Hall v. Department of Adoptions

• Decision Date: 02 May 1975
• Citation: 121 Cal.Rptr. 223,47 Cal.App.3d 898
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Joan M. HALL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF ADOPTIONS, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 44194.

Page 223

121 Cal.Rptr. 223

47 Cal.App.3d 898

Joan M. HALL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF ADOPTIONS, Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 44194.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

May 2, 1975.

John H. Larson, County Counsel, and Louis V. Aguilar, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for defendant and appellant.

MacCabe & Donaldson and Steven D. Fienberg, Torrance, for plaintiff and respondent.

BEACH, Associate Justice.

NATURE OF CASE:

Plaintiff, Joan Hall (respondent), signed a form relinquishing the custody of her child to the defendant, County of Los Angeles (appellant), for the purpose of allowing the child to be placed for adoption. She later brought action to set aside her relinquishment. From a judgment in favor of respondent setting aside the relinquishment, the county appeals.

APPELLANT'S CONTENTIONS:

Appellant contends:

1. The trial court erred in overruling appellant's motion for judgment on the pleadings in that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action against appellant, and (b) the court failed to require joinder of plaintiff's husband as an indispensable party.

2. The judgment is not supported by substantial evidence.

3. The court failed to make appropriate findings and refused to make specific findings which were requested.

We agree with appellant and we reverse the judgment.

DISCUSSION:

1. The court erred in denying the appellant's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

(a) Failure to state a cause of action.

The complaint as originally filed alleged, basically, that appellant was unaware of the consequences of her act of relinquishment because of emotional distress which resulted from abuse by Her husband; and that she was induced to sign because of duress of Her husband.

There are no allegations in said complaint charging the appellant with having engaged in any wrongful conduct towards respondent and/or with having participated in any wrongful conduct and/or with having any knowledge that any wrongful conduct had been directed towards respondent to induce her to sign said relinquishment. After filing with the Department of Health, a relinquishment is final and binding and may be rescinded only by the mutual consent of the adoption agency and the parent or parents relinquishing the child. (Civ.Code, § 224m.)

The Legislature has made detailed and specific provisions for the adoption of minors. The legislative purpose behind this provision is best served and the interests of the child are afforded the greatest recognition by giving continued effect to relinquishments and consents to adoption. (Adoption of Graham, 58 Cal.2d 899, 907, 27 Cal.Rptr. 163, 377 P.2d 275.)

Relinquishments, once executed, must be relied upon in order to insure that children will not be forced out of one home and into another at the whims and caprice of emotionally upset and perhaps ill-advised persons. The state has expressed a strong policy in the necessity for giving effect to relinquishments, for to do otherwise would 'open the door to practices which could conceivably discourage adopting parents from opening their hearts and homes to unwanted children . . .' (Adoption of Lawes, 201 Cal.App.2d 494, 498, 20 Cal.Rptr. 64, 66.)

The complaint charges husband and Not appellant, County of Los Angeles, with the wrongful conduct.

The pleadings are of generalities at best (if not merely conclusions). Respondent does not clearly and unequivocally allege that she was forced to sign by any threat of her husband. She did not allege that her husband threatened anything at all if she did not sign. She merely set forth reasons for her own desire to have the child adopted and to sign the relinquishment. What is not present and seems to be carefully avoided in the pleadings in any allegation that the husband harmed or abused her or threatened to do so if she did not consent. Assuming for the moment that such fact was reasonably inferable, there was still no allegation that the appellant, County of Los Angeles, was in any way connected with, connived with, or knew of the husband's conduct.

Even under rules permitting rescission of ordinary contracts, respondent's original complaint was insufficient in stating any cause of action against appellant.

Duress or fraud of a third party "renders a transaction voidable by a party induced thereby to enter into it if the other party . . . has reason to know of the fraud . . . (or duress) before he has given or promised in good faith something of value in the transaction or changed his position materially by reason of the transaction . . .." (Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal.2d 195, 206, 1 Cal.Rptr. 12, 20, 347 P.2d 12, 20; see also Harper v. Murray, 184 Cal. 290, 193 P. 576; Carroll v. Carroll, 16 Cal.2d 761, 108 P.2d 420; Civ.Code § 1689.)

After appellant's motion for judgment on the pleadings but prior to ruling thereon, the court permitted respondent orally to amend her pleading by adding thereto the following allegation:

'7. Plaintiff was induced to sign said release by the fraud and duress of the department and its agents and employees, including Susan Bronn, who at all times acted within the scope and authority of her employer, the Department of Adoptions.'

To allow the amendment was error and even with the additional paragraph the pleading was still insufficient.

It was error in that the pleading was without notice to the appellant as required by section 473, Code of Civil Procedure, which provides in part that the court may 'in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon such terms as may be just, an amendment to the pleading . . .'

The amendment was more than mere correction of an obvious mistake, which may be corrected without notice. It was done without notice to appellant and without opportunity to allow reflection and considered response. The amendment occurred at the commencement of trial. More importantly, the pleading was still insufficient. The pleading here concerned a matter of significantly greater importance than, for example, the recovery of an amount of money under a contract. It concerned the conduct of the appellant in its role of carrying out its awesome responsibility to act as a temporary parent for the minor. The pleading charged appellant in general and unspecified terms with 'fraud and duress.'

The general rule with respect to the pleading of a cause of action in fraud and duress is stated in 3 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2nd ed.), section 574:

'(F)raud must be specifically pleaded. The effect of this rule is twofold: (a) General pleading of the legal conclusion of 'fraud' is insufficient; the facts constituting the fraud must be alleged. (b) Every element of the cause of action for fraud must be alleged in the proper manner (i.e., factually and specifically) and the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings will not ordinarily be invoked to sustain a pleading defective in any material respect. (Citation.)'

When the serious accusation of fraud is made, it should state specific facts of how and where it occurred. It is bad for courts to allow and lawyers to use vague but artful pleading of fraud simply to get a foot in the courtroom door. It is no answer to say 'it will all be resolved at trial' and 'the testimony and evidence will tell us what the fraud is.'

Respondent asserts that the authorities (citing and quoting 3 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2nd ed.), § 575) indicate that too much attention is given such rule of specific pleading in fraud cases. We will not attempt here to determine the accuracy of such assertion or the wisdom of laying down a flat rule requiring very detailed pleadings in all cases wherein fraud is alleged. We hold that in the type of circumstances at bench, very definite allegations should be clearly set forth. As this case illustrates, the rule is salutary for if respondent could plead to more than she proved (giving respondent the benefit of all reasonable inferences) and accepting her testimony, the court could have and should have resolved the matter against respondent at the pleading stage. Plaintiff did not prove any case of fraud or duress as we shall discuss below.

The proof at trial did not cure the defects in the pleading. Great care and hesitation should be used in permitting the involuntary removal of a child from the custody, care and control of its parents. In such a case, all uncertainties should be resolved and inferences drawn in favor of the parents keeping the child. That is not the situation here.

In summary, the evidence at trial showed (according to respondent's testimony) that respondent took the child to the adoption agency with the original sole intent of having the child placed in a foster home for a short period of time. However, she did not communicate that express reason or limitation to the adoption agency or anyone else at any time. Respondent's undisclosed intention is insufficient to show fraud or duress. In the matter at bench, respondent herself initiated the entire proceedings. Respondent felt herself unable to care for the child; felt that she would possibly kill the child; telephoned and said 'somebody better take this kid;' voluntarily went to the adoption agency and took her child there. Respondent voluntarily signed the relinquishment. The consequences were carefully explained to her. No one told her she had to sign; no one told her that a lawsuit would be brought if she did not sign; no one misrepresented any fact whatsoever to her; no one threatened any bad consequences if she did not sign; no one said or implied that it was wrongful for her not to sign.

If a basic factual and honest summary of the foregoing circumstances had been pleaded rather than a bare conclusion that the appellant had committed fraud, the trial court should have been able to see that there was no cause of action stated. There hopefully would have been prompt resolution of the case.

(b) The nonjoinder of the natural fa...