehentz Bowles desire to sell this land or should she die then the said W. L. Morris or his legal representatives shall have the exclusive right to buy the same at the actual cost of improvements on said land should he so desire.'

'To have and to hold to the said Leehentz Bowles her heirs and assigns forever.'

Then follows the usual covenants of seizen. The deed was signed and acknowledged and recorded on the same day that it bears date.

The bill alleges that Mrs. Bowles has very recently died and that the complainants are the heirs at law of W. L. Morris and that they have a right to purchase this property at the 'actual cost of improvements' as provided in the terms of the deed above quoted. They allege that the have made investigation and find that the 'actual cost of improvements' is $1100.00 and that it is to their advantage to pay this for the land. They pray for a receiver and accounting since the death of Mrs. Bowles and the they be allowed the rents, etc., since that time upon their payment of the amount of the 'actual costs of the improvements' on the property.

We in this State disregard the technical rules of common law as to formal parts of a deed and examine the deed in all its parts to ascertain the grantor's intention, so that the estate conveyed may be enlarged or lessened in the habendum clause. McCord v. Ransom, 185 Tenn. 677, 207 S.W.2d 581. This case is the last expression on the questions raised by the demurrer. The case distinguishes a number of the other cases cited by the appellees in support of their various grounds of demurrer.

The deed here in question is a general warranty deed and an effective conveyance of the property in question unless the clause quoted immediately before the habendum clause is violative of the rule against perpetuities. The clause is merely an option to re-purchase retained by the grantor in this deed. This option is a right of election in the grantor to exercise a privilege, and only when that privilege has been exercised by acceptance in the manner specified in the option does it become an absolute contract, binding upon both parties. It is simply a contract by which the grantor retains in himself the right to buy this property at a fixed price within a certain time. Such an option may be taken unless it violates the rule against perpetuities. Does the provision in question violate the rule against perpetuities? We think it does not. Such an option must be fulfilled within the period of lives in being and 21 years and the period of gestation. If the option may extend beyond such a time it is void, but if it must take effect at all events within a life or lives in being and 21 years and the period of gestation, it is valid. Armstrong v. Douglass, 89 Tenn. 219, 14 S.W. 604, 10 L.R.A. 85.

For a rather complete academic discussion of the subject see Restatement of the Law, Property, Sections...